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SUMMARY
%  chief contention is that the evaluative aspect of the concept 
of creativity has been underplayed. If we bear this in mind, we 
shall have to look more closely at certain facets of concepts which 
are inter-related to that of creativity.
This is so because first, though we may speak of a creative arti­
fact or idea, we can only do so by seeing either as an exemplification 
of intentional activity. Secondly, whenever someone is thought to be 
creative, what he has done is seen in some way as original, and thirdly 
as good. All these ideas are implicit in every example of the usage 
of ’creative1, but precisely what we are committed to when we employ 
the concept, is rarely made explicit.
To make these points explicit, it is necessary to clarify the 
concepts of thinking and intelligence since intentional behaviour will 
only be understood by presupposing these to some degree. Moreover, if 
one is to act with originality, then this will demand seeing connections 
unseen by others; and for this to be possible, a concept of intelli­
gence is necessary* Here, we ought to be aware that any means or ends 
adopted are dependent upon how an evaluator sees them. He must consider 
them as good in some way.
So, when we claim that someone is creative, we mean that because 
he has acted with originality, he is necessarily considered intelligent, 
and also that what he has done is considered valuable. That particular 
sense of value will be shown to be one which enriches understanding; 
this is the reason for the evaluation.
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INTRODUCTION
Many things have been said about the concept of creativity. In 
fact, when Rhodes^ began his investigations, he found no fewer than forty 
definitions of creativity. However, once he had examined these ,defini­
tions he discovered that they could all be fitted into a system of four 
strands. These strands were identified as pertaining to the person, 
process, ’press’ and products. By ’press' Rhodes means the kind of 
relationship which is thought to exist between people and their environment.
Now, this method is very useful in obtaining some synthesis of various 
views, and is suggestive of ideas for research. Nor example, we could 
begin to investigate whether there was a connection between I.Q,. scores 
and creativity, as Rhodes suggests.
Yet, for most pieces of research like this we already need some 
concept of creativity in order to proceed. Presumably, then, some 
implicit concept exists which can gradually be made explicit when 
certain connections with the concept are suggested. This was probably 
the position with a concept like Morality, where writers such as Plato, 
Butler and Hume had said various things which did not tally with the 
implicit concept.
Of course, not all concepts are like this. It is not likely that 
an implicit concept of Relativity existed before Einstein began his work.
On the other hand, there is a strong possibility that an implicit concept 
of creativity has existed, since there is considerable agreement about
2some people being placed under this category. In fact, in Ghiselin's
1. See Rhodes, M,, ’An Analysis of Creativity’, Phi Delta Kappan,
Vol. 42, 1961, pp. 305-310.
2. Ghiselin, B., The Creative Process, The New American Library, N.Y. ,1952.
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collection of autobiographical sketches, the names of accepted creative 
people would probably be mostly the same as in other lists.
It was with this possibility of an existing implicit concept that I 
began, in the hope of searching out central points about the concept.
What, for example, could be noticed was that whenever a concept of 
creativity had been employed the follov/ing major idia-as were discernible. 
First, some idea of originality was presupposed. Secondly, the concept 
always had reference to an idea of evaluation.
Specifically, the evaluation has always been directed at intentional 
activity, and never simply at products, however magnificent these have 
been. Because of this point, one vital concept to consider is that of 
thinking, since how is intentional activity to be otherwise understood? 
Moreover, if we are to account for a person’s acting with originality, 
then we presuppose that he sees connections between ideas, and sees them 
more quickly than other people. In considering these points, it will 
be understood that the real search for a clarification of the concept of 
creativity will not necessarily lie in what has been said of the subject 
of creativity.
To argue for the coherence of my view I shall attend first to some 
leading ideas centred on the subject in order to point to an elucidation 
of the concept. Thus, in the consideration of the concept of creativity, 
I shall be directing attention very much towards the concepts of thinking 
and intelligence. Clearly, if the stress is placed upon what has 
frequently been called ’creativity’ it would be difficult to clarify the 
concept. For example, by picking out particular points about the 
relationship between ’creativity’ and ’intelligence’ as pursued by some
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writers, would be beside the point simply because the intelligence1 
usually spoken of is an I. Q,.-oriented concept. Such a way of looking 
at it is, as I shall show, mistaken. To make the whole idea of my 
view quite definite, the area of investigation is the concept and not 
necessarily the subject of creativity.
What I shall attempt to argue in this thesis is that the concept 
of creativity functions as an evaluation of intelligent, original activity.
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CHAPTER 1
A consideration of ideas associated with the concept of
Creativity
Introduction
To claim that to he creative is necessarily also to he intelligent 
may not seem too outlandish, although of course if one glances
•j
through Ghiselinfs collection of autobiographical sketches, it may 
certainly seem so. However, some of the works on Creativity in the 
past few decades have, at least hy implication, heen moving in the 
direction of linking the concepts of creativity and intelligence, 
especially Guilford* s works. Yet, what is usually lacking is a 
clear arguing of the interconnection of these concepts.
Further, to claim that the concept of creativity necessarily
functions as an evaluation sounds quite reasonable, although in which
way it is evaluative remains vague even in a writer whose main
pconcern is to argue about it as an evaluation.
These two claims will be shown to be fundamental when we look 
at what is presupposed in the concept, yet it appears to be very 
difficult to reconcile both claims in the light of recent usage when, 
for example, it is said that children are creative and engage 
frequently in creative activity. The question then is whether more 
recent usage is stretched or whether although intelligence and evalua­
tion are necessary to the concept, something more is also required
1. Ghiselin, B., The Creative Process, The Hew American Library,
H.Y., 1952.
2. See Olford, J.E., fThe Concept of Creativity1 in Proceedings of 
the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. V Ho. 1, 
Jan. ffl, Blackwell, Oxford.
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which is more important, or finally whether the concept is polymorphous 
and, say like farming, can he applied very widely.
However, what can he noticed is that whether we are talking of 
children or of great inventors there always appears to he presupposed 
some concept of originality, however vague that is: and it may he
with this in mind that other criteria are underplayed. This, for 
example, has happened with other concepts, notahly with the concept of 
punishment where, for example, in some usages, the infliction of pain 
has heen the only concern. It is likely that some idea of originality, 
however necessary, has received a great deal of attention since the 
upsurge of interest in Creativity, instigated hy Guilford, and certainly 
this is evidenced in the pressing of the idea of divergency.
How, if we bear in mind recent usage in connection with children, 
and look at what must be meant in talking of a creative salesman, 
footballer or engineer, or at the third area of usage where certain 
people like Shakespeare, Poincard and Mozart are spoken of as creative, 
in every instance they have heen thought of as offering something 
original. Where a doubt exists about the ascribing of originality, 
a doubt also exists about the awarding of 'creative1. Secondly, in 
all examples of usage, the users mean to give praise, unless sarcasm 
is intended but then this is parasitic upon the primary meaning.
What the children do is seen as good; what the footballer does is 
what is worth observing; what Shakespeare has done is praiseworthy. 
Thirdly, in so far as anyone in any sphere acts originally in a way 
that is worthy of praise he must be bright, quick, intelligent, since 
no one else has acted precisely in this way before.
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While these ideas will have to be worked out in detail,
conceptually they have a ring of truth, yet in so much of the discus­
sion, writers have not really arrived at this point. The reason why 
this is so is that writers have not so much turned their attention to 
what is necessary to the concept and to what is sufficient, but to
various associated ideas centred on the concept. They have, for
example, assumed some kind of meaning which has not been examined, 
and investigated how it arose or which kinds of empirical conditions 
were helpful in promoting it or whether some outstanding product was 
associated with it.
While it may be wondered how such ideas can be generated without 
a clear meaning given to the concept, they can in fact be helpful in 
enabling us to become clearer about the concept, which I shall show 
presently.
Lack of precision about a concept and yet pursuing ideas generally 
connected with it is not new for it has many parallels. For example, 
in Morality there are certain concepts like courage and kindness which 
may or may not be crucial to Morality. Now, instead of examining a 
concept of intention without which Morality has no meaning, we can 
light upon courage or kindness and wonder whether either is innate or 
developed in one's early years or correlates with a certain level of I.Q. 
This wondering and this investigation, however well done, is not 
sufficiently crucial to the analysis of the concept but it may give 
some clues. Just as likely to come up for investigation is intention 
and when empirically tested stands up very well, and so much so that 
an opportunity is afforded to see whether we could even conceive of 
a moral act without imputing intention to the actor.
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This and similar forms of assistance can be offered by investi­
gators of ideas associated with the concept of Creativity. There 
seem to be seven leading associa/tive ideas which may be gathered from 
the literature on Creativity. They may not exhaust the supply but 
they are certainly sufficient for the purposes of directing attention 
to the crucial points about the concept of creativity.
I would like to look at six of these associative ideas in this 
chapter.
Being creative and being gifted
The first idea is that creativity is a gift. Actually in 
employing the concept there must be some implicit meaning attributed to 
it but this tends to be overlooked and therefore never made explicit.
At the lowest level no conceptual investigation is offered at 
all, and this can be illustrated in the notion of a poet being bom, 
not made. Even in Be Bono!s comparatively advanced work in which he 
offers an account of lateral thinking, he sidesteps a direct analysis 
of creativity by saying that like humour and insight it is something 
to be prayed for.'*'
At this level there is a note of passivity, and while this only 
looks to be covering an assumed origin of creativity, it colours the 
functioning of the concept to the extent that investigation appears 
superfluous. Thus, in answer to the question of what creativity is, 
the only reply is a gift.
1. Be Bono, E., Lateral Thinking - a text book of Creativity,
Ward Lock Educational Ltd., 19?0> P« 9*
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What we have then is a theory of explanation which operates 
either mystically which links with other beliefs about our lot in 
life, or in terms of a model as in that of the four basic humours 
which gives an account of why we are what we are.
The implication of any such theory of explanation is that there is 
nothing that can be done. All is given and there’s the end of it. 
’Innate mental capacity' as an account of intelligence is in the same 
category.
At a higher level, some investigations into the implications of 
creativity have been made where the notion of a gift has been offered 
both as an aspect of Creativity and as a final explanation when other 
implications of being creative appear to be present and yet nothing 
ensues. For example, Wallas has suggested that creative people have 
gone through four stages, namely those of preparation, incubation, 
illumination and verification. These I take to be implications of 
being creative since he has already accepted what creativity means 
implicitly and has tried to show that if anyone is creative, then, for 
example, he must have been prepared in the field of operation. 
'Illumination* functions in the stages as a gift where, however much 
we may deliberately put aside our efforts at thinking, we are depen­
dent upon something happening within us, where indeed we are passive.
A very difficult point, of course, is that Wallas is committed 
to two views which cannot be reconciled. First, while thought is 
a natural process,"** Wallas is insistent that what is necessary for an
1. Wallas, G., The Art of Thought, Watts & Co., 1949 > P» 51 •
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art of thought is that a thinker should make a conscious and voluntary 
1
effort to control the processes, whereas secondly, for creative
2thought we are dependent upon illumination which by his own examples 
cannot be controlled.
In pointing to the idea of being gifted we do not really enlighten 
understanding of the concept of creativity because we do not separate 
out what is necessary to that concept as opposed to any other mentalis- 
tic concept. We could say that to think, to act intelligently, to 
remember are all matters of being gifted.
Of course, at the root of any mentalistic concept is that it is 
employed of people, and because of this, something is given in the sense 
of having potentialities. This emphasises that they are not, for 
example, stones or trees. Again, this is why the views of Chomsky 
and McNeill concerning a potentiality for language acquisition are 
acceptable. Thus, some idea of potentiality in terms of a given is 
presupposed in any mentalistic concept.
If this can be seen as an implicit contribution of Wallas, it is 
helpful. Negatively, though, in so far as any one presses for a 
gifted idea to account for creativity he affords us an opportunity 
of showing how such a view cannot be accepted. In the three areas of 
the usage of creativity, we make a distinction between what people do 
well and do badly. With a child in class if it is said that he is 
creative, at least we can observe that for example he uses material
1. Wallas, G*, op. ext., p. 51*
2. Wallas, G., op. cit., pp. 28-29.
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and seems to take things into accounts and the same is true of the 
creative footballer or Shakespeare.
Certainly then all have done well, but I do not know that any of 
these in fact had more gifts than others. If I say that they must 
have had, I am only basing this upon an assumption. At one point we 
may talk of a gifted pianist but if he stops practising and develops 
a dislike for playing, do we attribute his deterioration to other 
gifts? Rather, when we are pressed, we talk of making use of one’s 
gifts: and, moreover, we do not even know of these gifts until
someone has made some effort.
This presupposes a concept of freedom. Certainly, then, if 
’gifted' is used to cover up the possibility of freedom, it has to be 
applied throughout the field of human activity which makes nonsense 
of any form of praising or condemning. Clearly there would be no 
place for morality and none for creativity as evaluative of human 
effort.
Since moreover the epithets employed in morality carry with them 
an evaluation of human effort, this presupposes freedom. Now in 
the moral sphere we also accept certain pre-conditions just as we do 
in considering any mentalistic term, but essentially we are singling 
out the idea that in praising a person for doing one thing, there is 
a possibility that he need not do it. If in morality, why not in 
creativity? The individual has done one thing but equally he need 
not have done.
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The plain idea of gift as an idea of utter passivity is therefore
unacceptable in picking out what is necessary to the concept of
creativity as distinct from other concepts. What is possible,
however, is that 1 gifted1 in one meaning unites the ideas of the given
1
and the effort. For example, Getzels and Jackson write that for so 
long the notion of ’gifted1 has been synonymous with high I.Q,., and 
according to them, this is an incorrect notion. They see ’gifted’ as 
a laudatory term and wish to apply it more widely so that it can cover 
moral, social and other outstanding qualities. The difficulty I see, 
though, is that the stress is on passivity, simply by employing a 
term which conjures up gifts.
A consideration of products
The second idea is associated with a product. Although clearly 
when people use the term 'creative1, a notion of a product is 
generally conjured up, what is essential is to see whether 'product' 
anyhow is unambiguous and then to see whether in any meaning it is 
necessary to the concept of creativity.
From the start, it is interesting to note that the O.E.L. 
distinguishes between a product and a production, stating that product 
is a thing produced by natural process or manufacture, in its first 
meaning; and it is not until production is mentioned that there is 
any reference to human activity.
If then ’production’ is used of a musical composition or an 
artistic or literary work, and 'product' is used of a car, insofar as
1. Getzels, J.W. & Jackson, P.W., Creativity and Intelligence,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., London & U.W., 1962, p. 2.
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all are primarily dependent upon human activity, the difference which 
is pointed to is one of final manifestation. So, 'production1 used 
of painting or of literary work would refer to the painting actually 
done by the artist or to the actual manuscript of the author.
'Product' in each case would then refer to a final manifestation as 
a result of reproducing the originals.
Thus 'product' itself is ambiguous since it could refer to what 
was originally offered by human activity or it could refer to what has 
come about through the various forces in Nature, like stalagmites or 
cloud formations. While, further it can refer to what was originally 
offered by humans, in their final state there is a separateness about 
products which tends to make us think of them as in the same category 
as things, brought about in any way.
Now, when the concept of creativity is invoked, it always has 
reference to what is brought about by 'intelligent' beings. What 
may be noticed, however, is that we sometimes refer to a creative 
painting or to a creative poem, as if 'creative1 were actually being 
used as giving some account of things. This is not so, for we do 
not use 'creative* of trees or rock formation or coal fields. It is 
only used where what has been produced is considered as produced by 
'intelligent' beings. For this reason, when applied to poems or 
paintings, it is so applied as a transferred epithet, just as we use 
'thoughtful' of a poem or other artifact.
The ambiguity within the idea of a product has to be guarded 
against since there is a tendency to lose sight of all that makes 
any so-called product possible.
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Actually, a gradual losing sight of the person can be seen in 
Brogden and Sprecher who, in attempting to establish criteria of 
creativity, press a great deal for what they call scientific creativity. 
At one point they say, "Almost all workers agree that one important 
characteristic of the creative scientist is the originality of his 
product; most would add that the value of the product, variously 
conceived, is also important".'*'
In looking at this statement, an analogy with morality and 
intelligence will help to pinpoint an essential of the concept of 
creativity. When we assess people we have to look at what they do.
It is not possible to say that someone is moral unless he generally 
performs moral acts or is intelligent unless he performs intelligent 
acts: but these acts are not seen in isolation from the performers,
since once they are looked at in isolation they are no longer moral or 
intelligent. The point can be illustrated in this way. Suppose the 
moral act is the giving of water to a thirsty man. Now, such a 
thirsty man may simply light upon a spring from which he gains 
refreshment. Quenching thirst is the result or the product; but 
while this cannot be divorced from the moral act, by itself is 
nothing moral. Again, suppose the intelligent act is to pass a ball 
to a player who has an excellent chance of scoring from the position 
he has taken up; yet what could happen is that, because of a mistake 
on the part of an opposing player, the ball could glide into the path 
of the potential scorer. The result would be identical but such a
1. Brogden, H.E. & Sprecher, T.B., ’Criteria of Creativity’ in 
Taylor, C.W. (ed.), Creativity, Progress and Potential,
McGraw-Hill Inc., U.S.A., 1964, p. 156.
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result or product would be no part of an intelligent act.
The product in either case is pleasant and useful but unless seen
as necessarily linked with a certain kind of intention, cannot be moral
or intelligent. It remains merely pleasant and useful. In the same .
way, unless the product is necessarily linked to the person, it cannot 
be considered minimally as creative, however useful and pleasant it 
may be.
It is precisely because of a lack of clarity about the kind of 
evaluation that the concept of creativity implies that these same 
writers can shortly afterwards go on to claim that, "Process measures 
are one step further removed from the ultimate criterion of creativity, 
which is, presumably, bound up with products"."*’
Nor are these writers alone in perpetuating an error. Worried 
by the elusive nature of creativity, Ghiselin holds that to overcome 
the indeterminateness of the concept, we must establish ultimate 
criteria on rational grounds, and the first requirement is an acceptable
p
definition of creativity. This, though, is how he suggests it should 
be obtained: "through analysis of creative products in their intrinsic
nature".^ Such a view immediately disturbs him because any defini­
tion offered in these terms begs the question since as yet no 
criterion has been offered for judging what is creative among products.
He then continues by offering the suggestion that "what really is 
required is an examination of products, in an effort to discover some
1. Brogden, H.E. & Sprecher, T.B., op. cit., p. 163.
2. Ghiselin, B., 'Ultimate criteria for two levels of Creativity* in 
Taylor, C.W. & Barron, P., Scientific Creativity: its recognition 
and development, John Wiley & Sons Inc., N.Y. 1964, P* 31*
3. ibid., p. 31.
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grounds on which we can assign or deny to them the epithet Creative1
in a fully intelligible and defensible way11.^  Immediately, though,
as if coming to grips with the evaluative aspect of the concept of
creativity, he narrows products to “things physical or spiritual
2
that have been brought into being by human agency”.
It is possibly because of the ambiguity with product that Ghiselin 
at one point separates it from its maker and at another sees them as 
necessarily one. There is a further point which can be mentioned 
here, one which highlights Ghiselin’s difficulty. If we are offered 
a writing to evaluate, it is presupposed that it is the work of 
humans: but the same is true of paintings. Now, if we are impressed
by the originality, we may say that the writing and the painting are 
creative, meaning that we impute to the maker some original activity. 
Yet, if then we are told that a monkey did the painting, do we still 
say it is creative?
To answer this immediately, we should withdraw the award just as 
we should with moral simply because whs/fc was presupposed to the award 
has now been shown to be inapplicable. If then the questioner claims
that this painting is as good as the others done by humans, and if
these are creative, why isn’t the other, we may not deny his point 
(although if this genuinely happens, it may give us concern about Art). 
The reason is that we are not making an award for a product, any more 
than we are in morality. There again, to overcome anxiety about Art, 
there is always a possibility that the ’right’ thing could be done
1. Ghiselin, B., op. cit. p. 31.
2. Ghiselin, B., op. cit. p. 31
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accidentally, and this applies logically to any field.
What this example shows is that the offering of something 
original is implicitly accepted as a criterion of the concept of 
creativity, hut what it means to act originally is not worked through 
sufficiently. Extemalisation, generally thought of as a product, 
seems necessary for us to say that someone was creative or indeed for 
us to learn how the concept functions. In other words, it gives us 
evidence for saying that someone is creative.
Attitudes and the concent of Creativity
A third idea suggests that creativity is a matter of having 
a special kind of attitude. This suggestion is one that comes from 
Erich Fromm. When he asks what creativity is, he says: "The best
answer I can give is that creativity is the ability to see (or to be 
aware) and to respond. This seeing is obviously not superficial 
because he claims that sometimes a person who says that he sees a rose, 
may be emphasising the act of cognition and verbalisation rather than 
the seeing. Now this seeing depends upon five conditions, which are 
worth looking at if only to become clearer about this seeing. The 
conditions are: l) capacity to be puzzled, 2) ability to concentrate -
to live in the here and now, 3) acknowledgement of a real sense of 'I1,
4) ability to accept conflict and tension resulting from polarity,
\ 2 rather than to avoid them, 5) willingness to be bom every day.
1. Fromm, E., fThe Creative Attitude1 in Anderson, H., Creativity and 
its Cultivation, Harper & Row, Ef.Y., 1959> P* 44*
2. ibid.
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An immediate response would be to wonder whether these conditions 
are fairly vague ways of saying that one should act intelligently.
If they are, then instead of being conditions of seeing, they would be 
what constituted the act of seeing. Yet, even if one sees in this 
way, wondering, concentrating, pushing oneself to face conflict and 
looking freshly at things, does it mean that one is creative? The 
whole point of seeing and its connection with responding is that 
something is there. Now if we see anew and respond anew there is 
a possibility that we could be creative, but there is nothing in this 
1 seeing1 in itself which would enable anyone to say of such a see-er 
that he is creative. Even if it could be shown that all those ever 
called creative saw in Fromm's way, this would prove little, since it 
is possible that hosts of others who also saw in that way were not 
called creative.
Because, anyhow, the concept of creativity is a mentalistic 
concept, then having some kind of attitude will be part of what ’to be 
creative1 means; but what kind of attitude needs to be investigated, 
and whether such an attitude is sufficient also needs investigation.
Is the concept of Creativity to be seen as a process?
A fourth idea is to see creativity as a process. There is of 
course a sense in which process can be used which simply points to what 
is going on or is being carried on, where all is observable. Thus, 
for example, we could observe various processes in the making of a car 
or the various processes leading to a piece of sculpture.
This, though, is not the sense in which process is used when we
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speak of the concept of creativity. It is at least clear in this 
area that what is being singled out is not some partly or wholly 
finished work hut what goes to make someone creative. In fact, 
conceptually this kind of approach has much to recommend it, mainly 
because in picking out that someone is creative, I already need a 
concept of creativity before I can tell whether a certain person's 
offering is evidence enough for me to say that he is creative. An 
example will help to press the point. I can have a concept of 
strength without any reference to the particular evidence of strength. 
When, though, I am asked how I know that a particular person is strong, 
I point out his various abilities in lifting heavy weights. Now if 
then it is shown to me that, in fact, the man was engaged in trickery,
I no longer wish to claim that he is strong, but nonetheless my concept 
of strength remains untouched. Evidence for strength is something 
other than the concept of strength.
7/hat constitutes being creative is then crucial. However, 
processes mentioned have tended to be very vague. Two methods of 
looking at any such processes have been offered. One is by asking 
already accepted creative people how they viewed themselves prior to 
and in the act of being creative. This is the method employed by 
Ghiselin j_n j^ g collection of autobiographical sketches, but the 
difficulty with this is twofold. First, any particular processes may 
not be crucial, and, even if crucial may still be insufficient since 
it is quite possible that the processes listed may also be identical 
in others not thought of as creative. A parallel, drawn from morality 
would be this. If we collect together a number of people generally 
acknowledged to be moral, and then look at what they have said about
1. Ref. Ghiselin, B., The Creative Process.
themselves in reaching their moral stature, most of them may say that 
when they were young they had a great fear of breaking rules, or an 
inborn sympathy for other people or that they had great temptations to 
be selfish. What of course could happen is that if generally 
acknowledged immoral people were asked to account for their immorality, 
they would list identical points made by those who were moral. Again, 
as the second part of the twofold difficulty, because certain people 
are creative it will not follow that they are expert in telling us 
of their processes. vVhile it may be said that there is unanimity in 
the various accounts, this is explicable in terms of those people 
already having some implicit concept of creativity and attempting to 
fit their accounts to what they vaguely accept. In fact, they may 
even be trying to make explicit their implicit beliefs.
The second method of looking at processes is much more important,
and the exemplar here is Wallas. Now Wallas, at first sight, may
look as if he is only offering a factual account of the processes
involved in creativity, when for example he says that all these creative
people have gone through a stage of preparation. Yet, there is arguing
for the positions which he adopts. For example, he opens out the
process of preparation into 1 an elaborate art of education1'* under which
2
come Logic and Mathematics and the observational sciences. In fact, 
the kind of question which he faces is whether it is possible to engage 
in some kind of original activity, say in Science or Literature, without 
to some extent being prepared.
It is this point which is missed by John White when he says:
1. Wallas, G., The Art of Thought, Yfatts & Co., London 1949 j P- 54*
2. Wallas, G., ibid. pp. 53—54-
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11'Creative1 is a medal which we pin on public products, not the name
of private processes.”'*' Of course, it is true that we do not know
2which processes Shakespeare underwent,: and certainly White is factually 
correct here, but the kind of move which is being made by Wallas is 
suggestive of what is essential to someone's being creative. This is 
not an empirical question.
So the argument which is at the base of investigating processes 
under this method is one which claims that while products are 
necessary for us to be able to award 'creative' to someone, the 
possibility of the award rests upon our having some concept of 
creativity. The product, then, is merely evidence for our awarding 
'creative*. So the question is concerned with whether the concept of 
creativity necessarily includes the idea of certain kinds of processes.
This point is strong because although I do not know specifically 
about the processes which people employed for coming to an understanding 
of basic Mathematics, what I do know about any such understanding is 
that it is logically bound.
Thus, the concept of creativity, because it is evaluative of 
what people have done may indicate that creative people have indeed 
thought differently from others. They could not, for example, have 
thought illogically, for then what they offered would not have been 
comprehensible to others who say that they are creative.
1. White, J., 'Creativity and Educations a philosophical analysis' in 
Dearden, R.F. et alia (eds.), Education and the Development of Reason, 
R.K.P., 1972, p. 136. #
2. White, J., ibid. p. 135*
-  26 -
The only attack is that there is a lack of precision about any 
process, and there are two possibilities why this is so.. First, 
because we have not really attempted an analysis of the concept of 
creativity, we have not seen what is presupposed to the concept.
Secondly, because the concept of creativity is evaluative, we cannot 
be precise about actual processes or their sufficiency. However, 
what we may be able to say is that we cannot conceive of creativity 
unless we presuppose thinking or thinking intelligently.
A consideration of Problem-solving as a criterion of the concept of 
Creativity
A fifth area is that of seeing Creativity as problem-solving.
There are two reasons for suggesting that this is a possibility in 
getting to the concept.
First, since a problem involves either a question or difficulty 
that is set or is in need of solution, then the moment one tries to 
offer a solution, some human activity is presupposed, which then is 
possible to be praised.
Secondly, because of a general agreement about those actually 
thought of as creative, and the possibility that these have been engaged 
in some form of problem-solving, a clear link may be made with the 
concept of creativity. Archimedes is someone referred to who may be 
taken as an exemplar in this area. He certainly had a problem, and 
he could see clearly how his problem could be solved by using the idea 
of water displacement. How to make explicit the idea of water displace­
ment was new; and, of course the bringing about of something new
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certainly looks to be presupposed to a concept of creativity. 
Problem-solving is narroY/er than the bringing about of something new 
since the problem may have been encountered many times and solved; 
but at least, there is an aspect of newness for the individual who 
solves a problem.
Seeing the concept of creativity as a matter of problem-solving 
has its difficulties. Three difficulties can be expressed in order 
to attempt to judge of the validity of the connection.
In the first instance, the word 'problem' is used extremely widely. 
For example, I can agree that Archimedes was creative and had a problem 
to solve, whereas Shakespeare was creative but did not seem to have 
any problem to solve. Here, though, is where 'problem' covers a wide 
ground, since some people may hold that Shakespeare must have had a 
problem, for otherwise he would not have written. It is this very 
width of the notion of 'problem* which, if linked necessarily to the 
concept of creativity, will embrace every human activity which in turn 
will render the concept so general that the evaluative aspect becomes 
effete.
PUrther exemplification of this point may be seen if we turn to 
Guilford^  who, in offering the idea of problem-solving, presses for its 
similarity to creativity. Moreover, he offers an account of the ideas 
of three progenitors of the problem-solving method, who are Dewey,
Wallas and Rossman. Between them they cover the wide and the narrow.
1. See Guilford, J.P., 'Frames of Reference for Creative Behavior in the 
Arts' in Gowan, J.C. et alis (eds.), Creativity: its educational
implications, J. Wiley & Sons Inc., H.Y., 1967
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Dewey, for example, thinks in terms of an explicit formulation of an 
encountered difficulty. On the other hand, the steps of Wallas - 
preparation, incubation, illumination and verification - may be an 
overall idea in saying what happened when a problem was solved, but 
there is no mention of a problem at the beginning of the steps.
Wallas, then, rests on hope in contrast to Dewey’s precision. Finally, 
Rossman, in his seven steps, begins with the observation of a need or 
difficulty. Indeed what precisely is a problem is a problem itself.
Secondly, if the idea of a problem is sufficiently circumscribed 
so that the vagueness is taken away, so that a genuine difficulty is 
acknowledged which is not simply trivial, we can then see whether this 
can be connected to a concept of creativity. Here, though, what we 
can see is that solving problems may be simply like the answering of 
questions where the difficult thing to do is to ask the right kinds of 
questions.
If the generally accepted problems are solved, those solutions may 
be quite ordinary. What is possible is that inventors are not merely 
those who solve problems but who also suggest problems in such a way 
that solving them may be comparatively easy. It would certainly be 
useful to investigate this idea with reference to people like Marconi, 
and indeed Hume whose problems roused.' not.only Kant from his slumbers 
but very many other people too.
Thirdly, there is a point, illustrated by Guilford which shows the 
kind of error we can fall into if we try to link problem-solving to 
the concept of creativity before we have fully analysed the relation­
ship between problem-solving and novelty. This is the error.
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Guilford claims that genuine problem-solving involves some degree of 
novelty, and since novelty is the sine qua non of creative production, 
problem-solving involves creativity."*" This move involves Guilford in 
having an undistributed middle term in his argument. All kinds of 
activities may involve novelty, and while it may still be held that 
novelty is necessary to creativity, this may be by no means sufficient. 
What in fact may be more to the point is that although problem-solving 
involves some novelty, problem suggestion involves a greater depth of 
novelty. However, what the idea points to is originality.
Originality as a criterion
This then is the sixth idea. It is probably no accident that 
repeatedly in the literature on Creativity the idea of originality is 
mentioned as important. At this point it looks as if the beginnings 
of an analysis of the concept are being made but it is precisely 
because the evaluative aspect of the concept has been underplayed that 
the analysis has stopped short, and originality has become something 
of a necessary and sufficient criterion of the concept of creativity.
It has taken on this appearance because, unclear about any evaluation, 
we have given an implicit value to being original, over and above what 
it can bear.
Certainly, though, it bears some value. Normally, in saying that 
someone is original, we mean that no one else has offered something in 
this way before. This is what we are saying of people like Plato and 
Shakespeare and Picasso. Actually, to be able to do this, we require
1. Guilford, J.P., The Nature of Human Intelligence, McGraw-Hill, 
N.Y., 1967, p. 467-
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a great deal of understanding and experience, since with limited 
experience we may think that, for example, no one else has written in 
a particularised way before, but we may be wrong. It is for this reason 
that we may light upon someone’s painting or writing, think highly of 
it only to find later that it has all been done before. Therefore, 
there is this value in the idea of original, for we say of what we 
formerly thought was original, that it was only copied.
Concerning this, we may be unable to detect the difference 
between an original piece of work, say in a painting, and a copy, and 
because of our inability, rely on experts, but in so far as we are 
informed about the difference, whether correctly or not, to that extent 
we think more highly of the original. It is quite possible that a 
copy is, as a product, every bit as good as the original, but in 
declaring praise for an originator we are singling him out.
Although the primary sense of original carries with it the idea 
that this has never before been in existence, it is possible to use 
original in a restricted sense when we say, for example, that someone 
has done something new for himself, though not new in the world. He 
may have solved a problem which, though many other people may have 
solved before him, he has not himself solved before. He may offer an 
idea which he has thought of by himself, and therefore is original for 
him. This appears to be the sense in which it is employed in looking 
at children’s work. The stress here is on ’origo’ which is a source, 
and it emphasises non-copying. Actually this may look a little 
stretched in meaning but it may be accounted for quite easily by 
considering this example. If we learn of one of the most outstanding
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of human achievements which we call original, and then find that quite 
independently another person has achieved identically, we tend to think 
of both as equal and thus as sources.
Somewhere between the extremes of new in the world and new for the 
individual, both of which carry some value, is an idea mentioned by 
Torrance which amounts to “statistical infrequency of a response within 
the given culture”?’ This too is acceptable in so far as there can be 
a comparative excelling.
Once we are aware of these various senses, the evaluative nature 
of originality is seen more clearly. Yet, notwithstanding this 
evaluation, a non sequitur often enters the kind of thinking conducted. 
This thinking suggests that because all those who have been creative 
have been original, then anyone who demonstrates originality is also 
creative.
Yet this is clearly not so. Some original ideas, even original in 
the world, are quite worthless. Standing on one leg holding a frying 
pan for an hour looks to be in this category, and with very little 
effort the examples could pour abundantly. It is possible that 
because of the emphasis of originality, recent work with young children 
has been misguided. Originality, obviously connected with the concept 
of creativity, has been used to cover the whole concept.
What is necessary is to separate the kind of evaluation which 
originality has from an evaluation given to those who are original.
1. Torrance, E.P., Education and the Creative Potential, Univ. of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1963, p. 73*
-  32 -
An argument on the following lines will show this separation. First, 
simply being original may elicit praise. Here one may be original in 
the world, more original than other members of a group or original for 
oneself. In some areas of activity it will be important to emphasise 
originality and to encourage people to be original. In teaching, for 
example, an aim would be to get pupils to work things out for themselves 
and not simply to copy what others have done. In morality too, we 
would be necessarily concerned to enable people to examine principles 
and to work out reasons for themselves in connection with what they ought 
to do. That they become sources is vital. Whether what they decide 
on is new in the world, comparatively new or merely new for themselves 
will be less important than that they are sources. Yet, however much 
we stress the importance of originality in any of the three senses, it 
is always possible that any such originality is beside the point, worth­
less, stupid. It remains, none the less, original.
It will be admitted that those people who have been selected, who 
appear in any list of creative people, have offered what has been 
thought to be outstanding, magnificent work. If their work had been 
thought to be poor, whether or not original, we would not have been 
further concerned.
So there can be magnificent work which is not original and some 
forms of craft are in this category. There can be poor work which is 
original, and possibly the Patent Office has examples of this. Finally, 
there can be magnificent work which is also original - and to this, it 
is contended, we give high praise, in terms of its originator.
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There are two positions which can be adopted in looking at origina­
lity. First, if what someone has offered is clearly original and 
certainly the paradigm is original in the world, then we look to see 
whether it is worthwhile. Secondly, if what has been offered looks 
to be worthwhile, we then check to see whether it is original.
Conclusion
Many ideas have been shown to be associated with the concept of 
creativity, but not all these ideas are central, to it.
To summarise which views are central, it can be said quite 
simply that whenever we claim that someone is creative, we know that 
we are singling out that he has done something of value. Thus, we 
must have some concept to judge of this. This concept refers to the 
activities of people. How these activities must, of course, be 
externalised in order that we have the evidence to employ the concept, 
but just as with the concept of morality, we infer some kind of intention. 
Some product is therefore essential for us to award ’creative1 to others, 
but our concept, though probably learned through the extemalisation of 
others, is not dependent upon this.
While, in employing the concept of creativity, we single out 
people for praise, clearly we bear in mind that unless people start 
with something, there is no chance of doing anything. Again, what 
has been admitted, and this must be admitted in any area of human 
evaluation, is that there is always a difficulty in separating what is 
given from what people have done. In practice, however, we do
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separate these, and this is only possible if we presuppose some effort 
without which praise is meaningless. Obviously, then, we presuppose 
certain processes, however unclear we may be about these. They may be 
of a problem-solving nature, although the indications are that more is 
implied, especially as the concept of creativity looks to be more to do 
with problem-suggesting.
Finally, in praising creative people we have already looked at 
their offerings. If they are worthless, there is no sense of praise. 
If they have some value, we can say that they are magnificent: if
they are also expressive of originality, we say they are expressive 
of creativity. Originality is therefore part of the concept of 
creativity.
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CHAPTER 2 
A concept of Divergency
Introduction
At the outset it y^ as claimed that the concept of creativity was 
evaluative, and also that it necessarily embraced the concepts of 
originality and intelligence.
When ideas associated with the concept of creativity are examined, 
the one clear point which emerges is that some form of originality is 
necessapy. Usage also supports this because the concept is never employed 
when we believe that pure copying is being considered, and is only ever 
employed when we believe that we are considering that someone has acted 
with originality. Thus, some concept of originality is presupposed.
What has also become clear is that there is nothing accidental about 
this originality. Many things may be original, but at the least, under a 
concept of creativity, we are attributing praise to human beings who have 
acted in an intentional way. Of course, difficulties remain about being 
precise about the originality which is praised, but these will be 
examined later.
Moreover, in examining various ideas associated with the concept, it 
has been seen that while the terra ’creative' has been used evaluatively, 
it has not been clear in which sense the concept was evaluative. From 
what I have said already, the clue to praising people for their intentional, 
original activity lies in the concept of intelligence. This, however, 
will require close analysis.
How, the last of the seven ideas associated with the concept of 
creativity is divergency. Because this is a shorthand way of referring to 
divergent thinking, then divergency has possibilities in explicating crucial 
points centred on the concept of creativity. This is so because if
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originality is presupposed, then the kind of thinking required looks to 
be intelligent.
A concept of Divergency
The concept of divergency as a clue to the concept of creativity 
will have to be seen in the context of what Guilford says of it, since 
anyway, the introduction of the idea is his.'1' Certainly, from what 
has been argued already, some of the ideas which would be necessary to 
creativity appear to apply also to divergency. However, in the first 
place what must be established is whether these ideas are precise enough 
and secondly whether they are sufficient to a concept of creativity* 
and by looking into what is claimed for divergency, some further clarity 
will emerge.
As a definition of divergency, Guilford says that it is the 
’’generation of information from given information, where the emphasis 
is upon variety and quantity of output from the same source, likely
p
to involve transfer”. From other points which he makes in connec­
tion with creativity, it is clear that he is very much concerned with
3
the ability to see problems, and because of this there is in his 
definition a stress on the information already given. Further, because
1. See Guilford, J.P., ’Creativity' in The American Psychologist, 
published by The American Psychological Association, Inc., Washington, 
Vol. 5, 1950*
2. See Guilford, J.P., The Nature of Human Intelligence, McGraw-Hill, N.Y. 
1967, P. 213.
3. Guilford, J.P., ’Traits of Creativity* in Anderson, H.H. (ed.), 
Creativity and its Cultivation, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1959, P«145*
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divergency is opposed to convergency which “proceeds toward a restricted
1
answer or solution”, he has taken up the idea that all manner of 
suggestions will be fine. The point which he makes concerning transfer, 
seems to have reference to what on occasion he has called 1 spontaneous 
flexibility1, exemplified in the suggestions for the uses of a brick, 
where an examinee “jumps readily from one category of response to another”.
This definition will have to be supplemented by Guilford’s own 
idea that in divergent production there is a generating of logical 
possibilities,^ because otherwise we are given to understand that any 
kind of suggestion will do.
There are five points which are important to this idea of diver­
gency. First, because divergency is a branching out from existing 
structures, originality is necessary to it. Secondly, it leaves open 
in which sense someone must be original. Thirdly, because the whole 
idea is related to problem-solving, it points to a way of acting intelli­
gently. Next, it rules out the bizarre, for it generates logical 
possibilities. Finally, it accords with the usage of the verb ’to 
diverge’.
If these points are expanded we can begin to see in which ways
divergency is a viable concept in the explication of the concept of
creativity.
1. Guilford, J.P., 'Traits of Creativity’ in Vernon, P.E. (ed.), 
Creativity, Penguin Books, Middx., p. 180.
2. Guilford, J.P., 'Traits of Creativity', ibid. p. 172.
3. Guilford, J.P., The Nature of Human Intelligence, op. cit., p. 215*
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As has been argued already, however general an idea originality 
may be, it is necessarily included in a concept of creativity. So, 
if I am to say that someone is creative I must have in mind that 
someone is original. To avoid a charge of merely making an assumption 
it is important to make explicit the precise grounds upon which originality 
is seen to be necessary. It could, for example, be suggested that 
originality was not necessary and that while many people have been both 
original and creative, others have simply done outstanding work which is 
valued highly but this work may not be original. Thus, the concept of 
creativity is necessarily concerned with evaluation of any outstanding, 
human work. This could be aesthetically pleasing but this is not 
necessary.
Now, it should be asked what in the first place makes any such work 
outstanding. If, for example, anyone had previously done all the 
things which Shakespeare did, would Shakespearean work still be 
outstanding? Certainly it stands out from most others but not from 
the one which is identical. Immediately we would say that we had seen 
this before. What then makes this outstanding and worthy of praise?
It cannot be the mere work since 'creative1 is only ever applied to 
objects by transferred epithet, when in fact, it is thought that these 
objects are the works of 'intelligent* beings. It must be that there 
is something outstanding about the individual, and indeed in so far as 
it is thought that the individual has operated independently of others, 
to this extent he is outstanding - to the extent that he is original.
To make the point more firmly, in all instances of usage, 
originality is necessary to the concept of creativity. What, of course,
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is conceivable is that usage could change, but that applies to any 
concept.
Secondly, there is no stipulation within this concept of divergency 
that 'original* must be taken to mean that it has never been seen before. 
In fact, we do have to modify 'original* by adding terms like 'competely* 
or 'in the world*. At one point Guilford actually refers to 
unusualness of responses as one principle of measuring originality 
statistically, ^ and so I am not stretching his point. Clearly, the 
more important of these senses is 'new in the world* since presumably 
the most difficult of problems will only ever be solved by the most 
divergent, but in singling out a particular pupil in a group, there is 
a sense in which teachers would say that he is comparatively creative. 
There is, though, a little difficulty concerned with the third sense of 
original where it refers merely to an indivisual. Here, the individual 
is not merely a source but he diverges from the paths which he has 
previously taken. Now, as Guilford holds and which is true, some
novelty always results from solving a problem. Yet an individual will
also have problems, say even in language mastery or in familiarising 
himself with a new building; and it looks as if he is diverging 
just as the others who were original diverged. His overall standard, 
though, may be extremely poor. The difficulty then in beginning to 
see him as creative is obvious for two reasons. First, what he does is 
utterly insignificant in comparison with heralded creative people like 
Einstein or Plato; and secondly, 'creative* here picks out very little 
for it more or less applies to everyone. However, if we are aware of
1. Guilford, J.P., 'Traits of Creativity* in Anderson, H.H. (ed.)
op. cit , p. 173.
-  40 -
the intended meaning, these difficulties may not be insurmountable 
since anyhow so many concepts allow of degrees, and moreover, so many 
concepts - among them, thinking and remembering - apply to more or 
less everyone.
When considering any of the senses of 'original1 what may easily 
be overlooked is what actually constitutes originality? There are 
three ideas here which should be mentioned, all of which may thro?/ 
some light upon the concept of creativity. First, sometimes people 
do things which for them are matters merely of interpreting the world 
or managing their everyday affairs, yet when looked at by others are 
considered to be original. Here, people can be original and not 
realise that they are being so. Shakespeare, for example, simply wrote 
plays to be acted. If then it is claimed that the concept of creativity 
is essentially evaluative of people's efforts and these people do not
always realise that they are original, on what is the evaluation
resting? Secondly, someone may do something quite accidentally, like 
dropping a clay model the result of which another person may value 
highly and consider to be original. Is there a sense here where the 
concept of creativity has application? Thirdly, we may, as a result 
of doing something accidentally or of having a dream, realise the 
significance of what has happened. This presumably is what is meant
when it is said that to be creative one must have a prepared mind. In
this sense, identical sights may appear before different people but only
those prepared can interpret or even recognise what is there.
All these ideas about originality indicate that some kind of
intentional activity underpins what is thought to be necessary to
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being original. There cannot be a specific need to intend to be 
original (in the world). All that is really pointed to is that we 
look to a thinking being whose thinking is purposive and construc­
tive. Here, one can act independently of others and then possibly 
find that what one offers is actually new in the world.
The third point about divergency is that any problem-solving will 
require an individual to sum up a situation, see connections between 
ideas, and suggest an idea which is not, of necessity, contained in the 
problem. At a simple level, if deep water is to be crossed, several 
solutions have been readily available for a long time. Yet, at any 
particular time swimming, using a bridge or using a tunnel could all 
have been original, and those suggesting the ideas could all have been 
thought of as creative. At least, they all point to what looks to be 
intelligent performance.
The idea of problem-solving in pointing to intelligent performance 
actually suggests a way in which the concept of creativity functions 
since those who act in these ways are considered to be creative.
There is, though, one worry which I mentioned before, which indicates 
that while one needs to act intelligently to solve a problem, one may 
not need to have a problem in order to act intelligently. It is, of 
course, possible that problems emerge while one is engaged upon looking 
at something in a new light, but the whole has not been so much a 
matter of problem-solving as problem suggesting, or even more simply the 
offering of an idea. Here too there is a need to sum up a situation, 
to make connections and to suggest an idea which not only is not 
contained in a problem but which is not even given a lead through an 
existing problem. ^
-  42 -
Fourthly, the idea of divergency rules out the bizarre. I am 
not sure whether it was due to the early accounts of divergency or to 
the lack of understanding of what was being claimed for divergency 
that the concept seemed to be embracing the doing of anything unusual.
Of course, to arithmetical questions there were definite answers, and 
in fact it is precisely because of the nature of certain questions, 
that they could only be treated in one kind of way, that Guilford 
began to consider other kinds of questions. These were questions or 
problems to which there were no necessarily right answers. This 
point has sometimes been missed.'*'
Even here in the area of conjecture Guilford looks for logical
possibilities. Now, it is true that there is always a difficulty
that, even though logically possible ideas are suggested, people cannot
2
at one point appreciate them. The work of Kuhn actually illustrates 
this very well. Yet, if ideas are not logically possible, no one can 
ever appreciate them. This means that some people who actually produce 
logically possible ideas and are perhaps years la,ter thought of as 
creative, are not thought of as creative at the time. The leading 
point of this way of looking at the idea of divergency is that positively 
it directs attention to the evaluation that is necessary and gives a 
reason why some activity could be valued; and negatively, that it 
suggests that if an activity cannot be minimally understood, there are 
no grounds for singling out the actor for praise, for such an evalua­
tion would be out of place.
1. See Heim, A., Intelligence and Personality, Penguin Books, Ltd., 
Middx., 1970, p. 42; and Burt, C.L., in ’Critical Notice1 in Vernon, 
P.E., Creativity, Penguin Books, Ltd. 197^ > PP* 211-2.
2. cf. Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1962.
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The last point in this consideration of divergency is that there 
is an accordance with the usage of 'diverge1. There is, of course, a 
sense of using 'diverge1 where no kind of intention is part of its 
meaning, where, for example, we talk of lines or paths diverging, hut 
from the moment we talk of people and what they do, we bring in the 
notion of intention. Only when it is shown that instead of doing 
things, people are acted upon, do we withdraw the implications of 
intention.
In an intentional sense if we are to diverge then we must have a 
model, paradigm or norm from which to diverge. The idea of 'verging* 
implies a path to be followed. So if we do not understand what 
constitutes the paradigm there is not a sense in which we can diverge 
from it. Apart from understanding the paradigm, we must if we are to 
diverge, move off intentionally. People wander because they are not 
properly conversant with a paradigm or they stray because there is 
nowhere in particular to go.
Usage, then, favours Guilford's suggestion of divergency since it 
can cover all the other points claimed for it.
Some pointers have already emerged by looking at the concept of 
divergency, and these can be linked quite easily to my original claims 
about the concept of creativity. These claims about the concept 
were based upon the kinds of meaning necessary and sufficient in being 
able to operate in three areas of usage. These areas seem to 
comprise the total.
It is useful to recall these three areas of usage. The first was 
the sense in which children were thought of as creative; the second
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where we spoke of creative salesmen or creative footballers; the third, 
where we praised outstanding people like Shakespeare.
The areas have probably come about in some historical way, rooted 
in the idea of God's creation,'*’ but there is also a psychological 
explanation of their genesis which adds weight to the arguments 
assembled so far. When we first learn that certain people are creative 
we may be unsure about precisely what they have done, and yet these 
people constantly reappear as great artists, great composers, great 
poets. Now until we can see why it is that they are thought of as 
great, we can only imitate what is said. However, there will also be 
a logical linking so that a certain kind of greatness or magnificence 
is connected to a concept of creativity. What is clear, and this gives 
etymological support, is that these great people have made things. Yet, 
and this is gradually discovered, other people make things but these 
are not thought of as great. The one point which the great people have 
in common is that they have offered something originali the essence of 
their particular brand of originality is something which may take years to 
be appreciated,but at least what is appreciated is that if we copy down 
a Shakespearean play or carry out an experiment on water displacement, 
we are not great as Shakespeare was or Archimedes was.
Therefore, without knowing what specifically is great or magnifi­
cent some concept of originality can be grasped which can be logically 
linked with a concept of creativity. While, then, we may be still 
unsure of what exactly is great about Shakespeare or Keats, we may be
1. Ref. Elliott, R.K., 'Versions of Creativity' in Proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. V No. 2, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1971*
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able to see greatness in Athletics, Football or Music, and because in 
any of these fields we also acknowledge originality, we can then make 
use of the second usage of the concept of creativity.
In the first sense where it is said that most children axe creative, 
the greatness will not be so much in terms of what is offered but tha,t 
it is offered, that in fact, these children are doing something which 
looks to be original. There is not the expectation of the magnificence 
which some people claim is in Shakespeare, nor the magnificence of 
other grownups because they are only childrens but it is magnificent 
at this level.
So, in all three senses, originality and greatness, however much 
these may be toned down and however weak an understanding of them may 
be required, are both seen to be accepted as part of the implicit 
meaning given to the concept of creativity. Speculation on the 
psychological genesis of the concept in fact points to some logical 
requirements of the concept and renders all these usages legitimate.
However, while originality and some idea of greatness or magnifi­
cence can be seen to be necessary in rendering these usages legitimate, 
that any performance covered by the concept of creativity is necessarily 
also intelligent, may not be readily granted. In the first instance, 
people may simply dispute tha,t the concept of creativity has any kind 
of reference to a concept of intelligence. When they hold that someone 
is creative, they look a/t what he does or has done, and then evaluate. 
Nov/ in order to extract some admission from them, v/e could ask how they 
would know how to enable others to be creative. Yet, in reply they
could then say that they do not know, nor do they have to know: they
merely evaluate what others have done. Thus, on this, Picasso, 
Shakespeare and Poincar^ could all be creative.
Such a reply is superficial. This can be seen if we look at an 
analogy in another area of human evaluation. If people say that they 
easily recognise a morally good man but that they have no idea how to 
get others to be good, and all that they do is to evaluate, their 
position is very similar. Just as those who made an evaluation of 
others under the concept of creativity claimed that they did not refer 
to intelligent performance, so these claim that under the concept of 
morality they do not refer to freedom. Nov/, while it is not at all 
necessary to make an actual reference to a concept of freedom in 
declaring someone to be moral, it is not possible to employ a concept of 
morality without presupposing a concept of freedom.
In a similar way, while no direct reference need be made to 
intelligent performance under a concept of creativity, it is this which 
looks to be presupposed.
At this point, while it may be conceded by objectors who formerly 
claimed that they were only evaluating original, human performance, 
that something more than what is directly referred to must be taken 
into account, doubt may still be expressed about whether this 'something 
more' is intelligent performance. This is the second phase of the 
objection, and there are at least superficial reasons for this. One 
reason may be on account of the pervasive influence of the I.Q,. metric, 
which links the concept of intelligence to performance, especially 
academic, but which does not seem to account for creative activity
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particularly in areas which are non-academic. Another reason is that 
it may not dawn on us, since on the face of it, there's an idea of 
intelligence, there's another of creativity, just as there are so many 
other ideas, all apparently quite disparate. One further reason may 
he that it is extremely difficult for us to commit ourselves explicitly 
to pinpointing what we have in mind.
One point, though, is clear. Problem-solving results in 
originality and such originality is often thought of as creative.
To solve problems there is a need to act intelligently. This may be 
granted by objectors who may wish to hold that while it is possible 
that such problem-solvers may be creative they are probably working in 
specific areas, like Science or Technology, where the idea of problem­
solving is appropriate, but not everything is like this. There are 
other areas of endeavour like Painting and Pottery and Sculpture where 
things are different. These perhaps are areas which have little to do 
with intelligence but a great deal to do with feeling.
Thus the concept of divergency points to a need for a clarifica­
tion of the concept of intelligence first, because, although on the face 
of it divergency points towards intelligent performance, this has not 
yet been adequately shown; and secondly, because it does look as if we 
can still act intelligently without having need of a problem to solve, 
and to the extent that we may be thought of as creative. Moreover, the 
various objections to the concept of intelligence being a necessary 
aspect of the concept of creativity also demand that clear criteria be 
established for the concept of intelligence.
Limitations of Divergency
The idea of divergency has become something of a panacea for some 
writers,^ but it certainly has its limitations. Some of these limita­
tions have definite implications in the explication of the concept of 
creativity, whereas others call out for a clearer, more explicit account.
First of all, when we are said to diverge, from what is it that 
we do diverge? I have defended Guilford1 s usage of 1 diverge1 in 
that a model or paradigm must be understood, and that any movement 
a?/ay must be intentional; however, it is not made explicit exactly 
what is happening in divergency. We could diverge from the model 
itself or from the usual answers to problems which the model helps us 
to answer. An example from Ethics will illustrate both forms of 
diverging. We could keep to the Naturalistic model, and like Butler 
suggest that though there are other principles, to consider one’s own 
interests in an enlightened way would lead us to be much better people; 
or, on the other hand, we could attempt, like Moore, to overthrow the 
naturalistic model altogether.
If divergency is a matter of either moving away from usual 
responses within a paradigm or completely overthrowing a paradigm, there 
is a possibility of being creative in either form: but that one form is
related to the following of a model whereas the other is essentially to 
overthrow the model, is not brought out sufficiently well. What is 
true of Guilford is that under divergency there are two kinds of flexi­
bility: the one, spontaneous flexibility which enables us to pass
p
’’from one category of response to another” ; the other, adaptive
1. See e.g. Torrance, E.P., Education and the Creative Potential,
Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1963, p. 5»
2. Guilford, J.P., Traits of Creativity, op. cit., p. 172.
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flexibility which presses for new ways of solving problems where ordinary 
assumptions may have to be rejected. From this we could say that both 
forms are catered for, but this is only true in a general way. If 
anything, because of the exemplification of divergency1 by Guilford and 
the kinds of tests advocated as a result of viewing divergency, the 
emphasis has been on remaining within an existing model. The actual idea 
of abandoning a model is there in embryo but more than this is required, 
first, to show the relationship between importantly different ways of 
diverging, and secondly, to emphasise what it actually means to diverge.
The reason for these two points is that in singling out people for praise, 
the idea of originality is vital.
Related to this is that Guilford looks to be employing two senses of 
’diverge’. When he talks about passing from one category of response 
to another, the example which he uses is of giving words similar in 
meaning to ’low’, and he claims that we could offer ’depressed’, ’cheap’, 
’degraded’. Now, in offering these words, we would sh<5w that we were 
flexible since if we merely kept to the category of height and did not 
entertain other categories, this would be inflexible. This, though, is 
the objection. In offering these words, are we diverging in the sense that 
we know the model and are moving off intentionally or is it that our 
answers are merely different from those of other people where the differing 
is not our intentional act? In the first sense there is a highlighting 
of an intentional act; in the second, this is not so. If then we say 
that it does not matter, that both are divergent, then 'to be divergent' 
is used in both intentional and unintentional senses.
1. Guilford, J.P., ’Traits of Creativity’ in Vernon, P.E., Creativity, 
op. cit., p. 180.
2. ibid.
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Another related point concerns the validity of the idea of diverging
p
when we are faced with a completely new problem. If, for example, we 
suggest a few ideas for solving the problem - and from the previous 
arguments it seems clear that the concept of creativity could well be 
called upon here - it is difficult to see what application diverging has.
Ho other person could have offered ideas and so there is no diverging 
from usual answers. Nor, because the problem is completely new, is there 
any necessary model for viewing the problem.
How, even when these points have been dealt with, three other kinds 
of limitations need consideration.
First, the idea of divergency is too suggestive of problems to solve, 
and while useful in some activities is not useful in others. It must 
be admitted that in very many pursuits there are problems to be solved 
but this is not to say that every pursuit can be characterised as problem­
solving. Even in technical or scientific matters we would need to 
distinguish between the suggestion of an idea, and the problems which may 
be met in attempting to realise the idea. Yet, in other areas like 
painting, writing a novel or landscape gardening, the idea of solving a 
problem is quite often out of place. In fact, in holding to a concept of 
creativity we can admit of the possibility of problem-solving being 
encompassed but not as necessarily including it.
If anyone is creative, then it does not seem necessary that he must be 
aware of a problem to solve. He may simply see that a particular 
paradigm is inappropriate or that the suggestions of others are unhelpful. 
Further, he may not know that a problem has been associated with the 
enquiries he makes or ideas which he suggests. A poet may simply express 
his joy, and still be considered creative.
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So, basically, the question is whether the concept of creativity 
necessarily involves the idea of problem-solving. Certainly, problems 
may be solved, but if we look at an analogy the point will be made clear.
If religious meetings are encouraged, they will help the building trade.
They may help in this way, but such help is not central to the idea of 
religious meetings.
Secondly, the idea of variety and quantity of suggestions is part of 
divergency but it is not certain that the idea is necessary. There has 
been a tendency to think highly of fluency where idea after idea is 
offered, and this indeed has been pressed quite strongly.^ Actually, in 
a particular piece of enquiry, it is likely that many ideas are enter­
tained by creative people. To support this, while often in scientific or 
technological pursuits we only witness a final result like a washing 
machine or an aeroplane, the moves on the way to the result could well have 
been very numerous. In the same way it may be said that in a poem there 
may be a new idea in each verse, and moreover the final work may be the 
result of very many trials.
Yet, even if it is true that as a matter of fact those who are 
thought of as creative have actually offered variety and quantity of 
ideas, others not thought of as creative may have made similar offerings.
In this case it is not the variety and quantity which become crucial.
All people may have dreams but perhaps there are few, like Coleridge, who 
make use of them. If, then, Coleridge is thought of highly, it is not 
because he had dreams, since all others may have done, but because he used 
them to advantage.
1. See, e.g., Parnes, S.J., ’Education and Creativity* in Vernon, P.E. (ed.), 
Creativity, op. cit., p. 348.
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Farther, the manner in which people conduct themselves is usually 
very personal. Some cannot work unless they are quiet or unless they 
have the right kinds of instruments or unless they smoke. ^ Thus some may 
suggest many ideas, others very few. In saying that one is creative we 
do not know how he has operated. A concept of creativity cannot then 
necessarily embrace the idea of offering variety and quantity of ideas, 
however appropriate these may be.
Again, if many ideas are suggested what is crucial is that people are 
hright enough or intelligent enough to recognise which idea is worth 
pursuing. Some people may suggest an abundance of ideas but not be 
intelligent enough to light upon the most important.
Lastly, a first idea may well be sufficient. Others may not be 
central at all. A concept of creativity cannot declare upon the matter.
The third limitation is that the evaluative nature of divergency is 
not sufficiently explicit. In assessing whether someone is divergent 
there is some kind of commitment to certain value stands. We may show 
this especially in the problems which we offer to others, connected say to 
fuel supply, to fast cars or getting to the moon or in the questions we 
may ask concerning the wrongness of a social arrangement or the inefficiency 
of a particular tool. We may show this too in considering the ideas 
actually suggested by people. The difficulty is that the values which 
one holds will be those upon which one decides that others are divergent 
and indeed intelligent: and these values may not be rationally supported
values. Divergency, though suggestive of acting away from existing ideas, 
has tied the values of acting intelligently too closely to values held
l.cf.McKellax, P., Imagination and Thinking, Cohen & West, London, 1967* 
p. 129.
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about existing problems without any explicit statement about the essen­
tially evaluative nature of it. By bringing out this evaluation we are in 
a better position for examining the values we hold; by overlooking that 
it is an evaluation we can pass to the assumption that the same applies to 
the concept of creativity which would be a dangerous assumption.
What divergency offers
Because of some very definite limitations within the concept of 
divergency, it is not possible to consider it satisfactory in the explica,- 
tion of the concept of creativity. However, there are points which are 
helpfhl in directing attention to what is crucial.
Checking what is crucial can finally be done only by seeing whether what 
is explicitly claimed coheres with central usages where there exists an 
implicit meaning. The most important usage is to single out certain 
people like Shakespeare and Galileo and to praise what they have done.
Under this usage, all those people who are praised have done something 
original, indeed original in the world. From these two points, namely 
tha,t they are praised and that they have acted in an original way, we can 
deduce certain presuppositions.
This is so because in examining various associative ideas centred on 
the concept of creativity, it has become clear that whenever any mentalistic 
idea is used, it is based upon the idea that there is a starting-point in 
terms of mind. Now, in praising people we must acknowledge that they 
have done something. Clearly, this cannot be accidental for then praise
would have no point. This praising, this imputing of intentional activity
can only make sense if thinking is presupposed.
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Moreover, since thinking may he at a very ordinary level, where for 
example we merely think of what we had for dinner, the kind of thinking 
required to produce something original, especially original in the world, 
will he more than this.
In drawing to itself the important substance of the other associative 
ideas, the concept of divergency not only makes sense of certain 
presuppositions of the concept of creativity but also gives pointers to a 
clearer understanding of these presuppositions. There are four important 
points which can he considered here.
First, there is no insistence that to he original one must he 
original in the world. Clearly, this looks to he the primary meaning if 
we consider people like Kant and Einstein, hut it must he allowed that we 
do characterise others as creative when what they offer is original in 
that it is not copied from or even influenced by the work of others.
Again, what is done within a group may he comparatively original.
Under the heading of originality, divergency presses that this comes 
from humans, and thus even apart from Guilford's model of the structure 
of intellect, allows for and insists upon a concept of thinking as 
necessary.
Secondly, because divergency is seen to generate logical possibili­
ties, this again is linked to a concept of thinking. With this point in 
mind, there is an opening out of the possibility of understanding what is 
offered. An illustration from De Bono will make this clearer. In 
developing his idea of lateral thinking he holds that "if a solution is 
acceptable at all then by definition there must he a reason for accepting it".
1. De Bono, E,, Lateral Thinking - a textbook of Creativity, Ward Lock 
Educational Ltd., London, 1970> P« 48
See also Guilford, J.P., 'Creativity' in The American Psychologist, 
op. cit., p. 447.
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If ideas have some logical basis, while it is true that not everyone will 
see them, either through lack of ability or some kind of commitment to 
an already accepted paradigm, there is always a possibility that they will 
be seen: and because of this, there is a possibility of giving praise to
the originator.
Thirdly, because divergency is seen in the area of problem-solving, 
and this requires understanding and the suggestion of ideas, there is a 
need for intelligent performance.
Fourthly, divergency opens out the possibility of considering a 
concept of intelligence which is wider than that of the I.Q. metric in so 
far as the kinds of problems which can be encountered are open and so 
beyond those of the I.Q. test whose questions are closed.
Conclusion
From what has been said, there are both negative and positive points 
about the concept of divergency which together are suggestive of what 
constitutes a concept of creativity.
Negatively, what is crucial is that first, while we may be concerned 
about problem-solving, what we are necessarily concerned with is the 
suggestion of ideas. Secondly, any suggestion may be concerned with many 
and various ideas, but necessarily with one idea that is worthwhile. 
Thirdly, while clearly an evaluation exists, this has remained merely 
implicit and it should be made explicit.
Positively, what is crucial is first, originality, but as soon as we 
understand what it means to be original we shall presuppose intelligent 
thinking.
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If we subject the usage of the concept of creativity to scrutiny, 
these negative and positive points suggest that together they form 
what is. necessary and sufficient to the concept.
However, the suggestion now needs to be argued much more fully.
It is one thing to say that the concept of creativity necessarily embraces 
intelligent thinking but quite another to show that this is so.
To defend this and eventually to bring together all these negative 
and positive points, a concept of thinking must first be considered.
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CHAPTER 3 
A concept of Thinking
Introduction
What gradually became clearer in the first chapter, when ideas 
associated with the concept of creativity were discussed, were three 
main points. First, the concept was mentalistic, and even though it 
was countered that usage connected it with things or products, this was 
only ever by transferred epithet. Thus it was seen that the concept 
was directed at what people do. Secondly, the concept picked out an 
award of people's efforts and here it was clearly evaluative. Thirdly, 
if there was to be any accounting for an evaluation of what people do, 
at the very least it must be allowed that they think.
Similarly, in discussing the concept of divergency which is 
certainly suggestive of a concept of creativity, the idea of acting 
originally which is necessary to both concepts is one which presupposes 
thinking.
For these reasons, some account of a concept of thinking is 
necessary.
Furthermore, as I shall show later, intelligence is a concept 
which refers to a certain kind of thinking. If what I have maintained 
so far is true, then a concept of creativity will rest upon a concept of 
intelligent thinking. This can genuinely be defended only if an 
analysis of the concept of thinking is first offered.
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The need for being explicit about the concept of thinking
There are numerous indications that the concept of thinking is 
simply taken for granted. Frequently, for example, we talk in Education 
of developing thinking in people. Divergent thinking is something which 
many would wish to develop in opposition to convergent thinking. Again, 
it has been claimed that we ought not to inhibit the development of 
rational thinking in young people. Even if we are asked what thinking 
is we can usually only offer synonyms, and perhaps the reason is as Cook 
Wilson suggests, that it is sui generis.'*’
Particularly because of this last suggestion, we all know what 
thinking is, and further we could hardly live in a community for long 
without knowing what it means. However, there are other concepts like 
1 knowledge* and belief* which are just as familiar to us and yet the 
explicit attempt to become clear about them is very difficult.
It may well be, then, that the concepts which we have are sometimes 
very generalised, and may sometimes show grave discrepancies at an 
interpersonal level. One example of this is the concept of intention. 
There is even a saying that ’the floor of Hell is paved with good inten­
tions’: and yet, the concept of intention is the corner-stone of any
theory of morality which can begin to have credence.
Specifically with a concept of thinking, some people would maintain 
that this is the preserve of the head and not the heart; and perhaps go 
as far as holding that because it goes on in the head, it directs what the 
rest of the body does. Yet, according to Ryle this would be to mis­
construe completely any concept which refers to mind. Again, because of
1. Ref. Cook Wilson, J., ’The relation of knowing to thinking’ in 
Griffiths, A.P., Knowledge and Belief, O.U.P., 1967* P.« 19*
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a traditional separation between body and mind, it is sometimes imagined 
that Art is the area of feeling which is presumably in the body. This, 
of course, is all the more difficult since so frequently is the concept 
of creativity associated with the various forms of Art.
There are then two reasons why it is important to try to demarcate the 
concept of thinking. One is that it may remain merely implicit and 
therefore we may be vague about its implications. For example, while it 
is possible that some of the Greeks who were questioned by Socrates about 
justice, were operating quite sensibly within the concept, there were 
real difficulties in trying to see the kinds of relationships which the 
concept had to virtue. Equally, with a concept of Thinking while it 
remains implicit there are insurmountable difficulties in seeing whether 
or not this is related to a concept of Intelligence or whether these two 
concepts are related as genus to species, merely because there is no 
explicit way of looking at the possible implications. Not only are the 
implications of a philosophical nature. We may, for example, need to 
discover whether thinking can be controlled and if so, how it can be 
controlled. Further, it may be maintained that the kind of thinking in 
which we operate is conditioned by the group allegiance that is ours.
While our concept of Thinking remains implicit we can call upon no evidence 
either to support or refute such an idea.
The other reason, of course, is related to the first. In a very 
closely-knit community, the concepts which people have with regard to 
everyday life are normally put to crucial tests frequently. Even then, 
it is surprising how often concepts which can only be tested out obliquely 
show that people work on very vague concepts. For example, we may be
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able to test that someone has a concept of a table or a fork because some 
direct counterpart to the concept has physical existence but others like 
1 authority* can only be tested in an oblique way if we have to observe 
what people do in relation to how they conceive of authority. When 
people are moderately explicit and refer to the various examples of what 
they caH authority, their statements are often in conflict with what is 
held by others.
Being explicit, then, is important. However, in any attempt to be 
explicit about the concept, the very concept of thinking is employed. On
this view, this is one concept which is so basic that there is no 
possibility of ever making it explicit. Yet, if it is so basic, this 
does not seem to prevent people from saying things about the concept in 
an indirect way.
For example, Graham Wallas in 'The Art of Thought1 seems to have
implicit assumptions about thought. Certainly he divides it into the
lf concentrated mental activity of the professed thinker" and that v/hich is
1
penetrating and guiding other activities, and here there is a possibility
of putting forward a theory that thinking is what is presupposed in any
activity: but along with this division, while it has something to do
2
with Logic, he holds than an achievement of thought could be the making 
of a new generalisation or invention, or the poetical expression of a 
new idea. Ho?/ other people may wish to agree with these points, but 
these are apparently results of thought. Another point is that the 
examples which he uses are academically bound, and then the wonder is
1. Wallas, G., The Art of Thought, p. 3.
2. ibid., p. 5»
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whether Wallas would claim that thinking was presupposed in any activity.
Another example of a writer who says a great deal about thinking is 
Professor Peel. To grasp what could be meant by thinking, he says:
"The pupil first experiences through his senses, something then goes on 
inside his mind and lastly certain actions ensue . . . .  Thinking is 
what goes on inside the mind, in between sense-reception and effective 
action.
The assumption seems now to be that something can be said about 
thinking. Now, in looking at the implications of what Professor Peel 
says, it looks very much as if, though it may be difficult to demarcate 
the concept of thinking precisely, the concept may be tied up 7/ith 
others, which may be illuminating.
First of all, he makes a sharp division between thinking and 
effective action. Now, on some occasions a person may very well 
consider a proposal for a long time before he actually puts anything 
into operation. For example, he may wonder whether or not to take up 
an appointment which has been offered to him. He may work out the 
comparative monetary rewards, and he may have legal or even moral problems 
which need to be considered seriously long before he takes any effective 
action. On the other hand, an action may be performed by someone who 
does not do this kind of working out in detail. He acts at once. To 
account for this, it may then be claimed that the thinking is done quickly, 
and by the time he acts, the thinking has already been completed. Another 
way of giving an account of this, especially if there is no time at all 
for this so-called thinking to go on is to say that it is a reflex action. 
Yet, both these ideas support a mechanistic theory of mind.
1. Peel, E.A., The Pupil’s Thinking, p. 11.
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Such a theory is insupportable because it does not do justice to 
the various concepts associated with mind. If, for example, vre say 
that someone is intelligent, or thinks logically or has insight, then 
to judge of any of these we need criteria. We judge that someone is 
intelligent, for example, by whether what he does comes up to certain 
criteria centred on the concept of intelligent performance, which may or 
may not be implicit. Here, then, we cannot conceive of effective 
action without seeing it under some conceptual scheme. In this sense, 
then, effective action looks to be a thinking activity. However, the 
point which is being made here which is based upon a Rylean point of 
view, is a conceptual one. In this way there is not expressed any idea 
that a counterpart to the principle of mechanical causation  ^is employed: 
and this is the objection to Professor Peel.
The conceptual objection is as strong if we consider Professor 
Peel’s separation between sense experience and mind. What sense 
experience could be independently of mind is impossible to understand. 
Merely to gain any kind of experience will presuppose mind, and this is 
why, although the Ryle an position may not be finally satisfactory, 
it does give us a means of employing concepts which is sensible.
To illustrate this point further and also to illumine the concept
of thinking by seeing its possible relationship with other concepts,
another quotation from Peel may be offered. Shortly after he has
spoken about ’effective action’, he says:
But not all that goes on in between is 
thinking. For instance, the pupil may
1. Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, p. 23
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be active emotionally. Eirthermore, 
thinking may taice place without a start 
from the senses and without conse­
quential action.^
Now, to have an emotion is to see things in a certain way. be
afraid, for example, will indicate that one sees a situation as
dangerous; to be sorry is to see that one has done wrong. Emotions
are cognitively based and therefore seem necessarily to embrace thinking.
Here, emotions are not at all explicable without some concept of 
thinking but equally there may be a suggestion that thinking also 
involves emotions. Against this suggestion, it may be held that people
think about a mathematical theorem or a logical argument quite 
unemotionally and coldly. Why they hold this is because certain 
emotions have been singled out where the effect of having these emotions 
is particularly marked in external behaviour and where such behaviour 
is publicly demonstrable to some degree. This would be so very 
frequently with emotions of jealousy and anger. It is probable that 
the term 'emotional1 is actually used of those people who publicly 
demonstrate their emotions, and in this sense, the emotion of a Russell 
for mathematical beauty or for truth, or of a Socrates for truth and 
justice looks, on the face of it, too cold and calculating. There may 
be no sudden shout or movement; but the emotion will exist none the less. 
The implication of this is that emotion and thinking are conceptually 
related.
There is, however, in Professor Peel's idea something of importance
1. Peel, E.A., The Pupil's Thinking, p. 11.
2. See Kenny, A., Action, Emotion and Will, R.K.P. 1963, p. 60.
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which Ryle himself has not been able to refute. It is that thinking
can be independent of any consequential action. Public behaviour at one
stage in the 'Concept of Mnd' looks to be the chief, and later the only
criterion for using mental predicates. This movement may be evidenced
when Ryle says in the first stage that when we use mental predicates to
characterise people, we are describing ways in which people conduct
parts of their predominantly public behaviour;^ and when, in the second
stage he claims: "Overt intelligent performances are not clues to the
2
working of minds: they are those workings".
Prom the standpoint of an external observer, unless someone engages
in some publicly observable behaviour, there is no evidence available
that thinking is going on. It is true that Ryle accepts that mental
processes occur, ^ and he goes to some length to explain that he does not
wish to deny the point. All that he claims is that a statement about
mental processes should not be conjoined or disjoined with statements
4
about physical processes. On the face of it, then, Ryle seems to be 
agreeing that thinking is possible without any outward manifestation, 
especially as he also says:
Boswell described Johnson's mind when he 
described how he wrote, talked, ate, fidgeted 
and fumed. His description was, of course, 
incomplete, since there were notoriously some 
thoughts which Johnson kept carefully to him­
self and there must have been many dreams, day­
dreams and silent babblings which only Johnson 
could have recorded and only a James Joyce
5
would wish him to have recorded. J
1. Ryle, G., Concept of Blind, p. $0,
3. ibid., p. 23
5. ibid., p. 57*
2. ibid., p. 57
4. ibid.
-  65 -
The incompleteness of the description ties up not only with the idea 
of Peel hut also with the following two points which are related to 
each other. First, we are conscious ourselves that we have ideas, 
that we daydream where it is difficult for others to begin to look for 
evidence that this is what we are doing. Because of this conscious­
ness and our apparent similarities we infer that others also engage 
in non-externalised activity. Next, because of our stillness or the 
pose which we take up at times when we do think, people may ank us what 
our thoughts are. This at least will imply that others presuppose 
thinking to go on independently of anything beyond the stillness or 
pose. Moreover, in our learning of the concept, that others accept that 
we can think without externalising our thinking, the concept of thinking 
will cover this.
A way of becoming clearer about the concept of thinking
The argument so far points to a conceptual link between thinking 
and emotion. Further, while we may accept that human activity may be 
looked upon as thinking, we cannot accept that thinking is necessarily 
characterised by public behaviour, in the Rylean sense.
There are, however, two further ways of becoming clearer about the 
concept of thinking. One way is to see it as a genus and then to 
examine what are said to be its species. This method is circular, but 
it will indicate an interconnection between concepts which looks to be 
necessary with certain clusters of concepts. For example, if a person 
says that he does not understand the concept of furniture, I can help 
him by telling him that it is a class containing objects like chairs and
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tables and sideboards; yet in one sense, if he has grasped what chairs, 
tables and sideboards are, he has minimally seen what a concept of 
furniture is. On the other hand, if I give an account of the concept of 
'furniture1 without mentioning any particular species, then all I can offer 
is a tautology.
This method may be illuminating and it is one employed by several 
writers, notably Thomson. He has found six different meanings of 
thinking.^ The first meaning covers autistic thinking; then it is used 
as a synonym of remembering; imagination is the third, and this is 
different from autistic thinking because "it is evoked primarily by
p
external sources of stimulation". Next, when the command 'think what 
you are doing1 is used, an attitude or frame of mind is expected to be 
adopted. Fifthly, it can be used instead of 'believe'. Finally, there 
is reflective thinking or reasoning.
As soon as we look at the species of thinking we are faced with the 
same kind of problem as we are when we look at the species of furniture.
The problem is to work out in terms of what precisely a^chair is an item 
of furniture. Similarly, when we look at reasoning and autistic thinking 
which would cover dreaming and hypnagogic imagery, we shall find that it 
is difficult to say what both concepts share unless we say 'thinking* ^ or 
offer a tautology. At least, though, if somebody has understood what 
reasoning or reflective thinking is, he has minimally grasped a concept 
of thinking so that he can then gather, for example, what 'think what you 
are doing' means. Yet, in both these species there looks to be a clear
1. Thomson, R., The Psychology of Thinking, Chapter 1.
2. Thomson, R., ibid., pp. 13-14*
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activity, so much so that the genus thinking equals an activity of mind.
On the other hand, a difficulty presents itself if autistic thinking is 
considered an activity of mind. The reason is that while activity is 
used in the physical sense to cover what goes on, this description if used 
of humans would blur a vital distinction between what people's intentions 
are and what happens to them. One clear example of a blurring of this 
distinction would be in holding that an epileptic can help what he is 
doing. Certainly there is something going on but what is going on can 
only be interpreted in terms of what is happening to him; and this looks 
to be covered by a concept of passivity rather than activity. How, in 
autistic thinking all kinds of ideas can be entertained, and in dreaming 
especially there appears to be little control over what is happening.
Even if it were shown that the dreams which we have are the result of 
how we conceive of the world, which would be a difficult proposition to 
show in view of the bizarre nature of some of them, we are still aware 
that however much we try on occasions to push certain thoughts away from 
us, the task is too much for us. This must mean that the thoughts 
themselves impinge upon our consciousness in a way which we do not control. 
If now it is said that while the thoughts are presented to us, the actual 
thinking is ours, and therefore controlled, this is a quibble without 
substance. Simply by varying a part of speech nothing is shorn. To 
say that one had a dream is no more and no less than to say that one 
dreamed; and in the same way, to say that one was thinking is to mean 
that one had thoughts.
There is, then, in some species of thinking an idea of a lack of 
control whereas in most, especially for example in rational thinking, 
there is a very strong sense of control. It is for this reason that in
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studies of Thinking and also in popular usage, a meaning is assumed or
given of what may be termed the real or proper concept of thinking. In
some studies what is considered is how we form or attain concepts and
1
this is especially the case with Bruner’s ’A Study of Thinking’.
When Bartlett gives an account of thinking, he offers the followings
The extension of evidence in accord with
that evidence so as to fill up gaps in
the evidences and this is done by moving
through a succession of interconnected
steps which may be stated at the time or
2
left till later to be stated.
In the story which Bartlett relates about returning to a large American 
town after some years’ absence, he tries to show how he remembered 
certain points, and also how, along with the remembering, he made use 
of many other cues. Together these enabled him to get to his terminal 
point. According to Bartlett, the making use of any contributory 
sources of evidence to reach such a point is characteristic of thinking.^
Popularly, a similar position is maintained. The idea, of ’a thinker’ 
confirms Bartlett's point; and sometimes if a particular problem or 
investigation is to be considered, we hear somebody say, 'you are not 
thinking'. There is an analogy in connection with other activities 
like drawing and writing, when people say, 'that’s not writing*, even 
though what is done appears to come under a general description of writing. 
Within some concepts there may be levels, and when the term used of the 
concept is employed by way of assessment, an aspect of the concept is 
being emphasised.
1. Bruner, J.S., Goodnow, J.J. & Austin, G.A. (eds.), A Study of Thinking, 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., F.Y. 1956*
2. Bartlett, Sir P., Thinking, p. 75*
3. ibid., p. 74.
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What, then, has to he decided is whether the concept of thinking 
centrally embraces a strong, intentional activity whereupon some so-called 
species are merely peripheral; or whether ideas of uninvited thoughts, 
dreams and, further, of having one’s thinking controlled by others, are 
all part of the concept of thinking.
A method of escape would be to offer some stipulative definition of 
thinking or to claim that we are going to discuss certain forms of 
thinking, leaving quite open the question of whether say, hypnagogic 
imagery is a form of thinking. Again we may omit any reference to the 
term ’thinking' in case our conceptual schemes are attacked, and merely 
talk about Autism.
However, while we have expressions like ’muddled thinking’, 
’inconsequential' or 'vague thinking’, ’ dominated'and 'dream-like: 
thinking', the concept must be wide enough to embrace much more than the 
strong, intentional activity of 'the thinker’. If anyone objects and 
says that any of these is not truly thinking, then he should account for 
these expressions which carry a meaning in our language. If, therefore, 
some meaning is to be given to these expressions, we cannot hold that 
thinking is necessarily an activity of mind unless at the same time we 
are prepared to accept that a person can engage in an activity which he 
in no way controls. Because of the difficulties of maintaining such a 
position, and to judge of these difficulties an attempt will be made 
presently to look at the concept of activity and its connection with a 
concept of thinking.
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Thinking and Consciousness
The other way of attempting to clarify the concept of thinking 
is by seeing its various species as related to a concept of 
consciousness. This is so because there are many terms used which 
give some conceptual insight into mind, and among these terms are 
'being aware', 'knowing', 'understanding' and 'seeing meaning', and all 
these can be interpreted in some measure by a concept of consciousness. 
Hot only is this true but also, consciousness runs through all the 
various species of thinking.
So the extent of the concept of consciousness may help us to 
judge of the particular cases when we would employ a concept of thinking 
synonymously with a concept of consciousness.
First of all, if we take any of the accepted species of thinking, 
none of these can be interpreted without a concept of consciousness.
To remember or to daydream or to think rationally will all therefore 
presuppose consciousness.
Moreover, some concept of consciousness is also employed to cover 
precisely what we mean when we use the various species of the concept of 
thinking. For example, to remember is to be conscious of memories, to 
think rationally is to be conscious of rational moves. In these examples 
where consciousness and thinking look to be conceptually synonymous, it 
is never sufficient simply to be conscious, as if in a state of readiness. 
However, this very state is all that a medical practitioner seems to 
mean when he says that a patient is now conscious.
What would be necessary here would be that a conscious creature would 
be capable of using its senses or engaging in some species of thinking.
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Now in this state, things can act upon us. All that we can say, then, 
is that consciousness may be merely a state or it may mean that we are 
conscious of something, in which case it is being used synonymously v/ith 
thinking. What must also be staled is that while we make this distinction, 
the threshold of thinking remains vague. It is likely that because for 
the most part we are reduced to finding out whether people are in fact 
thinking by observing their behaviour or by asking them, that when 
behaviour is at a standstill or virtually so, we cannot tell precisely 
what is happening. If after the standstill people tell us what, if 
anything, they had in mind, we can accept tha,t not all was completely still.
Again, to bear witness to their testimony, we are sometimes aware 
that during a period of what is an apparent standstill we too have been 
conscious of something. If, then, this consciousness of something can 
be accepted as one level and that to remember is to be conscious of 
memories, there will be various levels of consciousness, leading up to 
a point where Conscious1 means deliberate.
So, when we say of someone that he is just about conscious, we do not 
imply that he is thinking, although he may be. Here, consciousness is a 
state, available for activity or passivity. In fact, we use the term 
’state1 which indicates that we do not go so far as to say that he is 
doing anything or that anything is being done to him.
If now we look at one accepted species of thinking, namely autistic 
thinking, we may be very unclear about what to say of it, partly because 
frequently, when thinking is discussed, a strong intentional sense is 
meant, whereupon ’conscious of’ is also accepted in the strong sense of 
1 deliberate*. Since, however, there are these three senses of
consciousness, and also since we cannot claim that thinking is
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necessarily an activity as opposed to a passivity, we can only mean 
by thinking that it comes under the concept of ’conscious of* rather 
than ■under a state of consciousness.
A redundancy theory considered
There are grounds, then, for the holding of the following points. 
The concept of thinking, in a strong sense, comes under a, concept of 
activity. However, in its weak sense, where there are instances of 
thinking where no control is exhibited, thinking cannot be subsumed 
under activity. Moreover, there is no sense in which one can have 
emotions unless one thinks. Further, while the concept of thinking 
presupposes consciousness, there remains a sense of consciousness 
which covers a vague area where we are unsure about its necessarily 
being synonymous with any species of thinking. Lastly, while it is 
true that for the most part we have to rely upon what people do in a 
public way in order to determine whether they are thinking, a concept 
of thinking is wider than this purely behaviouristic account.
Some clarity has therefore been achieved but there is an even 
clearer way of demarcating the concept, and that is by examining the 
implications of an attack upon the validity of the concept itself.
Such an attack can be launched by showing how, whenever the verb 
’to think* can be used, it can be replaced by other expressions. By 
employing these other expressions, the verb ’to think1 is made redundantj 
and so, on the face of it, the various forms which the verb takes can be 
seen as convenient linguistic ways of expressing ourselves.
To illustrate the point, the following examples show some of the 
forms which the verb ’to think’ takes:
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a. I think it’s going to rain;
b. People used to think that the earth was flat;
c. Think a little more about what you are doing;
d. I’m sorry I marked you absent but I thought you were.
These sentences can all be converted without loss of meaning, to 
forms in which the verb 'to think* is omitted. The following sentences 
would be legitimate:
a. Perhaps it will rain;
b. As far as people were concerned years ago, the earth was flat;
c. Be a little more careful about what you are doing;
d. I’m sorry I marked you absent but when I looked I
couldn’t see you.
Certainly, in the rewriting of the original sentences, the 
linguistic expression of the concept of thinking ha,s disappeared; but 
this is all that has disappeared. This can be shorn by a closer examina­
tion of the meanings behind the various sentences. In all the examples, 
independently of the actual linguistic expression, the primary meaning 
implied by the converted clauses is that a viewpoint or outlook or way of 
viewing the world is being offered. For example, to give meaning to a 
statement like ’Perhaps it will rain’, a hearer will presuppose that the 
speaker is looking at the world in some way or is adopting some stance.
So, whether some form of the verb 'to think’ is employed in these 
sentences or an alternative form of wording is offered, an identical 
meaning is presupposed. The same, of course, is true of any synonyms 
which are used, like consider, ponder, arbitrate, cogita/fce or reflect.
All suggest that the subject looks or should look at the world in some 
way. In fact, whenever the verb ’to think’ in any mood or tense, or 
the noun ’thought' can be used, it can be replaned by some expression,
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which in the first person may be formulated thus: ’this is my existing
outlook on the world’.
If this is conceded, an immediate link can be seen first of all 
with that aspect of consciousness which I have called 'conscious of. 
Therefore, from the moment one can have an outlook on the world, one is 
conscious of something, however vague, however confused. Not only is 
this true of those instances of thinking which demand an effort, as in 
rational thinking, but it is also true of the weaker senses ofthinking 
where it is said that thoughts simply pour in or that certain thoughts are 
already present however much we try to exclude them.
This means, therefore, that even when we speak of dreaming or day­
dreaming or hypnagogic imagery, all of which cannot properly be said to be 
controllable, we are still speaking of thinking. Thus, under ’outlook’ 
all the various species of thinking can be subsumed. This means, of 
course, that intention is not necessarily part of the concept of thinking, 
although it will be in the strong sense of thinking. There will 
certainly be difficulties at points in determining whether thinking is 
intentional or not; but the very same problem is continually with us in 
ever determining whether someone is moral.
Thinking, as a concept, is therefore distinguished from all other 
concepts in this way. Other than consciousness when used to signify a 
state of readiness, thinking is the most basic concept used of mind. 
Moreover, all other mentalistic concepts presuppose thinking. Therefore, 
necessary to interpreting the concept of creativity is thinking.
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Thinking and Language
In talking of any concept relating to mind, there is, of course, 
no locating to be done. If, therefore, thinking is a concept basically 
related to mind, all that can be done is to see the possibilities and 
limitations of using that concept.
How, some people would like to limit the concept of thinking to 
those who can speak; and they would, therefore, see the possibilities 
of thinking linked essentially with speech.
There are two points to be considered here. First of all, in 
order for us to make a claim that someone is thinking, we shall need 
evidence; but we can be perfectly aware that another person has an 
outlook or is thinking by his facial expression. Next, though we need 
evidence for claiming that someone is thinking, there is still a possi­
bility that he is thinking even though we cannot make the claim that 
this is so.
If the position is stated in this simple way, it looks odd that 
people could have viewed things differently. However, not only have 
there been different approaches but these approaches also have serious 
implications for all other concepts which rest upon a concept of thinking; 
and for this reason alone what is central to these approaches ought to be 
examined.
Central to these approaches is that speech and thinking are as one; 
and, in a direct line from this view is the idea that thought can only 
come a,bout through language. The writing of Thomson is of particular 
relevance especially to the second view but it is also useful in that he 
cites the first one.
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Thomson, for example, mentions J.B. Watson who "reduced thinking to 
inhibited speech located in the minute movements or tensions of the 
physiological mechanisms involved in speaking".  ^ Thomson himself 
does not agree with the identifying of thought with language, but he 
certainly believes "that the non-linguistic skill involved in thought 
can only be acquired and developed if the learner is able to use and 
understand language". By language he obviously means verbal language 
since he says in this connection that often we have to straggle to find 
words in order to capture what our thinking has already grasped.^
Even the mention of this struggling for words indicates that the position 
he adopts is untenable, for there is certainly a development of thought 
here without the necessary language: but this point can be developed a
little later.
First, then, concerning the approach of Watson, we can see that it 
assumes that thinking is the prerogative of man as a speaking and 
therefore social animal, who has, moreover, learned the trick of talking 
to himself in silence.^ One obvious implication of this approach is
that before a child has speech he cannot think.
There are three objections to this but the clearest objection is 
that people who are deaf and dumb show that they have an outlook, and to
have any outlook at all is necessarily to think.
The second objection to this view is important to consider because 
it shows exactly how thinking mast be viewed. It is rela/ted to how
1. Thomson, R., The Psychology of Thinking, p. 164
2. Thomson, R., ibid.
3. Thomson, R., ibid
4* Ref. Ryle, G., op. cit., p. 28.
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possibly anyone could make anything of the world, especially that way of 
looking at the world which is dependent upon language mastery.
To experience anything, there is necessarily a trying-out of things - 
at least etymologically, but what can be shown is that etymology supports 
current usage. How, if I am to try out dancing or translating a French 
poem into English, there are certain pre-requisites, if usage reflects 
etymology. I need a scheme whereby to interpret what is there for an 
interpreter. Even when the term 'experience' is employed superficially 
to indicate that ah individual appears merely in the midst of things or 
occurrences where he looks to be in a passive sta/fce, some kind of 
activity on his part is necessary. For example, a situa/fcion may arise 
where one is shipwrecked or attacked, but unless one can see any such 
situation in a certain light, unless one is conscious of something, there 
is nothing to experience.
So, in order to experience anything, some conceptual scheme is 
necessary. To feel or to see this something, I have to see it as
something. ^ I have to impose upon things a form, say even of unity.
Even to acknowledge that something is there, I must do something. I 
must impose a structure like 'here now, gone' or 'presence and absence*, 
if I am to see anything.
Therefore, if I agree with Kant that everything starts in experience, 
I cannot see how anyone could make a start. For that reason, it must be 
held that the very first recognition of anything presupposes a 
recognitional set-up. If there is not a, first, there cannot be another.
1. These ideas have already been argued for by Dearden, R.F., in 
'The Philosophy of Primary Education', R.K.P. 1968.
Because of this, thinking is a presupposition of all other concepts 
which refer to mind. This can be illustrated at any level, but the pre­
verbal level will make the point clearly enough. If, for example, a 
child finds his bottle repeatedly even though there are other similar 
objects within his grasp, then he looks as if he can distinguish between 
one object and another, and for this reason he must be thinking. If now 
it is said, as a counter-attack, that the infant is merely operating 
within a pattern of instincts, then we must also say that an older child 
who requires a bigger brick or a longer piece of string and who repeatedly 
rejects the smaller brick or the shorter piece of string, is acting 
within a pattern of instincts. In the end, though, this acting within 
instincts is identical to having some conceptual grasp.
Basically, it looks as if a stipulative definition of thinking is 
being offered whereby thought is necessarily language-connected and 
therefore belongs to man; whereas instinct is appropriate to infants and 
animals. This view then has to be rejected in favour of thinking being 
necessary for the picking up of language.
The third objection is concerned with the idea that thought can only 
come about through language. When, of course, Thomson advances this 
point, he may only mean that although some thinking can be undertaken 
without specific language, all thinking rests upon an initiation into 
language. However, even if his claim is reduced to this, his position 
has already been overthrown by my arguments in the preceding section.
In fact, Thomson later reduces his claim when he says that "without 
language as developed and used by human beings, few skills could originate 
and develop beyond the crude trial and error stage".  ^ It is probably
1. Thomson, R., op. cit., p. 180.
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true that thought can be helped considerably by one's having some 
mastery of language, but a complete fusion of the two concepts is out 
of the question. The reason for this is that in our viewing of the 
world, the conceptual grasp that we have may or may not be dependent 
upon a linguistic or otherwise graphically symbolic system. For example, 
if we wanted someone to understand what the Naturalistic Fallacy meant, 
we would necessarily envelop the idea by words: at no time would we
resort to asking him to look at something or to feel something. On 
the other hand, if we wanted him to grasp something about Music, we 
must at some point get him to listen to the sounds.
Now, it is conceivable that Music, since it can be symbolically 
represented, can have all its symbols reduced to linguistic form (even 
though that would be ridiculous), but any word or group of words employed 
would have value only in so far as it had a referent. This referent, 
the particular sound, would be logically irreducible to any linguistic 
form. Of course, this argument would have identical validity in 
considering a host of other activities, like Movement and Painting.
Directing attention to such activities may be done through language, 
and it is likely that some form of language would have been used to 
develop these activities, but that they originated in this way is not 
so likely since without the referent, the language, merely because it 
is necessarily a pointer, would have meant nothing.
This directing of attention would be helpful motivationally in 
saying things, like 'try pressing your fingers more firmly on the strings' 
or 'move your arms back as far as they will go'. Again, language would 
be helpful for conveying ideas through analogy from one known activity 
to another yet unknown, and indeed for suggesting points which could be
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useful in seeing the possibilities or implications of an activity.
To realise that certain activities are extra-linguistic is of great 
importance for tv/o reasons. First, there is a tendency to link 
linguistic expertise with cognitive ability, and actually Thomson's 
remarks about a 'crude trial and error stage',"*' indicate this tendency.
Thomson actually likens this stage to the activities of chimpanzees, 
and children during their sensori-motor period. Now while these levels 
are probably very low, in that one is sub-human and the other in the early 
period of development, what characterises both is not only perception 
but an acting upon the given in such a way as to go from means to ends.
If this is so, then because it necessarily involves having an outlook, 
it is also thinking.
A stronger point may be made in this way. Even if a situation is 
merely one of trial and error, the whole point about it is that once an 
error has been made, a move is suggested to correct it and not to repeat 
it. Essentially, the trial and error method is one of attempting to 
improve upon one's thinking.
This tendency to link linguistic expertise with cognitive ability
goes back a long way, and at least to Socrates. Even though we make
allowances for the Greeks of his time who apparently found difficulty in
2actually knowing what ?/ent to make a good man, Socrates was still wide 
of the mark when he suggested that because people could not say what 
constituted virtue, they did not know. To be explicit, as I have 
explained, is of great importance, but lack of explicitness will not
1. Thomson, R., op. cit., p. 180.
2. See MacIntyre, A., A Short History of Ethics, p. 11.
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show that implicit knowledge is absent. One leading example here is 
that when Kant analysed the concept of morality, people could see that 
this answered explicitly ( and for the first time) what they had thought 
should have been done by them under this concept of morality.
Thus, while it is admitted that verbal language may be very helpful 
in promoting thought, and further that some activities which are engaged 
in are of their nature linguistic, thinking may still go on independently 
of verbal language. Merely because of the essence of some activities like 
Music, verbal language can only approximate to what is essential to 
such activities.
A concept of Activity and its connection with a concept of Thinking
There is another concept which ought to be considered more closely 
and that is the concept of activity because a problem exists about its 
rela/tionship with a concept of thinking. The problem is that if thinking 
is a presupposition of all other mentalistic concepts (except conscious­
ness when employed to indicate a state of readiness) then how does the 
concept of activity function? For example, if thinking is said to be 
an activity of mind, is this expression merely a synonym of thinking, 
or is the concept of activity a genus under which thinking is a species?
To come to grips with this problem, and to see the interconnections 
between these two concepts, I would like to point to four particular 
difficulties.
First, there is a difficulty where people may oppose mental to 
physical activity. Secondly, a definite ambiguity exists within the 
term ’activity* where a distinction between cause and intention is over­
looked. Thirdly, because of a strictly behaviouristic way of viewing
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activity there can be made an invalid inference from external stillness. 
Fourthly, sometimes because of a lack of clarity about the concept of 
activity, it is not even distinguished from a concept of passivity.
I shall deal with these difficulties in order.
The expression 'mens sana in corpore sano1 indicates that some-thing 
exists within some other thing. According to the theory which lies 
behind it, we can easily identify the other thing, viz. the body, and 
use the word 'physical* of it, but all that we can do about the mind is 
acknowledge it, like some invisible clockwork machine, possibly set in 
motion synchronously with the body, and use the word 'mental* of it.
One awful implication of this view is that the mental and the 
physical are opposed to each other. Here, then, people talk of mental 
activity, a doing of the mind, and they set against this, physical 
activity, an inferior brand of doing.
It is true' that Ryle has argued vehemently against this view but 
there are within his writing indications (already alluded to) that the 
whole concept of thinking is behaviouristically encompassed: and this,
as again I have shown, is unacceptable. It is therefore not possible to 
accept a Rylean viewpoint completely. All that can be done is to judge 
of the implication of a vie?/ where the mental and the physical are opposed 
to each other.
First, then, to judge of this, we use the concept of activity to 
direct attention to what is going on, when, for example, we say that a 
person acted with discretion or we refer to the activity in a beehive. 
However, while admittedly we refer to physical activity and apply the 
idea to humans, we can not merely be directing attention to what is
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going on, in tferms of a succession of movements. More is implied because 
we are addressing ourselves to something specifically human. For example,
we may be talking of religious or mathematical activity, and if we look
merely at what is going on, in terms of observable movements, we may
misinterpret what is really going on. This is precisely why the
particular movements of a human being may have to be seen in the light 
of some kind of intention.
Therefore, if a cricketer throws a ball back to the bowler, and the 
ball injures him, we cannot necessarily claim that the cricketer has 
engaged in the activity of showing disrespect to someone, however much 
we wish to hold that specific movement would be necessary in this kind 
of activity.
On the other hand, non-movement even physically may be interpreted 
as an activity of defiance or unacceptance. Thus, when we speak of 
what is going on, we are not necessarily referring first, to what is 
factually observable, movementwise: nor are we, secondly, referring
necessarily to any physical movement at all.
What is probably true of activity of any kind is that movement is 
characteristic of our first psychological encounters with itj and it is 
only gradually that we are able to identify that in order to discover 
what is going on in relation to human beings, we have to interpret how 
they see things.
So, when we ask about what someone is doing, we do so to discover how 
to appraise his doing. We may want to know whether it is blameworthy 
or praiseworthy, sensible or stupid. It is only when we realise that 
all such epithets are inapplicable that we begin to search for explana­
tions in terms of causes. One example is enough to make the point.
If, say, a man is lying in the snow, then because of my empirical
expectation of a man's need to survive, his lying there strikes me as odd. 
When, then, I ask what someone is doing, it is because at the moment I 
cannot see how he sees the situation. If there is no explanation 
through an inference of his cognitive perspective, then I look to a 
causal explanation, which, say, points to his being drunk or drugged or 
incapacitated in some way. For him to do, I presuppose his seeing in 
some way.
The implication is that human activity, however physically manifes­
ted, is mentalistic.^
Related to this is a second difficulty which centres on an ambiguity 
within the usage of the verbs 'to do' and 'to act*. Because human 
activity must be interpreted as necessarily mentalistic, there is not 
truly a sense in which someone can do something unconsciously although 
the idiom allows that this is so. In fact, the idiom perpetuates the 
idea when it allows us to say that someone acted deliberately, and to 
say that someone acted without knowing what he was doing.
However, in attempting to determine whether 'deliberately' or 
'without kno?/ing what he was doing’ should be applied, we should initially 
check to see whether the term 'activity' is or is not conceptually 
applicable in a human sense. Here, then, we distinguish between what 
anting as a human means from what happens to humans. For, after all, 
once one's balance is lost, for example, one is simply like any other 
object in spare, determined by various physical forces. If, then, we 
are clear that 'deliberately' should apply, this presupposes that someone 
has indeed acted - and this is the strong sense of 'act'. On the other 
hand, if we discover that the movements performed by a person who did not
1. cf. Dearden, R.F., The Philosophy of Primary Education, R.K.P. 1968.
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know what he was doing were in question, then his doing must he in a 
weak sense, where all that is being claimed is that the person was 
causally operative. This position is exactly the same as when a car 
runs over someone. To do or to act in the strong sense presupposes 
intention whereas, used weakly, merely presupposes causality.
The third difficulty can be looked at like this. If we adopt a 
purely behaviouristic model for employing mentalistic concepts, we shall 
have to wait until someone performs an act before we can make an award. 
Of course, at times, we can actually interpret no particular act as 
negative behaviour, as we can in an obvious example of not voting, with 
the proviso that this is to be seen within a network of an individual's 
other acts. Actually, for the purposes of learning what can be meant 
by any such mentalistic concept, there is a need for extemalisation: 
even in awarding, extemalisation is necessary. When these considera­
tions are borne in mind, we can see that what Ryle argues for in 'The 
Concept of Mind' looks plausible.
However, the plausibility is quite superficial because from the 
moment one learns a concept which is appropriate upon observing what 
someone does, then one can employ this privately. A prime example of 
this is in learning the concept of 'moral'. Once learnt, then for us 
to act morally, there is a need to judge possibly before or during or 
after a particular act: and what is stronger is that sometimes the act
is not externalised at all. Clearly, it is true that no one else can 
award 'moral' to us, and just as clearly we can not employ it without 
first resorting to public criteria but the final awarding must come from 
us. We are the final arbiters.^
1. cf. Dearden, R.F., The Philosophy of Primary Education, R.K.P. 1968
p. 132.
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That we can make such an award in the activity of moral and many 
other forms of thinking which need never he externalised will at least 
allow that the concept of activity cannot he circumscribed 
behaviour is tically.
Finally, there has been some confusion about the relation of
activity used in the human sense, and freedom. It has been held, for
1
example, that activity can be free or unfree. This, though, sounds 
odd because if there exists an activity which a person in no way controls, 
how conceivably can it be called his activity? The point of this 
objection can be exemplified in this way. A commander may order his 
firing squad to shoot at somebody convicted of desertion. How the men in 
the firing squad are aware of what is to be done; they know the effects 
of their1 actions, and may not want to do the firing. They may disagree 
with the ideas of the commander because they may detest the idea of 
killing another man. Here, then, they may be said to fire unwillingly. 
Yet, there is a sense in which the activity is theirs: no one is literally
forcing their bodies to do certain things, Y/here their bodies are simply 
tools manipulated by another. Again, it is not true that they are 
merely conditioned to perform certain a,ctions where they cannot choose 
what to do. What really happens on ocdasions like this is tha,t we 
choose to perform one activity rather than another in a hierarchy of 
values. Disobedience to the commander would be more troublesome than 
obedience, for exajnple. It is only when, say through utter fear, we 
formally do what we are commanded to do that we become unfree. In this 
situation we become passive.
1. See Dearden, R.F., op. cit., p. 140*
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Therefore, while a casual spectator may think that he is observing 
activities, he may be wrong. He may be like the man who, for the first 
time sees another in a fit and wonders why he does such things. The
point is that in the strong sense of !do!, he is doing nothing. He
is being acted upon and is completely unfree.
A summary can be offered now that these difficulties have been 
expressed and overcome. Such a summary will be shown to link the 
concepts of activity and thinking if we first have a look at the way in 
which the writers of the 1931 Hadow Report speak of activity and experience, 
where they were particularly concerned about making sure that pupils were 
not offered inert ideas. These inert ideas were those which at the time 
of their being imparted had "no bearing upon a child's natural activities 
of body or mind, and do nothing to illuminate or guide his experience".’*'
Nov/, I can understand how a person can have an idea which he would like 
to impart to others but I do not understand how he can actually impart 
this to another unless there is some comprehension on the other's part.
What the writers must be claiming is that an idea can be encompassed by 
words, and once the words have been said to another, then the idea has 
been imparted.. Yet, to impart something will essentially give another
a share in it. If we were to impart a secret to someone, we would
presuppose that he understood what lay behind the words used. The very 
act of imparting anything logically requires activity on the part of the 
person to whom it is imparted. He must listen or attend or somehow 
experience what is offered. In a word, thinking is necessary.
Very likely because activity was probably used in a physical sense
1. The Primary School, H.M.S.O., London, 1931> p« 74*
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first, whereupon we expected movement, the analogy has been pushed too 
far. Similarly, if we talk of physical conception we can imagine an 
actual grasping but when we employ ’concept1 we do not really expect an 
actual grasping although we speak of grasping.
In one sense, then, when we talk of activity - a,s, say, of the 
activity of eating - we are at the same time talking of the various 
physical movements and of the overall mentalistic seeing. Here, we can 
say that all human activity is necessarily mentalistic. ---
In another sense, when we say that thinking is an activity, we do 
not necessarily include any physical point at all. Here, we say that 
thinking because it is one with having an outlook is also one with 
activity.
So, thinking may be, and probably usually is, manifested; and 
’activity’ is employed whether or not it is manifested. Yet, because of
the distinction made between what humans do as opposed to what happens to 
them, activity in the strong sense is only concerned with intentional 
thinking, again whether it is or is not. made manifest.
Conclusion
The concept of thinking can best be explicated by viewing it as 
having an outlook. By viewing it in this way, the various so-called 
species, like dreaming and rational thinking, can all be subsumed under 
the concept. This idea, is all the more helpful because it does not 
imply a strong, intentional doing. We must, in other words, accept the 
idea that thoughts, quite uninvited, impinge upon our consciousness.
For this reason the concept of thinking cannot be seen to be covered by
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the claim that it is an activity of mind. It can be, of course, and 
is in most of our concerns, an activity of mind but in this sense we 
are employing the concept in a strong, intentional way.
To think will not exclude the having of emotions. On the 
contrary, the arguing has been to the effect that to have an emotion 
is to see things in a certain way which is impossible without thinking. 
Further, to think will involve some concern.
Apart from ’consciousness1 when used to refer to a state of readi­
ness, thinking is the most basic concept used of mind.
How, in order to learn about the concept some extemalisation 
would be necessary but thinking may still be pursued without any need 
for extemalisation. Moreover, however helpful language, as normally 
understood, is, language is not necessary to thinking.
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CHAPTER 4
A Concept of Intelligence, 
and its necessary connection with a concept of Creativity
Introduction
Th.think is to have some outlook on the world. If now we employ a 
concept of activity to explain this, we must be careful to distinguish 
the senses in which this concept is used.
The reason for this is that in its strong sense the concept of 
thinking presupposes intentional activity. On the other hand, in its 
weak sense the notion of activity which is being employed is one where 
there is something going on, much as there is something going on in 
radio activity. Where, then, we have some evidence that intention looks 
to be present, as for example in rational thinking, we have grounds for 
distinguishing this kind of thinking from others where, as far as we 
know, intention looks to be lacking.
Now, the actual connection between dreaming on the one hand, which 
conveniently may be termed a species of autistic thinking,'1' and rational 
thinking on the other hand may be considered to be tighter than the 
connection between the unintentional and the intentional There are 
two points which favour this consideration.
The first one is that the kind of autistic thinking which we have 
may be partly or wholly the result of our other, intentional thinking. 
Secondly, there may be elements in autistic thinking which look to have 
the marks of intentional thinking. What is being suggested is that
1. Ref. McKellar, P., Imagination and Thinking - a psychological 
analysis, Cohen & West, London, 1967 > P»4»
within a dream, for example, characters appear who act as if in an 
intentional way much as characters within a novel act.
However, while we can accept the possibility of some kind of connec­
tion between autistic and reality-adjusted thinking, precisely what the 
connection is, remains vague. If a clear connection could be made, as 
for example could be made between imbibing too much alcohol and being 
unfit to drive a vehicle, then we would be able to maintain that doing 
certain things leads to the having of certain kinds of autistic thinking, 
whereupon blame could be attached to the doing of certain things. At 
the moment, though, if we notice ourselves bombarded by thoughts or 
dreams, it would make little sense to us to be praised or blamed for 
having them, simply because we know of no way by which we could either 
promote or discourage them.
While allowing for a possible sense of mystery, what must be 
accepted is that the phenomenon of uninvited thoughts, dreams and 
hypnagogic imagery is probably the lot of most of us. Because of this, 
what is vital is to consider an aspect of thinking which leads to a 
possible evaluation which is positive.
How, there are at least two forms of thinking which merit our 
approval, namely intelligent and rational thinking. What looks to be 
crucial, though in the explication of the concept of creativity, is 
intelligent thinking. The argument for this is as follows. To be 
creative is to be praised. Thus, one must engage upon some intentional 
activity. To do this one must think, and think in the strong sense. 
Moreover, to be creative one must be original. To be original is to see 
connections unseen by others, and this very seeing looks to be what is 
called bright or quick or intelligent.
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This seeing of connections may be consistent with a rational 
pursuit but the difficulty is that there is always a possibility that 
once principles of rational procedure have been seen they can be partly 
ignored, say for the sake of self-interest. Here, of course depending 
upon the values which are held, someone may be thought of as bright or 
intelligent in pursuing self-interest even in opposition to the interest 
of others.
It is therefore the concept of intelligence which needs to be 
examined and made explicit if these points concerning the concept of 
creativity are to be convincingly held.
Once the concept of intelligence is examined, the concept of 
creativity springs to life as a special way of acting intelligently.
The relationship between the concepts of thinking and intelligence
One illuminating point in attempting to see a link between the 
concepts of thinking and intelligence is in Bruner's'*’ use of the term 
1 category'. At first, this looks to be quite a convenient way of talking 
about thinking because it identifies a method of classifying, and 
this classifying is not immediately obvious with 'concept1.
The reason for this is that 1 concept1 emphasises the grasp whereas 
'category' looks as if it emphasises the manner of the grasp. So what 
could be said is that just as in ordinary physical conception there is 
an enclosing or a grasping, so by analogy this applies to the mind.
1. Bruner, J.S., A Study of Thinking, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956*
et alia
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Taken in this way, to have a concept is to have a mental grasp. Further, 
the only way in which we can have such a grasp is through some form of 
classifying or categorising.
This seems straightforward but then Bruner speaks of two kinds of 
categories, namely perceptual and conceptual. Now the real difficulty 
is that in so far as 'category1 is an idea used in talking of the concept 
of thinking, it is necessarily conceptual. Although, to exemplify the 
point, individual items in the physical world have to be perceived, they 
will have to be looked at in some way. Even in my identifying an object 
as being different from another, I must see it as individual, and 
therefore in a class or category of things which are individual. I 
must operate in my perception upon a principle of discrimination, and 
this principle is nowhere to be seen in the perceptual world.
Bruner can, therefore, only be sensibly interpreted by saying that 
a perceptual category is a concept which has reference to a perceptual 
object. In fact, Bruner says that logically speaking there is no 
distinction between perceptual and conceptual categories "save in the 
sense that the materials categorised differ"."*-
So, the way in which 'category' is used by Bruner is especially 
helpful in that it stresses the manner in which concepts are concepts.
In other words, there can be no grasp unless there is some form of 
classifying or categorising. However, a point which is also being 
maintained, which Bruner's language does not make clear, is that the 
categorising is conceptual whatever categorising is done.
To make this point clearer, when Ryle talks of a category mistake, 
he speaks of it as a conceptual error. Presumably, since Ryle is
1. Bruner, J.S. et alia, A Study of Thinking, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1956, P. 9-
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sorting things out, he is concerned that if a concept is a grasp then 
this can only be so if ideas are correctly categorised. In his example 
of the person who claims that he has seen the batteries, battalions and 
the squadrons but asks where the division is,**" we can see that this is a 
matter of not properly grasping, because what essentially constitutes 
an army is not sorted. This means, of course, that there can be no 
concepts without some categorising. Having categories will therefore 
imply having a grasp, but not necessarily the logical one. This is what 
Ryle wants to rectify, so that we donft get hold of the wrong end of the 
stick.
The kind of labelling in which Bruner engages is similar to the 
talk of Bearden when he divides concepts into perceptual, practical and 
theoretical. Of course, Bearden only wants to emphasise that one 
particular grasp is brought about in reference to perceptual objects.
Thus, as he uses perceptual concept, so does Bruner use perceptual 
category.
However, the talk is a little confusing because there look to be
2different kinds of concepts. However they are derived or whatever 
their reference, they are simply concepts. This can be explained by 
seeing what is essential to a concept. Even in Bearden’s terms, to have 
a concept is to be in possession of a principle of unity, ^ and a principle 
simply does not lie in perceptual objects.
The confusion arises not because the adjective 'perceptual' is 
used but because it is used to give a misleading notion that it describes
1. Ref. Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson, 1949 > p*18.
2. Bearden, R.F., The Philosophy of Primary Education, R.K.P., 1968, p.110
3. Bearden, R.F., ibid., p. 108.
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a difference in kind. A comparison may be made to a ’falling door’.
Now the door is not different in kind while it is falling, for it is 
still, say, an oak door and seven feet long. ’Falling’ does not tell 
us about the kind of door that it is. Again, an identifiable or a 
well-placed tree is not different in kind because it is identifiable 
or well-placed.
It is legitimate to use adjectives like 'well-placed', ’falling’ 
and ’perceptual,' so long as we do not think that such adjectives are 
informing us about 'kind'. They may, as they do in these examples, 
tell us something about how the kinds of things have originated, how 
they are related to other things or how we see them.
Once this possible confusion is cleared, 'category* becomes quite 
a convenient way of illustrating the functioning of concepts because 
it emphasises the class nature of concepts.
So, it can now be said that within the strong, namely the inten­
tional sense of thinking, category is a most appropriate concept, and 
this can be illustrated by looking first at some fundamental points 
within the theory of Intelligence.
First, the kind of work done by people like Kffhler indicate that the 
learning which was being investigated was brought about by the animals' 
ability first to categorise simply, and secondly to see categories 
combined through an overall category of means - ends. Clearly enough, 
the scope of employing categories was limited to a perceptual field 
but none the less, if an ape can actually get hold of a banana which was 
formerly unreachable without an implement, then the system of categorising
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was of vital importance. Epithets to account for the ability of any 
such ape would be ’clever* or ’intelligent1. Quite popularly, it might 
be said that the ape was truly thinking. Here then, intelligent 
performance is looked upon as a species, and an important species of 
thinking.
Next, straightforward classification figures largely in I.Q. Tests 
where, for example, testees are asked to engage in picking out a 
discrepant element in a group. Thus the grasping of categories, the 
seeing of various relationships between categories are considered to be 
necessary in determining the Intelligence Quotient of someone. Once 
again, a particular kind of thinking is being picked out.
A third point which is illuminating with reference to the link 
between thinking and intelligence is Binet's work in the pioneering days 
of I.Q. Tests. ’L1 intelligence1 actually meant ’thinking’, and Binet's 
special job was to evaluate the kind of thinking which was necessary in 
order to cope with the academic study required in the normal school. 
Binet’s attempts to calculate this resulted in what have come to be 
accepted as Intelligence Tests.
Thus three leading points about the theory of intelligence ares the 
ability to categorise; the grasping of categories and their relation­
ships; and the overall idea that IE intelligence' meant thinking. All 
these points indicate that someone is bright, quick, clever or intelligent 
in so far as he grasps a situation, and in each case a clear categorising 
is expected.
In ordinary usage, the award of 'intelligent' is made when it is
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thought that someone has grasped a situation. ^ If pressed, it is
found that people employ an implicit notion of category to exemplify what 
they mean. They talk, for example, of 'getting things straight1 or of 
'putting things in the right slot'. Here, it is thinking of a special 
kind which is being assessed.
Still bearing in mind the appropriateness of 'category', there is 
a further point which links together the various species of thinking and 
which presses for the strong, intentional sense of intelligent thinking. 
Yi/hen people are thought of as bright or intelligent, they are thought of 
highly. In other words, these are positively evaluative terms. On 
the other hand, what passes as Autistic thinking is accepted as non- 
intentional and as such warrants no praise or condemnation, but even here 
some form of categorising looks to be present. The link between the 
species, though, is this. A reflection, on the one hand, of the strong 
forms of thinking can occur in the weak forms; on the other hand, a 
dream or an uninvited thought could later be used intentionally. If 
Coleridge, for example, actually had the dream he spoke of, then that he 
made use of it is praiseworthy. Because of our lack of knowledge about 
the occurrence of dreams and other uninvited thoughts, some credence to 
mystery is allowable.
It may be thought that these uninvited thoughts, these dreams, 
these fantastic images amount to part of the processes of intelligence, 
but this looks to be a mistake conceptually. One reason is that any 
such processes are hidden, and therefore any award offered would have to 
be done by the individual concerned: yet, by the time he awards it, he
has had to consider it, and moreover, if he is to give praise, it will be
1. cf. Heim, A., Intelligence and Personality, their assessment and their 
relationship, Penguin Books Ltd., Middx., 1970, p. 28.
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in virtue of his consideration of the matter. If, for example, he 
thinks to himself that a particular dream was intelligent, then first he 
has made an evaluation. Yet, what more is there? If he is looking at 
events, these of themselves can have no credit unless he sees that such 
a combination is worth having. However, we can see various combinations 
in the world, accidentally effected, but if I say that they are intelli­
gent, can I mean more than I can mean in the instance of the dream?
In both, there would be wonder about what was meant. The implication 
is, of course, that even the evaluation is baseless.
While such uninvited thoughts have no direct, necessary link with 
the concept of intelligence, they may form the basis of intelligent 
performance. It would be with this in mind that Coleridge could make 
use of a dream, or Joseph of his dreams in Egypt. Left as they are, 
who can be praised? As sights for Coleridge and Joseph, they may be 
marvelled at, much as Niagara Palls may be.
Related to the point of uninvited thoughts is the idea that such 
thoughts may be common to most of us, but 'intelligent' is only awarded 
publicly if we make use of them; and only awarded privately once they 
have been evaluated. If somehow we can recall a dream in which someone 
has acted in accordance with what we consider to be the criteria of 
intelligent performance, then within this realm, on the presupposition of 
intentional activity, no doubt the award of 'intelligent' can be made.
The only trouble is that in the important sense of intentional 
activity, we would have to say that in view of the realm of dreams any 
award would be merely quasi-evaluative. The reason for this is that
'intelligent' is learned in accordance with public criteria, and only 
then applied privately. As applied to people in dreams, the position
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would be similar if we were considering a novel or a play, where we would 
make evaluations of characters. It would certainly be odd if an 
individual on hearing about Fagin went to the ends of the earth to wreak 
vengeance on him; or if, as a result of observing a character in a dream, 
he longed for a 'repeat performance' so that justice could be done.
The point is that the concepts of justice and intention begin to have no 
application at all.
The most that can be said is that any form of autistic thinking can 
be used. It cannot be said that if people are intelligent then they 
must make use of a form of autistic thinking; or, if they are not 
intelligent that they do not suffer autistic thinking.
So far, then, it has been argued that the concept of intelligence 
embraces thinking which is intentional and is characterised by an 
individual's grasp of a situation as evaluated by the user of the concept.
Intelligence as an evaluative concept
The concept of intelligence necessarily carries with it a positive 
evaluation. This can be evidenced in the following ways.
First, the established Intelligence Quotient had in its founding
father, Binet, an investigator who was interested in searching for a
special kind of thinking. Separating those pupils who could cope with
the basic subjects in the schools of Paris from those who simply could
not cope^  was a task which was essentially evaluative. A standard or
norm was set up which itself confirms the evaluative stand. Again, in
2
reference to I.Q. Tests when later Guilford complained about the
1. See Guilford, J.P., The Nature of Human Intelligence, McGraw-Hill, 
Book Co., N.Y., 1967*
2. Guilford, J.P., 'Creativity' in The American Psychologist published 
by The Amer. Psych. Assoc. Inc., Washington, Vol.5> 1950* P* 447*
- 99 -
narrowness of the I.Q. metric, he did so by virtue of another evaluative 
scheme whereby he could see that divergent production was a good, 
unallowed for in the basic subjects which had become the general ground­
work of Ii<|. Tests.
Secondly, ’intelligent* tends to be used by those in authority in 
’academic1 work, and so the values of the teachers tend to rub off to 
the pupils. In other spheres, ’bright’ or ’quick' or ’clever' are 
used but again in reference to the users. There is no sense in which the 
users are not praising what they see. If, then, an individual wishes 
in any way to identify with those using such terms, he is ensnared in 
the evaluative scheme.
Thirdly, there is a point which a learner of a language or even an 
experienced language user may not notice. It is that evaluative terms 
are picked up in accordance with a dominant value. For example, one may 
accept the values of one’s parents, and begin to call good those things 
and those activities called good by parents. In the same way does this 
happen with 'intelligent' or any of its synonyms. If the values are 
anti-authority groups, then ’intelligent1, 'bright', or 'quick' will be 
used of those kinds of connections made with reference to an overall 
avoidance of the effect of that authority. Because of the tying of 
awards like that of 'intelligent' to value schemes, then in changing from 
such a scheme to another, which is of course possible, an individual 
is faced with the prospect of finding difficulty in using the same 
concepts. For example, by seeing the particular value scheme which 
Socrates adopted which was not tied to survival physically at any cost, 
then those activities of his while in prison can be viewed as intelligent. 
A similar situation faces those who, say, adopt a new scheme of religious 
or other values.
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While obviously there will be other criteria for awarding 
’intelligent1 since otherwise one evaluative concept would be as acceptable 
as another, the tying of intelligence to a value scheme is necessary, 
and as with any such evaluative concept, it will be linked to some 
dominant value.
Very closely linked with the preceding point is Piaget's idea of 
adaptation. Here the end is given as having value in itself. Piaget's 
whole scheme is based upon a biological model which may have some
extremely useful implications: but the model has clear limitations as
regards intelligence. There are two matters which should be considered 
here. First, on the point of adaptation, Piaget cites Clarapede who 
held that feelings appoint a goal for behaviour, while intelligence 
provides the means ('the technique').1 Now, if we are to adapt and our 
feelings are modifiable, and are getting in the way, then acceptance of 
feelings would be contrary to the idea of adaptation. Thus, this view 
of free-floating feelings really needs to be analysed, to see whether 
they are localised physical feelings or emotions, and to check whether 
they are inevitable? and, moreover, while this view brings out the 
goal-directedness of intelligent activity, it stops short of examining 
whether the particular goals selected are intelligently selected.
The second matter to be considered under this idea of adaptation is
that,in accordance with the idea, animals which adapt tend to stay alive, 
whereas for humans to press for staying alive represents an evaluation.
Both matters falling within this view of adaptation are worth taking 
up at this stage because of the unexpressed values which are inherent
1. Piaget, J., The Psychology of Intelligence, R.K.P., London 1961, p. 4*
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in it, and also because it inhibits the consideration of final values 
which could be a matter of intelligent performance. If, further, the 
view were followed, it would commit us to a narrow concept of intelligence. 
I shall explain all this.
In various experiments conducted which we have heard about under the 
heading of 'Learning Theories', intelligent performance has been witnessed 
when a clear goal, like obtaining food, has been achieved through certain 
means. I do not object specifically to this. What I object to is the 
idea that the particular goal set up by those looking at the activity 
is necessarily the one set up by the one being examined.1 This actually
has been one major difficulty in passing directly from animal to human
enterprises: but, at least we can usually ask humans and not simply
assume a value.
Next, the goal suggested in so many of these investigations lies
outside of the means: and this tendency of looking for an end which lies
outside of the particular activity in which people are engaging may be 
attributable to the kind of language which we employ when we speak of 
'means - end*. Some particular activities may be engaged in as 
ends-in-themselves, and those people who ask instrumental questions of 
these activities will be unable to appreciate the intrinsic values of 
these activities, and for that reason will be unable to award 'intelligent' 
to them.
This example shows how inextricably woven is a concept which 
embraces 'means' and 'ends'. With the Piagetian notion drawn from 
Clarapede which presses for adaptation, 'ends' becomes a different,
1. cf. Peters, R.S., The Concept of Motivation, R.K.P., London, 1958, 
p. 98.
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hived-off concept and simply accepted. Feelings have appointed the 
ends; and that's it. Yet, suppose someone accepted an end like sitting 
quietly or counting one's money, isn't it apposite to ask whether it is 
bright or intelligent to accept any such ends as these? If this question 
can be asked, won't it show that the concept of intelligence need not be 
restricted to the acceptance of any specific ends?
Thus the point on adaptation as an end clearly informs us that 
unless we understand the value scheme in which someone is operating, we 
cannot appreciate fully what he means by 'intelligent'.
Fifthly, with regard to the actual preparation of the bulk of I.Q. 
Tests, an evaluation was made about the area which the material should 
cover. That this was decided to be Language and Mathematics would, in 
fact, be to the disadvantage of those who, for example, were unaccustomed 
to what Bernstein has called an 'elaborated code' of speech, and also to 
the disadvantage of those whose background and beliefs were contrary to 
the ethos of the school.
A sixth point is that among early investigations into the idea of
intelligence was Galton's work. Ideas of intellect, intellectual gifts
and intelligence have been worked in together and have carried with them
a notion of doing well publicly. Those people, in fact, who were looked
at by Galton would have been those who had received something of a
scholarly upbringing, and so the assessment of them was already in the
academic sphere, even though admittedly Galton was interested in obtaining
1
correlations by means of psycho-physical responses.
Finally, there are two misuses of the term 'intelligent' which point
1. Ref. Akhurst, B.A., Assessing Intellectual Ability, The English 
Universities Press Ltd., 1970? Suffolk, p*58»
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very clearly to the evaluative function of the concept. These are the 
magical and imitative senses. Concerning the magical sense, an overall 
idea of the end of a specific activity is accepted hut the intricacies of 
the means are not understood. For example, suppose a footballer were to 
run to a position away from goal and away from the ball, he could be seen 
to be stupid by those who misunderstood the various roles of team players. 
This would be even more marked if no result ensued. On the other hand, 
if some movement like this, which looked inappropriate to spectators, 
resulted fairly regularly in a goal being scored, then the spectators 
would view it as intelligent in a magical sense because it would appear as 
if it v/ere related to the end they themselves had. What is actually done 
is hidden: all that is known is that certain means have been taken up 
which have achieved certain ends.
Concerning the imitative sense, this is in common with the way in 
which children pick up the function of so many words. Thus, if grown-ups 
use 'clever* or 'intelligent' of some people, because the tone and manner 
of using these terms are indicative of praise, others who may not understand 
the reasons why some people are thought to be clever, may still follow the 
usage.
Long before children are aware of any reasons for liking certain 
people or of disliking others, their particular attitudes can already be 
detected. Actually, in giving an account of prejudice, that people have 
already adopted value stands with minimal understanding indicates how 
awards can be made chiefly through imitation.
Now, because 'intelligent' would have currency among teachers in 
speaking of ability especially in academic work, there would always be 
suggested an evaluative sense. Even though, in particular, parents may
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be unsure about why precisely a child is thought of as intelligent,
they are pleased to hear this of their child.
This imitative usage is, of course, similar to the magical sense in
that means are not appreciated, but, unlike this sense, is not tied to
the appreciation of an end. All that is happening is that a generalised 
value stand is assumed. As a result of using ’intelligent* in this way 
all that could be done explicitly would be to be able to put 'intelligent* 
into a pro-category.
The concept of Intelligence as wider than the I.Q. metric
Sometimes when writers have talked about Creativity, they have 
tried to show that there is something specific about creative people 
which looks to be different from the display of intelligence.
Ghiselin's1 collection of autobiographical sketches is enough to make 
the point.
This, however, I take to be a mistake. It is a mistake first of 
all because, as I have already shown, Creativity presupposes thinking, and 
all that ’intelligence' means is intelligent thinking. Secondly, 
because originality is necessary to a concept of creativity, the seeing 
of connections unseen by others is evidence enough of intelligent activity 
par excellence.
There may be two reasons for the mistake. On the one hand, many 
creative people have been evident in the field of Art, and here there 
has been a tendency to consider activities as removed from the standard 
performances within what have been accepted as 'intellectual' exercises,
1. Ref. Ghiselin, B., The Creative Process, op. cit.
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where there seemed to be a clear link with intelligence. Such artistic 
activities would have been of the heart, whereas the intellectual would 
have been of the head. Because what such creative people did was 
singularly marked by originality,-their work may have seemed to be 
generated by something other than normally human. To point to this, 
some of these creative people may not have had any success at intellectual 
pursuits.
On the other hand, since the early days of the testing of intelli­
gence, there has been a tendency to see this as synonymous with an I.Q. 
metric; and so when it seemed that certain people were creative and 
had not done well on I.Q. Tests, obviously there was no tie-up between 
the concepts of intelligence and creativity.
However, in its design and in its conception the I.Q. metric has
been narrow from the days of Binet. While it may be conceded that
1
'1'intelligence* meant 'thinking* when Binet began his investigations, 
the paradigm of this thinking lay squarely in what could be called the 
academic field. Nov/ what constituted this was narrow, and amounted to 
no more than would have been instrumental to managing academically.
This would include some mastery of one*s mother tongue and some basic 
ability in Mathematics.
C-
Actually, with regard to the academic there are two senses to the 
term, and the second sense is narrow. The work of the Academy has been 
to promote knowledge. One example of this work will illustrate both 
senses of the word.
The example concerns sorting out points on Grammar, which was an 
extremely difficult thing to do. The searching for patterns, say in
1. See Reeves, J.W., Thinking about Thinking, Methuen & Co.Ltd., London, 
1965* p. 242.
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parts of speech, how nouns varied in case in accordance with the overall 
demand of the function of sentences, how verbal forms once discovered 
could be systematised - all were matters of patient enquiry. This was 
the job of the Academics, and it required not merely an understanding of 
the various moves made in Language but also an ability to suggest 
hypotheses to account both for regularities and irregularities. Once 
the work had been done which "had been prepared for by generations of 
curious enquiry and practical endeavour",1 points concerning what a noun 
was, how adjectives agreed with nouns in number, gender and case could 
all have been memorised by pupils; and this very memorising was called 
academic. Indeed, at a .higher level than pure memorising, the fitting 
of the various parts of speech into a whole would require a pupil to 
identify categories, to see relationships between categories in an 
intricate manner, and to try out possibilities so that other relation­
ships could be brought to light. Again, this is academic: but it
stops short of the kind of work performed by those who put Grammar on 
the map.
So the difference is between a maker and a follower of a map.
Now drawing attention to the way 'academic1 is used, is helpful in 
so far as it illustrates the narrow aspect of an I.Q. Test. Here, all 
the answers are known and there is little room for manoeuvre, and what 
is more, no incentive exists for going outside of the map.
It could be replied that maps are like this. Actually, this is the 
implicit reply of the formulators of the I.Q,. Tests. There's a 
relationship, they would say, between an apple and a pear which neither
1. Farrington, B., Greek Science, 2, Penguin Books, Middx., 1949 > P*96.
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bears to an umbrella. Again, if we are trying to find out how many 
books of a certain width of spine would fit into a bookshelf of a definite 
width, there will be one answer.
Now, while I could agree that to work out problems like this one 
would require intelligent activity, I would also want to maintain that 
eating when one is hungry would be intelligent. Any objection to this 
could be equally an objection to the working out of book-widths. For 
example, if it were very dangerous to eat under certain conditions, then 
in accordance with a value scheme of survival, eating would not be 
intelligent. Similarly, if working out book-widths was done at the 
expense of connecting oneself to a kidney machine, again in terms of 
survival, acting arithmetically would not constitute acting intelligently.
If now we bear the preceding points in mind, four major criticisms 
of an I.Q,. concept of intelligence can be offered.
In the first instance, the Tests are evaluatively awry. It has 
already been shown that from the beginning there existed an implicit 
evaluation about pupils1 ability or inability to cope with basic academic 
subjects, to wit, that such ability or inability would determine whether a 
pupil was or was not intelligent. An evaluation was therefore needed to 
get into the narrow academic sphere, but this was purely implicit: the
rest was apparently descriptive. In other words, the psychologists 
were giving a plain matter-of-fact account of what pupils were intellec­
tually, and possibly innately so: or at least, this seemed to be the case.
Then, presumably to justify the position, it could have been held that the 
psychologists were only testing areas in Language and Mathematics - and 
some content was necessary. Further, all pupils had an opportunity to 
develop both. Clearly enough, from the point of view of the testers,
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and indeed of those others who would refer to intelligent activity quite 
magically, there was no doubt that what was done was nothing but legitimate.
The next point is an ^objection based upon the distinction between 
map makers and map followers. Everything on the verbal I.Q,. Test is
clearly drawn out beforehand. Every answer is known. Now, certainly
it may be part of the concept of intelligence that connections bet?/een 
categories are seen: further, that this aspect of the concept is evidenced
by the kinds of questions asked in an I.Q,. Test will show that it is also 
thought by testers that it is part of the concept of intelligence. Yet, 
while an individual will be considered intelligent if say he can see a 
connection in the following: 1, 4> 2, 5> 3> 6, 4> by suggesting the next
number, he would be so much more intelligent if he could see connections 
unseen by others. Such possible connections are not considered in a 
verbal I.Q. Test, and it is for this reason that the charge of narrowness 
is brought.
EUrther, one of the most basic flaws in the case for aligning the 
concept of the I.Q. metric with the concept of intelligence is that if 
people are considered intelligent then they also have academic interests. 
There is a corollary to this, namely that those who have academic 
interests show themselves to be more intelligent than others in that they 
can operate in abstractions. Now, the general flaw can be seen in this 
way. If all the principles of intelligent performance had been worked 
out and embodied in a test, this would have helped, but clearly in 
accordance with my last paragraph this is not so. Seeing relationships 
between categories, for example, looks like a principle, which of course 
looms large in tests, but then, if the background of pupils has not 
incorporated a reasonably high level of expertise in language development, 
while it is possible that such pupils could see identical or similar
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relationships in other areas of expertise, the mastery of principles 
will not be detected.
The actual seeing of relationships between categories can, of 
course, be fairly simple but it can be extremely complex. Examples of 
both kinds may be evidenced in the kind of test which assesses a particular 
level of I.Q., and this is to be expected. At a simple level where a 
testee is asked to pick out an item which is not in the same category as 
all the others, as in: hammer, apple, guavas, tomato, an identical
grasping of the principle will be witnessed when someone pushes aside one 
particular food or commodity which is discrepant with regard to the 
category of 'like1 or 'what is beneficial1 or 'price1. Especially with 
reference to 'like* or say a particular texture which cannot easily be 
verbalised, there may be no resorting to linguistic or other graphically 
symbolic forms.
At a more complex level a testee may be asked to compare two lists 
in both of which there are as many as five items. The work here would 
be to determine which two items in one list had something in common with 
two items on the other list. Here it is very difficult to see into which 
category to put either possible combination. The difficulty in the 
situation lies in the actual holding in abeyance possible categories so 
as to compare them with another set of possible categories; yet if we 
consider the kind of operation which may be required on the football 
field, a similar principle may be evidenced. For example, the various 
combinations of the members of both teams may be such that not only must 
their relative positions to each other be taken into account but their com­
parative speed - and this in relation to their existing readiness for 
movement - and their ability to anticipate the possible movements of 
others.
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Clearly there exists a high level of abstraction in the possible 
I.Q. example, but the level looks equally high in the other which is 
thought of as non-academic. It is here that the corollary, just mentioned, 
can be seen to be narrow as much as its main proposition is. The main 
pressure of the verbal I.Q. test lies not in considering the ability 
or lack of ability to engage in what is called 'abstract thinking* but 
in engaging in such thinking through an explicit system of symbols.
The fourth main criticism concerns the conjectures of transfer.
An error creeps in when as a result of doing well on an I.Q. test, an 
award is made of 'intelligent' as if it were an overall ability where, 
especially with some of the background which psychology has, it becomes 
something of an innate faculty. Under this notion, if there were a 
possibility of acting intelligently this would be expected of someone 
with a high I.Q., and, of course, a correspondingly low performance would 
be expected of someone with a low I.Q.
Yet, this would pressurise us into giving an account of the performance 
of some people who at once score well on I.Q. tests and who seem to be 
silly in other areas. To overcome the apparent problem we can pre-judge 
the situation, for there is nothing else to do; and when, for example, 
we are faced with a situation in which the performances of those of low 
I.Q. seem to satisfy the criteria of intelligent performance, because we 
are so tied to a belief in the efficiency of the I.Q. metric, we attempt 
to reduce the performance to a knack or luck or instinct.
Of course it’s a good predictor. We would expect that those who 
had shown ability in a specific field early in life would, on the whole, 
do well later. On the other hand, we would not expect others who had 
not done well early to do well later. In both cases, though, we realise
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that these expectations are based upon merely general assumptions which 
we would make in any field because of our belief in such ideas as early 
training and development of expertise, and crucial learning periods; but 
in all, we know how wrong we can be.
In the I.Q. test and in other fields the positions are similar. 
However, this is overlooked, and, a great deal more is claimed for the 
I.Q. test. If more were legitimately claimed then what would be necessary 
would be to show that those who do quite well on the narrowly academic 
material also act quite intelligently in non-academic matters, and those 
who do not do well on I.Q. tests act correspondingly unintelligently in 
non-academic matters.
Principles of intelligent performance and the concept of Creativity
In the search for criteria of the concept of intelligence, I would 
like first to bring together the ideas which pinpoint the inadequacies 
of the I.Q. metric. This will highlight the principles upon which the 
deliberations about the concept can be made explicit.
First, if we look carefhlly at the background of the I.Q. metric, we 
can see that the meaning implicitly attributed to intelligence was 
evaluative. Secondly, as soon as we examine the growth of the I.Q. we 
can see that it has been used within a narrowly academic framework. The 
illegitimacy of this is clear because the move has omitted reference not 
only to the most significant point about the Academy but also to the 
meaning behind usage which itself has reflected that significant point, 
namely the seeing of connections unseen by others.
Looked at squarely, the story is this. If pupils are to manage to 
deal with the basics of the vast range of material already thought out, •
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then they will have to think on special lines. Such special thinking 
had a ready-made equivalent in the term 'intelligence'; hut imperceptibly 
it had taken on a technical and narrow meaning.
Yet, if v/e simply look at what lay behind it, and of course, at
the other activities of those v/ho assumed that they were investigating 
the principles of intelligence, it can be seen that the meaning behind 
the usage was then and is now very similar to the meaning of 'bright', 
'clever', 'perceptive1 and 'quick'. However, the meaning of these can 
not be restricted to ability in Language or Mathematics: nor can it
be restricted to the seeing of connections which have been seen by 
others. Ho mandate exists for any such restrictions.
Now, the most difficult point in attempting to be precise about the 
concept of intelligence is that it is evaluative at every turn. I would 
like to illustrate the difficulty in this way. In so many examples 
where 'intelligent' is used, there is a clear indication that it is 
used in reference to ability to see relationships between categories.
This is true of tests, verbal and non-verbal; it is true of Kohler's 
apes; it is true of an ordinary, everyday occurrence in catching a train.
On the negative side, if this seeing of relationships is ignored, from
testers of I.Q. to average people viewing, there is a strong tendency not 
merely to withdraw the award of 'intelligent' but to award 'unintelligent' 
or 'dull* or 'stupid'. From this, we could easily gather that this very 
seeing of relationships between categories is a necessary criterion of 
intelligence, and possibly sufficient. Yet, imagine for a moment two 
opposed value schemes,- one a quasi-religious scheme and the other the 
Copernican system adopted by Galileo. He had clearly seen some connec­
tions which were important but was he the more intelligent in seeing the
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connection between his safety and keeping quiet? Thus, in the seeing of 
connections between categories, what is also being evaluated is whether 
the particular categories should even be considered.
However, within this wholly evaluative framework, as has already 
been exemplified, it is clear that unless connections between categories 
are thought to be seen, no award of 'intelligent1 is made. This seeing 
of connections between categories as a principle is supported not only 
in the work done on Intelligence testing and in ordinary usage but also 
etymologically. 'Intellego', even split up into its constituent parts, 
carries with it a notion of 'reading between1 or 'choosing between' 
and this implies the seeing of connections between categories. The 
various English derivatives of 'intellego* (which is usually translated 
as 'I understand') like 'intellect', '.intellegentsia1 and 'intelligible' 
all carry with them the idea of making connections. Even in the term 
'intelligence' as used in the Forces, there is a clear indication that 
it relates to the accumulation of relevant information which could be 
helpful in the making of crucial connections.
So while this seeing of connections between categories is necessary, 
there is more to the concept of intelligence. What can be noticed 
about the work done by people like Kohler, Thorndike and Pavlov is that 
the idea of an end was presupposed. Actually, it may be objected here 
that such investigators only assumed an end, like satisfaction of needs: 
yet while the particular end was assumed, some end was presupposed.
It is for this reason that the whole idea of means - ends has meaning, 
since it directs our attention to the goal-directedness of activity, that 
in. fact. :it is intentional. Thus to make intelligible why people or 
animals do things, some kind of end has to be accepted. Now, it is true
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that the particular ends which some people set before themselves are 
hidden from us, and therefore any particular means which they adopt may 
be unintelligible to us, but in so far as we refuse to employ a concept 
of intelligence of their activities, we do so in accordance with a 
presupposition of an end. For example, quite often we assume that other 
people’s ends are clear, and we may think that gaining advancement is 
such an end; and because of this we may then judge as unintelligent 
what these people do. Yet, this may not be their end. The mistake 
therefore is purely empirical. In so far as we judge, our judgement is 
made on principle.
At the moment, then, there are two points which are being held within 
the evaluative framework of the concept of intelligence. These are 
that connections between categories are seen, and that these are seen in 
relation to a particular end. However, as I have shown already, we do 
not always have to look outside of the particular activity in which 
someone is engaging in order to discover what his end is. The mere 
engaging in some activities is sufficient because they are seen as ends-in- 
themselves. Again, at this point there is an evaluation, for what can 
happen is that whether on occasion one should engage in activities as 
ends-in-themselves, or say be preparing for winter, no matter how 
intelligently the activities are conducted, is a matter of serious 
cont emplation.
Actually, it would be useful to offer a caveat here because quite 
often the assessment of people’s intelligent performance is done in a 
short-term way where any enquiry about aims is minimal, which means that 
the actual evaluation is extremely superficial. If another caveat is 
needed, it is that such an evaluation is sometimes made thrpugh media
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in which people are not at ease, which of course makes it extremely 
difficult to determine. These two caveats insist upon the looking 
carefully at the principles upon which we are deciding in employing the 
concept of intelligence.
Certainly, then, there are two clear points which amount to principles 
for judging our own or other people’s intelligent performance. This 
will not mean that we are right because we can easily be wrong about 
applying the principles. By way of illustration, we can look at a 
parallel in judging someone to be moral. Part of the meaning of ’moral1 
is the consideration of intention since if we are to say of anyone that he 
is kind or honest, which ideas come under the general heading of moral 
terms, then in so far as these terms are praising, then all is misplaced 
if intention is absent. Now, we may actually be wrong in our award 
because it may be shown that such a person could not have intended to do
whatever it was; or it may be shown that we had not perceived the situation
correctly. However, we could not make the moral judgement unless we 
presupposed intention. In a similar way do we use 'intelligent*.
Unless we presuppose an end and unless we presuppose the seeing of
connections between categories, there is no sense to be given to the usage 
of ’intelligent’ and thus the concept has no application. 'Intelligence' 
is always employed within a context of looking at things which requires 
thinking of a special kind. Because thinking is done through concepts, 
then unless an individual is judged to be seeing these as in some way 
connected to an end, there is no possibility of the concept of 
intelligence having application.
Therefore, these two principles are presupposed in a concept of 
intelligence.
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Of course, to give precise point to these principles some idea of 
speed is also built into them. Thus if it takes an individual weeks to 
decide upon an end, which for the sake of survival requires immediacy, 
then importantly he has not acted intelligently. An identical situation 
would arise if connections between categories were not seen fairly quickly.
Speed, though, may not always be very crucial. Some people may be 
a second .or two speedier than others in seeing connections but the 
connections seen may not be important. Again, even if some people are 
speedier than others, and just as accurate, the others may still be 
thought of as intelligent. Speed, then, looks to be a second order 
principle.
Yet, as soon as this is said, a major difficulty is seen, because 
it now looks as if we have both necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the concept. Actually, if we examine any I.Q. Test, these look to be 
necessary and sufficient. So too do they appear to be under normal, 
everyday circumstances. Thus if the matter is one of selecting a train 
or planning a meal, no more is required - provided, of course, that 
evaluation is built into the concept.
But suppose existing known ends or known means are inappropriate (and 
this is evaluative), if someone were to suggest an alternative to either, 
wouldn’t he be more intelligent than the others? An example could centre 
on a person taking a bucket to a well, but what of the person who could see 
the value of pipes and, say, of water finding its own level? The 
implication is that some people are very bright, very intelligent. They, 
in fact, see connections which no one else has seen.
Here, then, is the difficulty. When some people see connections
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unseen by others, although I employ the concept of intelligence of them,
I do not withdraw the award of ’intelligent1 from others who have not 
seen such connections. All I do is to compare the two. The one who 
collects the bucket and the water is simply intelligent but the other is 
very intelligent.
So, an end, and the seeing of connections in relation to that end 
are presupposed to a concept of intelligence. Moreover, both principles 
have built into them some notion of speed. If now I say that together 
they are necessary and sufficient to acting intelligently (provided, of 
course, that the evaluation is borne in mind) mustn’t I also say that 
there is never a need to suggest new categories? If so, how can I 
account for the idea of those who are intelligent par excellence?
The only possibility of accounting for this, and of overcoming the 
difficulty is by accepting two levels of intelligent performance under 
the concept. The higher level will be that embraced by a concept of 
creativity.
Links between the concepts of Intelligence and Creativity
The argument is then that it is possible to characterise as intelligent, 
and indeed very intelligent, those people who suggest new categories.
Of course, this is not to say than any suggestion of new categories will 
be thought of as intelligent because some suggestions of new categories 
may be of an extremely low level. Thus, any novel suggestion will have 
to be evaluated.
Now, in any award which I may make I may merely imitate the awards 
of others. Again, I may magically make awards. However, if I am
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genuinely to say that someone is creative I must accept that he has offered 
something original. If I do not accept this, there is no point whatever 
in my making use of a concept of creativity. In the offering of 
something original what was shown was that we were essentially concerned 
with praising human activity. In order to give point to this praising, 
a concept of thinking was presupposed.
In praising people for their original thinking we were singling out 
something special about their originality. We we re not saying, for 
example, that anybody who offers an idea which comes from himself, as a 
source, is necessarily to be praised. However, neither were we saying 
that anyone at all who offers something original is by that token to be 
praised as creative, since some suggestions of new ideas have no value.
Similarly, it was not held that if anyone saw connections in reference 
to an end he was necessarily intelligent. Most certainly he would have 
to be seen as acting in this way, but the whole must be evaluated.
Ends and means may singly or together be seen as inappropriate, in which
case the award of ’intelligent* will not be made.
How, in evaluating means and ends, we have in mind ideas like 
logical moves, useful ideas and sensible suggestions, and these ideas
have application whether we are dealing with an I.Q. assessment or with
looking at people’s general behaviour. All these ideas finally amount 
to an enriching of understanding. It is this, then, that gives an 
account of the specific evaluation of the concept of intelligence.
Further, in so far as the seeing of original connections is concerned, 
it is only when this seeing is considered to enrich understanding that 
such original activity is praised. Here we employ a concept of 
creativity.
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This must be so because we sometimes reject some of the work of 
otherwise acceptedly creative people as non-creative, and this would not 
be possible at all if every single thing that such a one did was thought 
of as creative. Again, among other people, however much they have acted 
as sources, and however much their ideas are new either to them or 
comparatively, or in the world, we may still reject all their offerings.
From this it can be seen that the concept of creativity makes use of 
a special sense of originality and a particular kind of originality. 
special sense has always been that such an offering has not been seen 
previously in this way, and of course, this stresses that the notion of an 
individual originator must be from him, as a source. This in fact would 
be a clue to the evaluation which is evoked. If, however, it were 
claimed that 'original for the individual' could be an accepted sense, 
we could counter this by showing that the slowest learning of the most 
basic points amounts to doing something original for the individual.
There would be nothing of significance here to compare with an Einstein 
or Shakespeare. Again, ’original within a group1 could equally be at a 
low level.
Actually, because of the various senses of original, it is easy to 
see how a newer meaning has possibly been given to the concept of 
creativity. For example, because the primary meaning envisaged has been 
'new in the world1, the newer meaning has caught hold of the lack of 
precision in the overall idea of original, and has claimed that whether or 
not an idea is original in the world, it is none the less original. If, 
then, I say that the concept of creativity does not merely make use of a 
special sense of 'original* but also embraces a particular kind of 
originality, which kind is it?
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To point directly to this, what is clear at the outset is that to 
be thought of as creative one must act in an original way. To do this, 
intelligent thinking is presupposed. With regard to the ordinary way of 
acting intelligently, what we are concerned with in our evaluation is 
that an individual sees relationships between categories with reference 
to an end. If it is thought that some people do not see such relation­
ships, then they are not considered to be intelligent. Therefore, on 
this alone, if someone sees relationships not previously seen by others 
he is more intelligent in this respect.
So the point is that in seeing connections with reference to an end 
we are operating in an area where it is possible for us to be thought of 
as intelligent. Moreover, if speed is important this will operate as a 
second order principle. Yet, what finally counts and necessarily counts 
is the evaluation, and it certainly seems that this evaluation is based 
upon the idea of enrichment of understanding. Following this, when we 
are concerned about the seeing of original connections, then unless such 
a seeing enriches understanding, there is no awarding of 'creative1.
It is conceivable that an individual offers some idea which a few 
other limited people think is original and intelligent, whereupon they 
consider the individual to be creative. He may consider it creative 
himself, because 'new* for him is synonymous with 'new in the world'.
If, as another example, someone after years of effort finally distinguishes 
between two letters of the alphabet, then he has done something new for 
himself, which may actually impress others slightly more limited. Yet 
the level of enrichment is low.
Nov/, those people thought of as creative are those who have stood 
out, and in this sense they were not ordinary. It is for this reason
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that comparatively few have been thought of in this wqy, which of course 
indicates that the primary sense of ’original in the world1 is intended.
The specific evaluation within a concept of creativity is one which 
is evaluative of a certain level of intelligent performance. This will 
be shown to have validity when I consider in more detail the evaluative 
aspects of the concept of creativity.
Conclusion
Within some scheme of evaluation, to see connections between 
categories is judged to be a matter of intelligent behaviour. Whenever 
the concept of intelligence is employed, presupposing some end which in 
some way can be seen as having some value, is part of the concept.
To establish that there are levels we shall have to accept that 
to see certain connections is comparatively easy whereas to see others is 
difficult. This, anyhow, can be exemplified by looking at the kinds of 
insight required in the I.Q. set-up. The situation faced may only 
require us to recognise whether or not a particular item belongs in a 
particular category. On the other hand, we may be faced with a situation 
which is more complex in the number of items and the various inter­
relationships which exist. If the mode of doing something can be estima­
ted in this way, then the idea of levels is important.
Now, in everyday living, to operate at a high level is important, 
but what we can notice is that a member of a family or a company may 
suggest an idea which has not been current in family or company affairs. 
Perhaps others knew of the idea but had not seen its connection in these 
matters. The bringing forward of such an idea not normally in vogue
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within one domain would certainly he an act of seeing connections between
categories. If, then, this idea is relevant and it would have to be
seen as relevant to be called intelligent, then this is a connection not 
previously noticed by others. This looks to be at a higher level of
performing than has been attained by others.
So, if seeing connections is necessary to the concept of intelligence, 
the seeing of more difficult connections will be at a higher level.
Normally, within any field, there are standard ways of operating, 
however complex some of these ways may be. In order to be able to grasp 
some of them, one may need to act very intelligently, but to pick up an 
already existing idea not normally associated with the field of operating 
will be to go one step further.
Utilising an idea like this may enable people to see more connec­
tions, and it is for this reason that greater praise is bestowed upon 
the one who has brought about the seeing of more connections.
furthermore, what can also happen is that not only are already 
existing ideas brought over to another field whereupon this can be 
looked at in a new light, but ideas never before existing may be suggested. 
Clearly, this is also intelligent activity.
In considering these two ways of acting intelligently, there is a 
difficulty in determining whether the second is necessarily more intelligent 
than the other. The proposal which suggests that this is so appears like 
this. Kohler’s apes operated intelligently in employing sticks as tools 
but if the sticks had not been visibly available, they would not have 
been able to make the connection. If this is true, then an ordinary 
level of acting intelligently would be where clues are visible, a higher
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level would be where the clues are not visible but have existence some­
where, and higher than this, where there are no clues at all in existence. 
Put in this way, the proposal has some persuasiveness.
Yet, it may be a proposal which has not been worked out in either a 
concept of creativity or intelligence. What may be important, within 
a concept of creativity, is that whether the idea is new completely or 
is already in some way existing in another field, the set-up which is 
being offered is new and moreover, in both cases the connections seen are 
previously unseen by others. As regards intelligent performance, if 
the idea is extant, then in linking this to another field an individual 
is acting on his own, as a source, and the connection which he makes is 
new; on the other hand, if the idea is completely new in the world, then 
the act of seeing it is intelligent because here it is not a matter of 
inventing plus a seeing of connections. The very inventing is a seeing 
of connections. Unless a connection had been seen, no inventing could 
have taken place.
At the moment, then, while a case is made for claiming that the seeing 
of more difficult connections previously unseen by others is to act, in that 
enterprise, more intelligently than others, it cannot be maintained that 
one of these ways of seeing such connections is more intelligent than the 
other.
Further, it must be made clear that because an individual does see 
such connections previously unseen by others, this in no sense renders him 
more intelligent in every way. All that is being held is that, in that 
enterprise, he is more intelligent.
Finally, what follows from this is that the concept of creativity is 
now being characterised as a high level of intelligent acting.
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CHAPTER 5
The concept of Creativity* 
its evaluative aspects
Introduction
In making the principles of the concept of intelligence explicit, 
the following has become clear. If people are thought to see connec­
tions between categories, and such connections are considered to be 
fruitful in reaching ends which are accepted as valuable, then they 
will be evaluated as intelligent. Because of these points, as 
synonyms of 'intelligent*, we employ 'sharp1 and 'shrewd'. However, 
if two people act identically, but one is quicker than the other, he 
will be considered to be the more intelligent. In fact, 'quick' 
functions also as a synonym of 'intelligent'.
Moreover, in attempting to become clear about the concept of 
creativity, two points have been maintained which gave rise to a 
consideration of a concept of intelligent thinking. One was that some 
kind of originality was a necessary criterion of the concept of 
creativity. The other was that creativity was a concept, evaluative 
of human activity. Because of these two points a concept of intelli­
gence was presupposed in a concept of creativity.
Now, it may seem, at first sight, that it is a factual matter 
whether a person's thinking is original or not since it is checkable. 
What, however, is important to investigate is the kind of originality 
which is thought to be valuable. This is so because not all original 
thinking is considered praiseworthy.
Clearly, then, the whole conceptual area is evaluative, but what
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we are committed to in saying this needs some investigation. There 
are two ideas here. First, we must be concerned with an evaluator.
To illustrate this idea, we may see that even the bombing of others 
has been considered intelligent. Again, when some people looked at 
Socrates in his death-cell, they could not see that what he was doing 
was intelligent since they were unable to value the ends he had chosen. 
Secondly, what is also crucial is that we must be concerned about what 
is evaluated. The answer, of course, lies within the ideas which have 
already been suggested, but they stand in need of some demonstration. 
That answer can be introduced in this way.
In estimating ends as appropriate, and in considering means as 
fruitful, we are ruling out the dull and bringing in the bright.
Here, for the purpose of exposition we mean by intelligent performance 
that there is some enriching of understanding. Now, at one level of 
intelligent performance there is no need to suggest original connec­
tions between categories. Yet, if original connections are suggested, 
and these are thought to be valuable, the reason is that they enrich 
understanding, par excellence. It is for this reason that people are 
thought of as creative.
To get to that answer, the two ideas concerning an evaluator and 
concerning what precisely is evaluated will have to be scrutinised; but 
even before this, because there have been certain confusions about the 
evaluative nature of the concept of creativity, these must first be 
considered.
'Creative1 - a linguistic caveat
That the concept of creativity is evaluative may not at first sight
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appear clear. If we deal with the concepts of the good or the pleasant, 
even without any contextual appeal, there is an air of evaluation about 
them which is immediate. Many adjectives and their corresponding verbs 
are always used evaluatively - some to praise and others to condemn, 
and the normal expectation is that the evaluation, positive or 
negative, applies throughout the various parts of speech. Positively,
'to sympathise* carries its evaluation through to 'sympathetic* and 
'sympathy'; negatively, 'to steal1 passes to 'stolen' and 'stealing*.
Now, some verbs are quite open, yet this does not mean that the correspon­
ding adjectives are open, and this makes for some confusion. 'To imagine* 
is in this group. We can imagine as a result of being directed; we 
can imagine good or bad things. On the other hand, if 'imaginative'^ 
is used, there is no sense here of being directed, but rather some 
notion of freedom and self-initiated activity are being considered.
All examples of being imaginative are also examples of those who have 
imagined, but not all those who have imagined are imaginative. To be 
imaginative is to be thought highly of, and is thus evaluative. 'To 
invent' is similar. All kinds of stupid things may be invented: an
invention may be worthless, but to be inventive carries considerable value. 
Again similarly, though even more strongly is 'creative'. The verb 'to 
create' is no more than to make, and this is wide enough to cover evil 
and good, worthwhile and worthless, innocuous and humdrum. 'Creation' 
is wide enough to include as much as its verbal counterpart. Yet, as 
soon as we pass to 'creative' we can never pass in a straightforward, 
logical way from verb to adjective. To think that we can do so is to 
make an assumption, as much as Mill's in passing from what is desired to 
what is desirable.
1. See Furlong, E.J., Imagination, G. Allen & TJnwin Ltd., N.Y., 1961.
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A reason for overlooking the evaluation
All that has been said so far points clearly to the concept of 
creativity as evaluative. This can now be made more definite by 
considering some ideas connected with its historic roots which set 
the scene for current usage.
There are two historic strands which are linked. The first 
strand sees the concept of creativity as based upon the idea of God's 
creation, and the second sees this creation as good. These strands 
have some foundation as the following four indications suggest.
First of all, the very strength of the idea of creation as given 
in Genesis would have been the groundwork of reading or hearing of 
countless people for many centuries. There would have been no doubt 
about the reference if anyone talked of creation or the creator, because 
God was seen as the model of all that was created. In fact, the idea 
that we are all creatures brings out the belief system which has permeated 
the tradition. Moreover, what was created was seen as good. It is 
surprising how many times its goodness is mentioned in Genesis, as if 
the goodness of it utterly imbued everything, and needed emphasis.
Secondly, while it is true that 'to create1 could have been 
rendered by 'to make', the words themselves which spoke of God's creation 
were, for a long time, kept apart and not used of profane matters. In 
all the early usages of 'create', references are actually made to God, 
and there are no contrary examples.’*' A direct move to 'creative' appears
1. See Murray, J.A.H. (ed.), A New English Dictionary on historical 
principles, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1893. References are made 
here to Chaucer and to Hobbes. Another is from Shakespeare's 
'Comedy of Errors', viz., 'Are you a god? Would you create me new?'
- 128 -
1
later in Cudworth who talks of 11 this divine, miraculous creative power1’, 
and of course here the reference is strictly deistic.
Thirdly, a movement can be detected which at one point picks
out what is thought to be central to God's creation, namely originality
and value, and here the verb is applied generally. An example of this
2
is, 'the mason makes, the architect creates'. What looks to be 
pressed for is that although the mason imposes some form on material, 
the architect, as it were, works on nothing. He brings out ideas from 
nothing.
The movement at another point picks out for the verb one aspect of
what is central to creation, and that is originality. For example,
there is a reference^ in 1592 where it was used of bringing into legal
4
existence, and Fortescue in 1460 used it of ranks. By the time 
Johnson^ offered his definition of 'create', we find that it is more or 
less what would be given today. Here, then, is where we can begin to 
see a separation of the verbal and adjectival forms: 'creation' because^
of its width of application has begun to lose its former tie with value, 
whereas 'creative' has kept this tie with value.
Fourthly, there is a romantic view of the poet who has looked to be
God-like, who operates on ideas and not on things, bom not made. He
is the one who, like God, genuinely creates, and because of this like­
ness, what he offers is good. Thus he is creative. This presumably
is what Shelley has in mind when he declares: "There is no one in the 
world who deserves the name of Creator but God and the Poet".
1. Ref. Hurray, J.A.H., op. cit. 3. ibid.
2. ibid. 4» ibid.
5. ibid. Johnson's definition is: "to bring into being, cause to
exist, especially to produce where nothing was before, to
form out of nothing".
6. Wallas, G., op.cit., pp. 95-96.
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From these indications it is clear that the model from which the 
concept of creativity stems is God's creation. Historically, all 
the references of usage throughout the forms of 'to create' are to God* 
but gradually the central points about God's creation, namely originality 
and value, have been applied more widely. In course of time, 'to 
create' and 'creation' have come to be applied without the idea of value 
being accorded, and yet 'creative' has always been applied not only of 
originality but also of value.
An explanation of the introduction of the term 'creativity' as a
noun corresponding to 'creative' could be this. Because, although
derived from 'creation', 'creative' gradually moved away from being
merely its adjectival form, there then existed an idea without a name.
At the time when 'creation' and 'create' still referred to God, 'creative*
was the appropriate adjective, but when 'creation* and 'create' were
employed without necessarily implying any attributing of value, then
clearly, because 'creative' was reserved for what was not only original
but also praised, 'creative1 was no longer the appropriate adjective.
Thus an idea of what pertained to 'creative' was only to be rendered
1
by 'creativity' or 'creativeness*.
This movement of language is important to notice because if ignored, 
an evaluation can be overlooked. In a similar way, we can see that 
the explanation which I have given applies to the idea of inventing 
where 'inventive', because no longer corresponding directly to 
'invention', requires the noun 'inventiveness' to cater for what 
'inventive' suggests.
1. In fact, 'creativeness' was used by Hunt in 1820 whereas the first 
mention of 'creativity' is in 1875 > where the reference is, "The 
spontaneous flow of his (Shakespeare's) poetic creativity".
A.W. Ward. See Murray, J.A.H., op.cit.
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It is now easy enough to see the implicit value assigned to the
concept of creativity hut there are two points about the concept which
can be noted in recent writing, which have not contributed to clarity.
First, that the concept is evaluative has not been made explicit. For
example, Guilford talks about reducing boredom.^  Getzels and Jackson
speak of ’’dealing inventively with verbal and numerical symbols and with
2object/space relations", and Torrance continually urges respect for 
what the pupil offers in terms of his unusual ideas.^ Obviously here 
and elsewhere writers have in mind that what they are talking of is 
evaluative but this is not brought out at all.
It is true of course that some writers have expressed ideas about 
the concept of creativity in fairly explicit terms, but, and this is 
the second point, here there is no pressing for an explicit account of 
what we are committed to in holding that the concept is evaluative. . For 
example, Barron claims that "a new form must correspond to some extent, 
or be adaptive to, reality”.^  Yet, what is real? Apart from wondering 
what 1 reality1 could mean, there is a sense in which what is real to us 
can only be appreciated if we have a sufficiency of conceptual schemes 
for interpreting what appears to be. In accordance with our values we 
may see Drama as unreal or real, or Picasso’s paintings as unreal or real. 
Here, then, the evaluative aspect of the concept is presented and yet it 
is so formulated as to put us off the scent.
Again, when Hudson holds that the true connotation of ’creative’
5covers the most able and intellectually productive, his idea is quite
1. Ref. Guilford, J.P., 'Traits of Creativity’ in Vernon, P.E., Creativity, 
op.cit., p. 167
2. Getzels, J.W., & Jackson, P.W., op.cit., p. 17*
3. Ref. Torrance, E.P., Rewarding Creative Behaviour, Prentice-Hall Inc.,
H.J., 1965, P. 43*
4* Barron, F., Creative Person and Creative Process, Holt Rinehart & Winston, 
Inc., H.Y., 1969, P.25.
5. Hudson, L., Contrary Imaginations, Methuen, 1966, p. 110.
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explicitly evaluative but we are still faced with the problem of the 
rationale for deciding who is the most able and intellectually 
productive. The methodology is similar to that of a moral philosophy 
which keeps holding that to be virtuous is best, which is clearly 
evaluative, but failing to show that this is any more than a statement 
of what is so. It is evaluative but it is hardly noticed.
Certainly these two tendencies, either of assuming value or of 
stating but not explicating value, have lulled us into a vague accep­
tance of inherent value which has appeared sufficient because it has 
linked up with former usage.
Apart from the literature, comparatively unsophisticated usage has 
remained implicitly evaluative. What, for example, is looked for in a 
creative salesman is his ability to sell well. To do this, there is
expected an ability to offer some new ideas, but these ideas are praised
in so far as they are effective in the selling programmes. The same 
idea is applied in the case of a creative footballer. If he simply 
offers new techniques but in no way do these promote the object of the 
game, he is not thought of as creative.
How, there is another area of usage which does adtually present
some difficulty, but nonetheless is evaluative. This is where 'creative1 
is applied to very young children, where what is actually offered by 
them does not look to be worthy of any praise. On the face of it, the 
idea is this. These children have acted originally and because they 
have acted originally they are worthy of praise.
Until this point of usage the concept of creativity has functioned 
first by its necessary reference to originality and secondly by its 
evaluation of what is original. For so long we have been saying that
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to be creative, what one offers must be original and good, but here it 
looks as if we are saying that to be creative, what one offers must be 
original and this is good. Several confusions will have to be cleared 
up, but now it is sufficient to say that while this may be a general 
implicit viewpoint, it is not even maintained by its protagonists in a 
consistent way since there are some areas of activity where any such 
originality would be condemned. Clearly, however, the implicit view­
point is evaluative.
A consideration of some confusions.
If we take note of this background, it does seem odd that any 
confusions could have actually arisen about the evaluative nature of the 
concept of creativity. One possible reason is that the background has 
been ignored. Another reason is that the literature, on the whole, 
has merely accepted the evaluation, and has done little to promote any 
explicit account. For whichever reason, there has been some fairly 
recent writing which illustrates two confusions.
The writing stems from Olford who has attempted "to argue that the 
concept of creation functions primarily in the appreciation and evalua­
tion of finished products, of many sorts, and whatever the kind of
*1
completion involved". Along with 'creative1, the terms 'creation* and 
'create' have been used but the actual functioning of the terms which 
would enable us to see which concepts were being referred to, should have 
been clearly demonstrated.
In the first instance, while the concept of creation as used of God
1. Olford, J.E., 'The Concept of Creativity' in Proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Education Society of Gt. Britain, Vol.V, No.l,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1970, P» 79•
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was evaluative, there has since been a considerable shift of meaning.
The extent of the shift has been to allow for a possibility of an 
exclusion of any evaluation. Nov/, once something has been created, while 
clearly this is a creation, it is not necessarily creative. The reason, 
of course, is that there is no direct move which can be made from the 
verb or noun to the adjective.
The normal expectation is that an adjective will correspond to 
its verbal counterpart. However, this expectation should be checked.
If it had been checked, then talk of the functioning of the concept of 
creation would not have been confused with talk of the functioning of 
the concept of creativity.
Because of a lack of discrimination Mr. ELliott has been able to
state, in reply, that "the concept of creation is not primarily evalua-
1
tive, but descriptive". To support his position Elliott cites the
ideas of different usages of the verb ’to create1, mentioning that God
2created the world, Olivier a part, Tom a disturbance. In all cases it 
certainly looks as if there is a describing rather than an evaluating of 
certain situations. These very examples were used earlier by Olford^ 
to argue that because the verb ’to create’ was employed in all three
4examples, we could not infer that the same sort of activity was at stake 
in each example. In this Olford was right, but not for the reason which 
he suggests. His suggestion is that the same verb is used because all 
the examples show that the subjects achieved what they set out to do and
5
were answerable for what they did.
1. Elliott, R.K., ’The Concept of Creativity, Reply to John E. Olford’, 
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Soc. of Gt. Britain,
op. cit., p. 98.
2. Ref. Elliott, R.K., ibid.
3. Ref. Olford, J.E. op.cit., pp. 84-85«
4. ibid., p. 85
5. ibid.
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The Latin origin of the word only means !to make1 and the usages of
this verb are wide and varied. We may well say that ’God made the
world* or ’a man made a face1 or ’someone will make the beds’ but
unless seen in context, we may miss an essential point. Olford, in
attempting to decide what the various contexts could imply, has ignored
the essential point of evaluation but instead has brought in a point
1
concerned with the achievement sense of the verb ’to create’.
What he could have done, based upon what I have already shown, was 
this. By comparing the examples of ’God created the world' with ’Tom 
created a disturbance’ he could have shown that what they had in common 
was the bringing about of something not previously in existence. This 
would have been an appropriate move because this at least runs through the 
usages of all the derivatives of the verb ’to create’. Then he could 
have seen that while 'to create’ and 'creation' have been used widely, 
covering both descriptive and evaluative ideas, ’creative' has only been 
used evaluatively.
The other confusion arises from the same source. First, it is
clear that Olford wishes to hold that creativity is an evaluative concept.
It is true that Elliott does too. Olford, for example, claims that
"when we speak of a 'creative product’ we locate it as a product within
some field of human activity ... it is creative with respect to novel
2
and valued features". Elliott speaks of a work as needing "soul, spirit 
or life",  ^ana here he is speaking of creativity.
However, because of not seeing in which way the concept is evaluative, 
both writers have been drawn into considering products. Olford talks
1. Olford, J.E., op. cit., p. 85
2. ibid., p. 80.
3. Elliott, R.K., op. cit., p. 103.
a great deal about the idea of a product, saying that it is *'creative
with respect to novel and valued features"^ - and that it "cannot be new 
p
in all respects". Elliott, in a similar vein, refers to Olford1s
view that many beautiful works which have been created but have not
3
embodied a new standard cannot be thought of as creative products.
Here, BLliott still operating on the idea of products, attempts to indi­
cate that even though a work does not embody a new standard, it can still 
be thought of as creative.
It bears repeating, with reference to this confusion, that any work 
is merely evidence for the award of 1 creative1. A work may indeed have 
aesthetic merit but it will not follow that it is creative. Actually, 
pressing the idea of products has looked as if any distinction between 
the aesthetic and the creative has simply been overlooked. Because 
creativity is a concept of evaluation of human activity, two points 
follow concerning products. First, a product is needed if we are to 
learn how to use 1 creative' since if nothing were ever externalised 
we would have no means of identifying what was meant. Secondly, some 
kind of product would be necessai^ y if we were to be able to hold that 
other people were creative. However, once we were aware, even implicitly, 
what was meant by the concept, we could then use it privately just as we 
could use ’moral1.
Moreover, whenever the concept is invoked, we have in mind what 
people do. It is not a matter of having in mind what is made or created, 
however unusual or however beautiful. It was indeed for this reason that 
a concept of thinking was shown to be necessarily included in a concept 
of creativity.
1. Olford, J.E., op. cit., p. 80
2. Olford, J.E., op. cit., p. 81.
3. Ref. Elliott, R.K., op. cit., p. 102.
4« ELliott, R.K., op. cit., p. 103.
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As a result of noting these confusions there is one point which is 
crucial. The concept has always been evaluative: it has always been
evaluative of some intelligent activity. However, if it is evaluative, 
it must be dependent upon the idea of someone doing the valuing.
Thus, just like the concept of ’good1 or of ’moral' or any other
evaluative concept, account must necessarily be taken of the evaluation.
Someone may tell me that a particular play is good, and while I know
what he means by ' good1, I may not think of it as good. He may tell
me that it is possible to inflict pain on others intentionally and
thereby to act morally, and although I know what he means by ’moral’ I
may still disagree with his evaluation. Similarly, I may be told that
a particular writer is creative, and even though we have reached agreement
about the criteria of the concept of creativity, I may still disagree 
about the evaluation.
It is this evaluation of human activity which requires investi­
gation, and which is ignored in directing attention too much to products.
How the evaluation can be overlooked
Be Bono presents us with the example of a writer who has failed 
to acknowledge that the concept of creativity functions evaluatively.
His main concern is with what he calls lateral thinking, but this is 
functioning in a textbook on Creativity, and for this reason has the 
appearance of guiding us. This then needs to be put into perspective.
First, he accepts that lateral thinking "is closely related to 
insight, creativity and humour", but what distinguishes it from the 
other three is that it is a deliberate process. The others can only be
1. Be Bono, E., Lateral Thinking - a textbook of Creativity,
Ward Lock Educational Ltd., London, 1970» P* 9*
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prayed, for. He also, secondly, mentions that creative thinking has
2generative qualities, hut there is no way of bringing it about.
How because of an expectation of guidance, it seems initially odd 
that this creativity which he speaks of, cannot come about through our 
efforts. This oddity, though, is removed in the same breath by his 
claim that lateral thinking is a process of using information to bring 
about creativity. On the face of it, he appears to be saying that 
creativity can and can not be brought about, and this needs to be 
explained because at the very least it is paradoxical.
One way of explaining it is like this. Most of us cannot lift an 
object which weighs a ton, but here is a technique for bringing about 
the lifting, namely a crane. There is, then, an analogy between 
this technique and lateral thinking, which De Jkona thinks of as a 
process. How, we can pray for strength to lift without a crane. 
Conceptually, on this analogy, creativity would equal strength.
Therefore, though we would not increase in strength, we would increase 
in mastery of techniques which would do what strength does.
Lateral thinking looks to be a functioning as a means to creativity; 
yet side by side with this view is another, which when explicated looks 
to equate lateral thinking with creativity. For example, He Bono 
claims that ’’lateral thinking involves restructuring, escape and provoca­
tion of new patterns”.^  Yet, in the previous sentence he has held that 
’’Creativity also involves restructuring but with more emphasis on the 
escape from restricting patterns”.^  From these declarations, creativity 
looks as if it is only noted as being different from lateral thinking in
1. De Bono, E., op.cit,, p. $.
2. ibid, p. 7
3. ibid., p. 11 
4* ibid.
- 138 -
the degree in which escape from restricting patterns is concerned.
However, here use is not made of an implicit analogy where I have 
suggested that creativity would equal strength, and lateral thinking a 
technique for bringing about what strength does. What is now being 
said is that what applies to creativity, more or less applies to lateral 
thinking. So close are they, in this account, that what one may call 
’creative1 another may call 'lateral thinking1. For example, if someone 
has restructured an aspect of looking at things, he must have escaped 
from some restricting patterns, and his very restructuring must provoke 
new patterns. On De Bono's account, we would think of him as a lateral 
thinker. Yet, if I say that he is creative because by the very act of 
restructuring he has notably escaped from restricting patterns and provoked 
new ones, do I say this merely because I am emphasising the escape? There 
is, from what De Bono says, a necessary emphasis on escape by the act 
of restructuring.
Lateral thinking, on this, is another name for creativity. fdiat,
though, is wholly significant is that De Bono holds that lateral thinking
1
is a process, and functions as a description of a process. This is 
wholly to miss the point.
By looking at De Bono, we can see how first the background usage 
of 'creative' has been overlooked; and secondly how in the midst of 
what purports to be a description he is able to employ an idea like 
'restructuring', which rests upon some value stand. It is because of 
both reasons that a closer look at values should be made.
1. De Bono, E., op. cit., p. 11.
- 139 -
The need for an explicit statement about values
Two points come to mind in looking at specific accounts of confusion, 
and the overlooking of the evaluative component of the concept of 
creativity.
First, there can be a lack of explicitness about what we are 
actually holding. Because of this, even when we say, for example, 
that smoking is good, and helping other people is good, we may be unsure e 
about the particular value which we are attributing to either. Again, 
we may not have distinguished between instrumental good and good-in- 
itself. In both cases what precisely we are committed to in saying 
that something is good remains unclear.
Secondly, this lack of explicitness is even more noticeable and 
important when we employ concepts which do not have an immediate 
evaluative ring in the terms which are used. For example, morality is 
like this. The concept would probably conjure up ideas of doing right, 
and for so long it may be said, everyone more or less knew what was 
right because it was made manifest in the Koran or the Bible, or was 
stated by the elders. Yet, as soon as the concept was openly investi­
gated and criteria for its usage established, the evaluative aspect of 
the concept gradually became clear.
How, while the concept of creativity has been shown to be evalua­
tive, like the concept of morality, it may not immediately appear 
evaluative in the way that ’pleasant1 and 'good' may.
In order to see clearly the kind of evaluation that the concept 
of creativity is, and also to see how it functions, it would be usefb.1 
first to look at the way in which values are normally thought to 
operate.
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Some basic points about values
One way of doing things may appear valuable to one person or 
group but not to others. Certainly, in time of war, the bombing of a 
town will appear good to one group and bad to another. Again, 
mountains can appear ugly to one generation and lovely to another. In 
each case the factual account of what there is to be observed is identical 
but how it is viewed depends upon how it is valued. This much is true. 
Thus, in one sense when something is said to be valuable, the value 
looks to be residing in us and not in the thing.:
However, there looks also to be a sense in which things have a 
value-in-themselves, independently of our particular estimate. A 
similar idea exists when we say that whether an individual is aware of 
it or not, seven sevens are forty-nine. Actually, if there were not 
ideas and things which had intrinsic value, there would be no particular 
reason why anyone should suggest that initiation into certain forms of 
activity was preferable to initiation into other forms. Of course, as 
an objection it can be said that all that is being suggested is that 
there is some kind of general agreement about which things tend to 
produce in people more subjective pleasure. Thus, we are still concerned 
with a subjective evaluation.
Yet, even though this might be the case, the argument still remains 
that there is something special about some activities or some things, 
that these rather than others are likely to bring about in an evaluator 
a higher level of value.
Because of this background, values have been divided into three 
main areas, namely subjective, relative and objective.
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It is likely that we often hold to subjective or relative values 
which, when we are pressed, we find hard to justify because in attempting 
to argue any position we presuppose rationality which necessarily 
commits us to a search for objective values.
However, there are two points which need to be appreciated if we 
are to see some kind of consistent pattern in the way a concept of 
creativity functions. First, whether what is thought good really is 
good becomes a matter of seeing what justification exists for the various 
value-judgements which are made. Secondly, whether or not an evaluator 
is justified in the judgements which he makes, some meaning may still 
be attachable to his judgements.
If we had only to deal with objective values, the task of seeing 
the functioning of the concept of creativity would be comparatively 
easy. We would then merely have to take account of the various reasons 
given and see them in the light of the context in which they were 
offered. Thus, at any point in time, even though there would have been 
a searching for reasons for claiming that someone was or was not creative, 
because of a lack of understanding, a lack of information or a lack of 
clarity about explicit meaning, one person who was evaluated positively 
or negatively might later have the evaluation reversed of him.
Nevertheless, not only for the sake of justification but also for 
the sake of meaning, we must take cognizance of both subjective and 
relative values. What will be noticed here, though, is that this normal
division of values throws up discrepancies which then need further investi­
gation. For example, if I hold values which are commonly held by 
members of my ethnic group, like detesting foreigners, then this would 
be an example of a relative value. However, I may hold, in common with
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members of another group, that I should do good to all people. How, 
while I clearly hold this as a relative value, and as evidence, if I am 
asked why I do this in the face of open nastiness on the part of some 
people, I merely reply that this is what we do in our set; nonetheless, 
it can be a position which can be argued for in an objective way.
The same sort of discrepancy may be witnessed with subjective 
values. As an example I may place great value on staring at trees.
Later in life I may even wonder what value I could ever have seen in this. 
On the other hand, another example of a subjective value may be in some 
ways quite different. An example of this would be the value which a 
person places on truth-telling. It may actually be suggested to him 
that telling the truth may, on occasion, hurt someone or cause himself 
trouble, but still he pursues the same path. Moreover, he does not claim 
that others should abide by this value. He simply values it himself.
Hov/ while many people would not agree with his utter acceptance of 
truth-telling, as a principle truth-telling can be defended on rational, 
grounds.
So, subjective, relative and objective values inform us of the 
manner in which values are held. However, what can make a considerable 
difference is whether, although no valid reasons are advanced by those 
holding subjective or relative values, it is still possible to defend 
them objectively.
How, this distinction is important. If a subjective value is held, 
then at one point in time a rational defence of it may be made, but 
because it is necessarily held without reference to reasons being adduced, 
any reasons advanced because of new light being shed on the value will
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make no difference to the holding of the particular value. Here, then, 
one person may hold a specific value subjectively but another person 
may hold the identical value objectively.
Implications of how values are held
A normal objection to a subjective value is that it is a purely 
individual way of looking at things and is therefore narrows but it 
need not be so. It may be quite inclusive of the values of others, 
and the same is true of relative values. Sometimes we are pleasantly 
surprised by the welcome which a people offers to us where they simply 
like visitors. An individual too may be utterly tolerant of our views, 
and give a complete impression of being objective. The main difficulty 
arises when the reasons no longer apply. Then the discrepancy is 
noticeable.
An example will make the point clear. There could be, at one 
point in time, good reasons for holding that learning things by heart 
stays and can be used later. How this idea could be held quite subjec­
tively; it could have been picked up and become an idea that I like.
Thus when I do my teaching I simply keep to this idea closely. Later, 
various reasons are brought forward, based possibly on psychological 
and sociological research - ideas connected with ’inert* ideas - for not 
continuing with an utter learning of things by heart. How, if the value 
is held subjectively, it is to be supposed that the identical value will 
continue to be held, since anyhow the value has never been rationally 
founded.
When, therefore, we come to invoke the concept of creativity, 
because this already includes the other concepts of intelligence and
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originality, the difficulties are similar yet more profound. I shall try 
to explain the reasons for this.
It looks as if there are some concepts, like ’good1 and ’pleasant' 
which are simple but others which are much more complex, where two or 
more criteria are necessary to the concept. An example would be the 
concept of morality. Here, if it were claimed that someone did something 
intentionally, it would not follow that he was moral. A similar situa­
tion exists with the concept of creativity. In wondering whether 
someone is creative, we may agree that originality and intelligence are 
necessary and so there will be objective linguistic points where we could 
find some agreement. Yet, we may still disagree about the value 
concerning originality and intelligence which we are attributing to the 
person whom we are appraising. We may agree about how 'intelligence' 
should be used as getting to a goal in considering means but there can 
still be disagreement about the ends and the means. Both the means and 
the ends which are selected, the particular form of originality may all 
fit into a framework of finally subjective values; but whether they are 
subjective or not, what matters in one important sense is whether or not 
they include the values of other people, and particularly of the one whom 
we are judging. The reason why I claim that this is important is because 
whether the values which are being held are subjective or not, relative 
or not, there is still a possibility of acknowledging the values of 
another if one's own values are inclusive. If one's own values are 
inclusive of another's who may have good reasons for holding his values, 
there can be an agreement in the awards which are made, although it must 
be admitted that this agreement may be finally superficial. This returns 
us to the point where it was held that although one may hold values 
subjectively there may still be reasons for the holding of these values
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which we either have no cognizance of or care nothing'for, or both. So 
while subjective or relative values tell us about the manner in which 
values are held, whether these include the values of other people or 
exclude them is an important consideration in seeing precisely the 
implications of holding values. This idea of inclusive and exclusive 
value schemes points to a clarification of the various superficial 
agreements and the various discrepancies which often appear in judgements. 
Thus, if schemes are inclusive, they can be looked upon by others as 
objective, and then the discrepancies will not show unless or until the 
reasons for holding these no longer have force.
Those who formerly held values subjectively may continue to call 
’good1 what cannot be defended rationally, and still call 'creative* those 
people who cannot now be judged to be creative on rational grounds.
Obviously, then, there are considerable discrepancies when we 
come to look at various concepts, like 'good' and 'pleasant' which are 
simple, but there are even greater difficulties when the concept is 
complex, as is the case with creativity. To illustrate this, because 
this concept will include the other concepts of intelligence and originality, 
while we may be in complete agreement about the linguistic points 
concerning meaning, we may still show grave disagreement about the various 
values which, say, the concept of intelligence covers. It can be seen 
from what has been said that there are difficulties enough with concepts 
like 'good' and 'pleasant', which are fairly straight forward but there 
are greater difficulties with complex concepts, like that of creativity.
One example will show this very well. This concerns the concept of 
intelligence which is embraced by the concept of creativity. In Homan 
times, the idea of using slaves was considered right and proper but later,
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because of changing attitudes, probably brought about mostly by 
Christian ideas, the idea of using slaves became anathema. However, if 
under Roman ideas, it was considered .that by using slaves other people 
would be enabled to produce works of art or engage in other activities 
considered to be worthwhile, then the selection of the means, namely 
using slaves, would have been considered good. To people of later 
generations the idea of using slaves would have been bad whatever the 
results. How, in awarding 'intelligent1 to activities, if the whole 
idea, of the means are considered to be bad, there is a possibility that 
no award which is positively evaluative can be awarded. This possibility 
dan be considered in two ways.
First of all, if we adopt a purely subjective value scheme, we 
may actually include or exclude the values of others which may well be 
rational. Therefore, if we detest particular means, then there is 
nothing else to be considered than our subjective value scheme. Thus 
logically we shall also refuse to award anything positively evaluative 
of the activity. Secondly, on the other hand, it may be said that 
although we detest the means, because we are attempting to be rational we 
may still be able to see in what people do some kind of value. In this 
case, it is not so much that our values are inclusive or exclusive but 
that we are attempting to be rational. The following will exemplify 
this. Suppose someone has devised a scheme for our downfall. His 
moves may be stealthy, to the point, highly original, sophisticated and 
utterly efficient. If, as is likely, our dominant value scheme at the 
time is security, we shall find it extremely difficult to see these points. 
A similar situation would have arisen with the Great Train Robbery. If 
a person is able to include the values of others within his own scheme,
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even though he has suffered under them, then he will be able to isolate 
the value of the activity as possibly intelligent and as possibly creative. 
Then, we may say that an activity is intelligent or creative even though 
its effects inveigh against us. The possibility of so isolating a 
consideration of an activity from its ill-effeets upon us is an objective 
exercise but this consideration now looks as if we have to say that while 
we may have to acknowledge that a certain activity is intelligent or 
creative, it ought not to be pursued. So, under a rational scheme, 
we can detest the means but still see some kind of value in them. On 
the other hand, if we were committed to an exclusive value scheme which 
was purely subjective, then we would necessarily refuse to make any kind 
of positively evaluative award.
This, therefore, will mean that the concept of creativity will be 
more difficult to demarcate because of its lack of simplicity. Embracing, 
as it does, the idea of intelligent performance, the means and the particular 
ends which have to be evaluated in order to discover whether an activity 
is intelligent, may well be subjectively or relatively determined but 
these may at any time include the values of others who are attempting to 
be rational. It is only when we can discover whether or not adequate 
reasons are being adduced for the values which are being held that we 
can tell whether the particular values are merely subjective or relative.
Thus, to illustrate the idea of the various discrepancies which may 
exist between people's awards and which therefore make us wonder about 
the concepts which are being employed, we can look at this example.
At a point where Galileo seemed to be departing from accepted norms of 
belief, whatever he did was objectionable. How some of those people 
who objected may have had some sound reasons whereas others merely had 
subjective ideas about him. Later, when values changed, and good reasons
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could be offered for the position which Galileo was adopting, rational 
people could then begin to see that he could be thought of as creative, 
whereas others, even in the light of these new reasons, would still 
keep to their former, views. Formerly, there would have been no distinc­
tion at all between their expression of values, and it would have seemed 
as if their concepts and the various awards made under the concepts were 
identical, but the discrepancy would show when later it could be seen 
that certain people kept to their former values without any reference 
to the new reasons which were being advanced.
Originality and value
The concept of creativity has looked as if it has picked out 
certain criteria which have been evaluated. It has been held that 
originality is part of this concept, and in claiming this, in the major 
usages of 'creative1 it has been maintained that originality was 
necessary, but it has also been maintained that such originality had to 
be good. However, there has been one recent usage which has caused 
some difficulty.
Clearly, when it is said that children are creative, and the implied 
meaning is that they are original, the main worry has been that it looks 
as though, simply because they are original, they are necessarily good. 
Therefore, there is no anxiety about the evaluative nature of the concept 
employed, but some anxiety presents itself when the claim is made that 
because someone is original he is good.
The nature of what is being claimed here needs to be looked at 
carefully. Can this particular point be sustained? On the whole, 
there seem to be three reasons why a particular evaluation has been
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offered for anything original.
The first one is the more recent insistence upon what has been 
called 1 child-centred education',^  where teachers have presumably been 
concerned with the values which children themselves have. The second 
one is concerned with an interest in the idea of autonomy. Thirdly, 
there is some kind of value to be given to any learner's way of coming 
to grips with the material to be learned.
These three reasons are very important in explicating a concept of 
creativity because there does seem to be a very fine thread separating 
the kind of originality which is thought to be coming from children and 
the kind of originality which I have shown is necessary to the concept 
of creativity. This fine thread is more apparent than real but in some 
of the arguments which can be mustered to show that all children are 
creative, it does look as if there really is some support for what is 
being held.
This idea is held because there is a sense in which children are 
original and there is a sense in which any such originality is praised. 
What, however, needs to be shown clearly is that the kind of origina­
lity displayed by children is not necessarily the one which is praised 
under a concept of creativity.
For the purposes of identifying the kind of originality which is 
being praised when people talk about child-centred education, I want to 
look for a moment at some of the things which Dr. Wilson says in his 
article because here, it seems to me, a full-blooded account of child- 
centred education is offered. He says, for example, that Ma situation
1. cf. Wilson, P.S., 'Child-Centred Education' in Proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Education Society, Jan. 1969» Vol. III.
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is only to be regarded as an Educational1 situation when what is held 
to be of ’educational1 value in it is what is currently held to be of 
value by the person avowedly being ' educated’, even when that person is 
a child”.^  Later, in the article, he claims that "children have no other
p
values than their present ones". This, of course, I would accept as 
true, but the chief worry is to discover from what he says and from 
what is implied, what education actually is.
If we educate the existing values of children, are we merely
developing the ones they actually have or are we sometimes concerned
with the changing of their existing values? The nearest th&t Dr. Wilson
comes to implying a concept of education is when he discusses a problem
of stealing.^ In this example, he is keen to show that we should not
really be concerned about leading children to an accepted conviction
even though, as a matter of prudence, it might well be necessary to stop
4
a pupil stealing or to induce him to stop himself. Here, he thinks that
the pupil would value stealing but he would also have learned to value
not stealing and, "as a matter of prudence, one would hope that he would
5
value not stealing, on balance, more". Further, and this is the point 
which Dr. Wilson makes: "As a matter of education, however, since his
valuation of stealing is itself unchanged, nothing has happened. He 
is no more educated about stealing than he was before." To exemplify 
how things could be improved, Dr. Wilson apparently thinks of the educa­
tional side as perhaps helping him to see, for example, what he was
7
stealing or what was the significance of the things he stole.
1. Wilson, P.S., op. cit., p. 105 2. ibid., p. 126.
3. ibid., p. 117 4* ibid.
5. ibid. 6. ibid.
7. ibid.
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How this point is crucial. Suppose a pupil does not value our 
idea of attempting to help him to see what he was stealing or what 
could be of significance among the things he stole, on Dr. Wilson’s 
account if he did not see value in what we were doing, we would not be 
educating him; and yet, on his account, this amounts to one of the. only 
ways in which we can educate him. This looks to be utterly contra­
dictory.
What probably is implied by ideas of child-centredness in education 
is that if there is to be any education at all, it must proceed from 
where the individual learner is at that moment. This does not mean 
that we must consider where the child is, to be good morally or 
economically but good as a groundwork, as a means to any other possible 
good.
It is here that we can detect a direct connection with the kind of 
value to be given to any learner’s way of beginning to see anything in 
what is offered to be learned. In one important sense, in learning 
there is necessarily a grasping of something new, and here the learner is 
acting in one sense in an original way. He must do the learning himself. 
The source is in him. Therefore, there is a possibility that the 
emphasis which is being placed on originality is concerned with the 
various values which are important within education, and therefore, 
within general moral development.
These two reasons, then, are interconnected, at the very least.
The other related reason is connected with the interest in autonomy. To 
illustrate the point I wish to make, I would like to look at the interpre­
tation of the concept of autonomy as given by Professor Dearden, which 
has some credibility.
- 152 -
According to him, the notion of autonomy was first applied to the 
city in Greek times. He writes: "The city had autonomia when its
citizens were free to live according to their own laws, as opposed to 
being uder the rule of some conquering or imperial neighbour.""^
Actually, if autos and nomos are combined, it can be said that as 
applied to the Greek city state and to modern states, autonomy certainly 
looks as though it can be employed without any necessary reference to a 
universal moral law. This is a helpful way of looking at autonomy since 
some means of comprehending what people are doing are made available 
without those means being thought of as moral.
Professor Dearden is mindful of the rule-foil owing notion inherent
in autonomy but his emphasis tends to be on the ’self1 aspect of it.
In fact, in his article, he suggests that "a person is ’autonomous’ to
the degree that what he thinks and does cannot be explained without
2
reference to his own activity of mind". Actually, at the very beginning 
of his next paragraph this suggestion has become something of a definition. 
It is true that whenever autonomy is used, the indication is of a 
person's managing by himself, and to do this he must be minimally free.
In this sense, what he says of autonomy as regards the self looks sound 
enough* but of course, there must be some rule-following idea built into 
the concept.
The points which Professor Dearden raises later concerning autonomy, 
reason and truth indicate that he considers that an increase of self- 
knowledge is necessary to autonomy^ and the idea that he uses is that 
"the better we know our own motives, wishes, purposes, typical reactions
1. Dearden, H.F., 'Autonomy and Education' in Education and the 
Development of Reason, R.K.P., London 1972* p» 448
2. ibid., p. 453
3. ibid., p. 456
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to others”, then the more likely we are to control what we think and do.
This can refer to a point where he is concerned about the idea of
internalising rules which looks to be an idea made by Piaget when one
passes from a heteronomous to an autonomous stage. Such internalising,
thinks Professor Dearden, could be merely the obeying of authority present 
2in fantasy. This is a possibility but if it becomes clear that 
someone has merely internalised rules without subjecting them to scrutiny, 
such a person is not thought of as autonomous. He is thought of rather 
as a stick-in-the-mud or conservative of pig-headed or obstinate. It 
is likely that it does not become clear which appraisal is the most 
appropriate until the conditions under which people operate are manifest. 
Yet in so far as we are aware that new conditions or new circumstances 
make no difference and that in fact a person still abides by old, 
inappropriate sets of rules which remain unexarained, we do not think of 
him as autonomous.
It is for this reason that notions of truth, understanding of our 
own motives and other points about ourselves and our relations towards 
other people, are of significance in determining whether a person is 
autonomous or simply pig-headed. What such a person observes is a form 
of rule but it misses the point of the idea of a mile which is to govern. 
If, for example, a form of rule were adopted which would mean that the 
superficial nature of a rule were observed, it would ignore the purpose 
of a rule. Therefore, suppose we heard that many people were rule- 
following and we envied them, we could claim that we also had a rule 
which was to imbibe alcohol on every seventh day. Now, this has the 
form of a rule, but if it led to our physical downfall which we didn’t
1. Deard'en, H.F., op. cit., p. 456
2. ibid., p. 450
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want, on what grounds could we call it a rule? If it does not govern 
in accordance with some desired end we do not think of it as a rule.
It merely has the form of a rule.
This looks to he the unexpressed argument behind Professor Dearden1s 
view of whether to call autonomous a person who demonstrates against the 
South African Springboks' rugby tour to Britain. To determine this we
need to know what kind of rule he is following. It is at this point
that the utter rule-following nature of autonomy is given a place. Of 
course, then, a person is autonomous when "to the degree that what he 
thinks and does in important areas of his life cannot be explained without 
reference to his own activity of mind",1 but equally, along with this, 
the rule-foilowing is essential.
If both aspects are accepted, autonomy can be seen to be a workable 
concept in creativity, because, basically, there is a possibility of 
seeing some kind of order in what is offered as a creative product; 
without which order there is no understanding on anyone's part.
However, the stress of the concept of autonomy, especially as it
is offered by Professor Dearden, is the stress on self, as being the 
source. Here, then, there is some kind of praise given to a person 
merely because he does something on his own. There is certainly no 
indication within the concept as has been expounded by Professor Dearden, 
that what one offers is of a high level. There is no need for this at all.
The importance of these two views can now be seen in perspective. 
Child-centredness looks mainly to be a plea that if children are to 
learn in any kind of meaningful way, then teachers ought to start from
1. Dearden, R.F., op. cit., p. 453
where children are intellectually. Their values should count as 
starting-points. This, of course, implies that teachers should value 
pupils. Moreover, in so far as they are learners, they can be seen as
sourcess they must, if they are to be learners, act in an original way.
Again, with a concept of autonomy, there is similarly a stress upon 
individuals as sources, as working out things and coming to decisions 
on their own.
In each case there exists an idea of originality and an idea of
value. Yet, and this is where confusion has arisen, both ideas are
built into the concept of creativity.
If we look back upon the chief usage of creativity then we must
consider that while many people have offered original ideas, they have 
not been praised on account of those original ideas. Because of this, 
there must be a distinction between being in a sense original and praised, 
and being original and therefore praised.
Thus, if we are to teach, we do not merely say that we shall check 
whether where the learner is should be only sometimes valued as a starting- 
point. Nor, if we are judging autonomy in people, do we wonder whether 
only sometimes should we take account of an individual’s own activity of 
mind. In both cases, there must be some acknowledgement of originality 
and value.
It seems, then, that when we consider some of the ideas concerning 
children and their freshness, it looks as if we have lighted upon the 
notion of originality without investigating the particular value which 
we were placing on it. Again, v/hen we have spoken of autonomy, we may 
not have realised precisely how the value which we have placed on
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individuals as sources, should have been interpreted.
What is clear in the central usage of creativity is that certain 
people are singled out for praise because in some way we value their 
original contribution.
Originality and the enrichment of understanding
Some concept of originality, then, is necessary to the concept of 
creativity, and precisely what this is needs to be made explicit.
From what has been maintained, it cannot be accepted that merely 
because someone thinks of something original it is therefore creative, 
since such could be unhelpful or stupid; and no one has ever been thought 
of as creative whose ideas were unhelpful or stupid. Thus, as opposed 
to the sense in which ’original1 may be used in connection with ideas 
centred on learning or autonomy, within the concept of creativity, the 
actual originality is not merely accepted but is evaluated. If it 
does not attain a definite standard, it is not accepted. Here, then, the 
position is not one of saying ’original, therefore good’ but ’original 
and good'.
What now is slightly puzzling is in which sense must such originality 
be seen as good. Clearly, it cannot be necessarily moral, for it was 
agreed that there was a possibility of thinking of those who participated 
in the Great Train Robbery as creative. Nor can it necessarily be 
economic, since many people, especially poets, can be at once judged 
as creative and as essentially non-economic.
However, it is true that if we operate within a system of values 
which is subjective, then the kind of originality which will be praised
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will have to fit into a network of values in a hierarchical way.
Thus, if one's values were finally economic, then any evaluative idea 
would have to fit into the scheme. Actually, if this were completely 
the case, then what other value schemes (apart from a consideration of 
the creative), like religious or moral could mean, would present diffi­
culties which would be logically insuperable. Yet, in having a minimal 
grasp of the concept of creativity, the person employing it within his 
economic value scheme would at least allow that the kind of originality 
which was worthy of praise would be one which enriched understanding.
If this were not so, then there would be no way in which he could see 
that what was offered could contribute to his economic value scheme.
This applies whether our values are subjective or relative.
On the other hand, if we operate within a rational scheme, then 
the value placed upon originality must be either instrument ally good or 
intrinsically good. It cannot be intrinsically good, for some original 
activity is poor. If it is instrumental, what end does it serve?
All the various values, like the economic and the moral, could be listed 
to check whether one would be essential; but at least, before any could 
be, what must be accepted is that any originality must enrich under­
standing, since otherwise it could not contribute to any other value.
This renders originality, seen under the concept of creativity, necessary 
if conceived of as enrichment of understanding.
Nov/, while it is quite often expected that the end which people 
have in mind in assessing value is economic, it might be thought that 
some end like this is necessarily to be linked with that aspect of 
originality which enriches understanding. This, though, is a mistake.
Any value attributed to originality will have to be seen within the
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the system of values which is held. For example, if my supreme value 
were comfort, and a new idea suggested a way of increasing this, then 
it would he possible for me to value the idea. On the other hand, with 
the same supreme value in mind, if a new idea were suggested, say, for 
assisting under-nourished people which decreased my comfort, I could 
not value the idea.
Where I see a value in originality under a concept of creativity two 
points are necessary. First, it must accord with my scheme of values; 
secondly, I must see some idea in it, which means that my understanding 
is enriched.
Among people who have offered original ideas, we have singled out 
those who}: we consider, have acted so intelligently that they have enriched 
our understanding. Of course, I can imitate the awards of others, but 
if I am genuinely to claim that someone is creative, I must see some 
point in his original activity. If I see no point, then I cannot make 
a positively evaluative award.
At this juncture, further precision may be offered about whose 
understanding is enriched. Clearly, if observers are already familiar 
with the kind of solutions to problems which they evaluate as intelligent, 
then it may not be said that these observers have their own understanding 
enriched. Yet, there is an enrichment for those thought to act 
intelligently. If those evaluated as intelligent are also familiar with 
those moves, and merely again act in a normal way, then their normal way 
is one which is comparatively enriched. Their understanding is thought 
to be at a high level.
However, some intelligent performance is original. Here, an observer 
vri.ll acknowledge that his own understanding is enriched. What has been
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offered brings light. It is an identical evaluation which an 
individual makes of his own intelligent, original, non externalised 
activity.
It can therefore be seen that what is evaluated under a concept of 
creativity is an intelligent originality, one which enriches understanding.
Conclusion
It is certainly interesting that the concept of creativity has 
always been evaluative, but of course, this has sometimes entered the 
meaning behind linguistic usage so deeply that it has remained implicit, 
and has needed -to be brought out into the open. Perhaps because it was 
so embedded, that in trying to say something of it, some people have 
actually missed the evaluation. Another reason was concerned with the 
functioning of the verb 'to create', which, though founded upon an 
evaluation, has since moved away to become a descriptive verb. The 
tendency to try to pass directly from verb to adjective has involved 
people in overlooking the essential evaluation which belongs to 'creative'.
In the holding of values we may not always be rationally justified, 
and in concepts which, like creativity, embrace others, there are 
certain difficulties if the values are not made explicit. Even when 
values are characterised as subjective, relative and objective, there is 
still a difficulty if we consider the classification as giving complete 
information. A subjective value, for example, could include the values 
of others, and actually look like an objective value, and it is only when 
discrepancies in judgements arise that we begin to suspect not only how 
a value is held but what it includes or excludes.
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The concept of creativity has always included some idea of 
originality hut in which sense this has operated has not usually been 
made clear. The arguments which I have offered press unequivocally 
for an evaluation of originality which enriches understanding. In 
this sense, there exists an evaluation of a high level of intelligent 
performance.
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CHAPTER 6
The concept of Creativity - some final points
Introduction
There seem to he some ideas which come under the concept of 
creativity but instead of offering some elucidation of the concept, 
they have simply added confusion. One such idea is the linking of 
'creative1 to 'create' in such a way that any kind of creating or making 
becomes sufficient for viewing the making as creative activity. I have 
referred to several of these ideas during the preceding chapters.
However, now that the criteria of a concept of creativity have been 
established, it would be useful to explore some of these leading ideas 
which lie at the root of the various confusions which are met in an 
attempt to become clear about the concept.
Apart from the various errors centred on the evaluative aspect of 
the concept, quite frequently ideas have been opposed to one another as 
if they were dichotomous, and the consideration of these ideas has 
implications for the concept. One example here is the idea of being 
academic and its necessary and sufficient connection with a concept of 
thinking. In one instance, thinking has been associated with the 
academic, whereas other areas of activity, not normally thought to be 
academic, have been considered to be different in kind; in which case the idea 
of thinking has not been attributed to these activities. Of course, 
there are two implications of this view. One is that doing Mathematics 
or Latin is academic, and constitutes an activity of thinking and 
pursuing highly intelligent enterprises. The other implication is that 
non-academic pursuits, like painting or playing football, constitute
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acting non cognitively. These, then, appear as low-level pursuits.
There are several so-called dichotomies which are in need of 
investigation, and the first one I have selected is that between acting 
on implicit and explicit rules. This is of particular interest because 
one idea about evaluating people’s ability is to offer them tests which 
are verbal. What I have continued to press for is that intelligent 
performance can be evidenced in any field. To judge of that perfor­
mance, while it may be easy to ask questions of the performers, the very 
asking presupposes some competence in verbal language. Properly to 
judge, we need to be initiated to some degree in the activity, and we 
need to observe the performers. The implication is that people may be 
implicitly aware of ideas, and act intelligently, and even creatively.
Now, the utter opposing of the ideas of the implicit and the explicit 
may be pressed too far by some people, so much so that the explicit 
conjures up ideas of language and thinking, whereas the implicit conjures 
up ideas of knacks or drives or instincts, the vague and mysterious.
By exploring this and other so-called dichotomies, a concept of 
creativity will be even more intelligible. This is so because once 
seen in perspective, through their means we can become clearer about the 
kinds of interconnections which have a definite relationship with a 
concept of creativity.
Dichotomies seen in perspective
(i) Acting on implicit and explicit rules
In order to gather some kind of view of a particular subject it is 
very often helpful to offer a model which enables us to gain some kind 
of insight into a subject. For this reason, dichotomies have frequently
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been suggested whereby people or ideas are classified. For example, 
the idea of introversion and extraversion is quite useful for looking 
at people’s behaviour. Another example is Bernstein’s idea of 
elaborated and restricted codes. These models are helpful in so far as 
they relate back to one particular idea. So, at least, with intro­
version and extraversion we are considering behavioural characteristics, 
and with elaborated and restricted codes we are considering one point in 
common, namely the way people speak the language.
However, in using some dichotomies we may sometimes be guilty of 
not going back with sufficient analysis to see what is in common with 
both elements. If sufficient clarity of analysis is offered, what we 
shall find is that there are two possibilities of looking at the elements. 
They are either disparate or interconnected. In trying to explicate 
the concept of creativity, it has been found that dichotomies abound, 
and by being aware of this distinction, a way to clarity is pointed.
So, with the various dichotomies to be examined I shall be directing 
attention to deciding whether, for example, thinking and feeling are 
disparate or interconnected ideas.
First, I want to take up the idea of the dichotomy between acting 
on implicit and explicit rules.
What one may hope for here is that the dichotomy would begin to 
explain what lay behind both the implicit and explicit, namely acting or 
thinking, but in one leading example which I have taken from Professor 
Oakeshott’s work, this does not seem to be the case at all. Professor 
Oakeshott is probably right about the kinds of points which he makes 
concerning the picking up of habits of conduct, especially when he 
claims that we do not construct Ma way of living upon rules or precepts 
learned by heart, and subsequently practised, but by living with people
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who habitually behave in a certain manner”. This is probably true but 
what he has done here is link the notion of explicit rules with the 
giving of words. which, if understood, would be considered properly to be 
rules. Of course, then, it looks as if the explicit side of things is 
to be depreciated, and, in fact, this seems to be the area for Professor 
Oakeshott of thinking, whereas the other area of implicit miles seems to 
be the area of feeling. So, instead of going back to what both elements 
of the dichotomy have in common, namely thinking, we find that the implica­
tions of one are concerned with thinking, but the implications of the 
other are to do with what he calls the heart. In fact, in the example 
which he recounts concerning the wheelwright, he again emphasises the 
point about explicit principles. The wheelwright apparently maintains 
that in his job, the right kind of stroke which he has to employ cannot 
be exactly calculated in explicit terms: it "cannot get into the hand
unless it comes from the heart. It is not a thing that can be put into 
words /rules/; there is an art in it that I cannot explain to my son".
What is important to notice here is that although rules may only be 
implicit, it does not follow tha,t thinking is absent and thereby forcing 
us to consider that something else must exist, like feeling. The kind 
of stroke can indeed be felt but this perception will require a categori­
sing activity in order for it to be felt as different from another stroke. 
The wheelwright, of course, would claim to know that this was the right 
stroke, and while he might not be able to verbalise this, he would be 
able to offer some kind of evidence that he knew, by pointing to the 
wheel which he had produced, for example.
1. Oakeshott, M., Rationalism in Politics and other essays, Methuen ec 
Co., Ltd., London 1962, p. 62.
2. Oakeshott, M., ibid., pp. 9-10 (footnote)
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Making things explicit, especially in some linguistic form, is not 
necessary to showing that thinking is being pursued. The real diffi­
culty lies in imagining that feeling is quite divorced from thinking 
which, the argument goes, is evidenced by explicit rules. There is, of 
course, a claim that the sight or feel of things can cause physiological 
changes in us upon which we act, and this is credible. Yet, normally, 
if we are saying that such a sight or such a feeling is present, then it 
depends upon a consciousness. At a lower level, merely because our 
bodies are governed by ordinary mechanical laws, then if certain stimuli 
are brought to bear upon this system, we would expect the system to 
conform to ordinary mechanical lav/s. Yet, this is not really to claim 
that we are talking about the sight or feel of things changing us to 
such an extent that we act, because if we are truly acting, then such 
acting will minimally depend upon a. consciousness, and also upon a 
concept of thinking. There is, though, never a need to be conscious of 
our consciousness, for if we are immersed in an activity then to draw 
away from this in order to observe ourselves in the highly conscious state 
of being immersed in that activity, is necessarily not to be immersed in 
that activity. Being conscious of what we are doing, without at all 
being explicit, is to be a thinker at the very least.
Under this general idea of a distinction between implicit and explicit 
rules, have come the ideas of the theoretical and the practical, and 
these have been frequently opposed. We speak about the theory of music 
as being pursued in a different sort of setting from the practice of 
music. With the theory we do not expect to hear musical sounds, except 
of course by way of illustration. This kind of distinction also applies 
to the theory and practice of education. While this distinction is 
quite useful in identifying approaches, the tendency has been to see
each element in the distinction as different in almost every way. One 
extreme view is expressed in the idea that some things are all right in 
theory hut of no value in practice. Some analysis of the ideas of 
theory and practice has been offered in recent times, particularly by 
Professor O'Connor and Mr. Moore.^ However, although both give some 
accounts of theory, what they do not seem to do is to light upon this 
idea where some kind of dichotomy between theory and practice has existed, 
whereby they may be enabled to see that the functioning of dichotomies 
has often been misleading. So instead of going back to what both 
elements had in common and examining these points, what has happened is 
that both elements of the dichotomy are seen as disparate, and this has 
been most misleading.
In every usage of theory, whether we talk of theory of knowledge, 
theory of value, group theory, theory of number, 'I have a theory 
that . . .', what lies behind these usages is the meaning of 'a system 
of understanding’. On the face of it, when people engage in some publicly 
observable behaviour, it may not look as if this is covered by a system 
of understanding, because so often people have considered that such a 
system of understanding or theory has been entirely encompassed by words, 
and this has been seen to be divorced from any kind of observable 
activity.
However, it is a mere convenience that a theory or a system of 
understanding can be put into words. There is not even a need for this 
rendering in words to show that one has a theory or understands something. 
Some meaning will have to be given to the having of or working on implicit
1. Ref. O'Connor, D.J., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, 
R.K.P., London 1957> and Moore, T.W., Educational Theory* An Intro­
duction, R.K.P., London 1974*
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rules. A system of understanding could quite well cover a non- 
linguistic area where the very last things we would ever want would be 
words. Non-linguistic areas covering Music, Art, Movement are all 
essentially non-verbal areas, and in a very important sense these can 
never be reduced to the purely verbal.
Thus, if we are going to see any kind of value in practice, then 
the practice can not be devoid of a system of understanding. In this 
sense, theory is necessarily part of what practice means. This theory, 
however, is not one which is necessarily reducible to verbal language.
While language can be extremely helpful in directing our attention 
to various points which there are in activities, like Music, Art and 
Movement, the essential value of any of these activities is non-verbal. 
Nov/, if there really is value in any of these activities, the value will 
be finally available to us through our ability to pick up principles; 
and probably, in the first instance, v/e v/ould pick up these principles 
as we v/ould pick up the principles of language. This ability to pick 
up the principles of language certainly argues for thinking, and also 
argues for intelligent thinking, since connections will have to be seen 
between what is said and what is meant by what is said.
Altogether, the kinds of ideas v/hich have been current as a result 
of Piagetian studies, are that we start off by looking at the world in 
a very concrete way and only gradually move on to what have been called 
formal operations or abstract thinking. However, what my arguments 
point to is that there is a necessity to act intelligently, so that we 
are able to pick up principles of language which therefore v/ill require 
what is required in formal operations. All that the Piagetian studies 
seem to point to is that there is a movement towards formal operations,
but only as regards language acquisition. They have no kind of
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reference to acting implicitly, and this lack of reference has clouded 
the whole issue.
If, for example, formal grammar and its mastery indicate a level of 
acting abstractly, so much so that young children cannot be expected to 
see what constitutes a notion of plural or conjunction or adverbial 
clause, then what must be admitted is that children do in fact see what 
lies behind the notion of plural or conjunction or adverbial clause, 
but they see all these by the grasping of implicit rules or principles 
and not in a linguistic, explicit way.
The thrust of Piagetian studies has been directed at the method 
which has enabled children to grasp the principles of language in an 
explicit way, and not at the method by which children think. Thus, 
there has been a failure to see the operating of implicit understanding, 
which has emphasised that the elements of the dichotomy between the 
implicit and the explicit are disparate.
Mentioning these points is valuable because it highlights the 
tendency of writers to link too closely thinking and verbal language and 
therefore to regard certain forms of activity as low level. One clear 
implication here for the concept of creativity is that any area of 
activity is available, not simply the creative arts, since all areas of 
human activity are areas of thinking, and for the exercise of intelligent 
performance in which originality is a possibility.
(ii) Feeling and Thinking
The second dichotomy I wish to pursue concerns feeling and thinking. 
This is an example of a dichotomy where, on the whole, there has been an 
insufficiency of returning to what is common to those two elements in 
the dichotomy. The idea of feeling has been extremely vague over a long
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period, and if a genuine analysis of this element of the dichotomy had 
been thoroughly undertaken, as Anthony Kenny has done in more recent times, 
then the dichotomy would not have been seen to represent simply disparate 
elements. This is a point which is in need of elaboration.
The whole feeling area has sometimes been thought to be the specific
domain of creativity. On the face of it, this area is not seen as one
in which intelligent performance is at stake because already it seems
as though we have a dichotomy between thinking and feeling. There has
been a strong tendency for this area of feeling being thought of vaguely,
but at least there has been one point where some kind of explicit account
1
indicates the idea of feeling as being opposed to a cognitive appraisal.
The question then is to discover what this feeling is as opposed to a
knowing. The best that can be done here is to offer some account of
2the arguments of Anthony Kenny.
Feeling covers both emotions and sensations. Some sensations are 
localised, while others are of a general nature. Thus we can sensibly 
say that we feel sorry or angry or that we feel toothache or that we feel 
'under the weather1. Emotions, for example, those of anger or remorse, 
may be accompanied by sensations, but what is at stake is that in order 
to characterise any particular emotion, some appraisal of a situation 
is necessary. ‘Without that appraisal there is not the emotion.
It is true that emotions are passively experienced83 but they do not come 
about haphazardly. They are so experienced because of a particular way
1. Ref. Ghiselin, B. (ed.), The Creative Process, op.cit., where 
D.H. Lawrence says* MWe know so much, we feel so little", p. 69*
"The conscious delight is certainly stronger in paint ... perhaps 
the joy in words goes deeper ...." p.71.
2. Ref. Kenny, A., Action, Emotion and Will, R.K.P. 1963, London.
3. Williams, B.A.O., Morality and the Emotions, An inaugural lecture at 
Bedford College, Univ. of London, Castle Cary Press, Ltd., Somerset,
1965, p. 22.
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of appraising situations. Concerning emotions, then, outside of some 
concept of thinking there is no possibility of their existence. What 
sometimes happens is that we appraise a situation wrongly where, for 
example, we think that a certain situation is dangerous and we are 
afraid. Our cognitive perspective may be muddled but, at least, our 
emotion will depend upon it.
If we have a particular sensation, this may well be dependent 
upon our specific emotion which is then dependent upon our appraisal of 
a situation. In any kind of talk about paint, for example, the idea 
must be that we are somehow aware of the paint, since apparently, as 
painters we do something. It would, of course, be a different matter 
if, for example, the fumes of the paint somehovr anaesthetised us where 
we became entirely passive and our movements like reflexes. Yet, we are 
discussing an evaluative concept. Thus, the feeling which is under 
discussion is one which is dependent upon a: seeing, and so there is no 
sense in trying to claim that the feeling is divorced from the cognitive 
perspective.
If only the analysis of feeling had been pressed back to what was 
essential to it, these two elements of the dichotomy, namely feeling 
and thinking, would have been seen as not disparate but as inter­
connected.;.
Of course, instead of acting intentionally, we may simply be causal 
in bringing about something new, which indeed may be aesthetically 
pleasing. This may actually be confused when people look at what has 
been brought about, and this may lead them to think that they are 
appraising someone who is creative but they are in this instance, 
actually, mistaken. The following will exemplify the mistake. Suppose 
as a result of a particular sensation our body becomes transfixed in an
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unusual way and through a similar, subsequent convulsion an identical 
situation arises. Others may think that we are offering something 
original and valuable; but what we must do here is to distinguish 
between the understanding and the functioning of principles from the 
awards made which, though made on principle, may be empirically at fault. 
This kind of situation arises in the awarding of moral epithets. An 
individual's own good can be so tied up with others that it is extremely 
hard to detect whether or not he is acting morally. As another example, 
it is quite possible for someone to be causal in bringing about some 
kind of good towards another person, and it may be difficult to pick 
out whether the intention was present. If, then, we are to claim that 
he was good, we must allow that intention was present but that it was 
present is by no means easy to ascertain. Thus, we may have called 
someone creative only to find that the awarded person v/as drunk, and 
fell upon a piece of clay. By analogy, we may have offered an award 
of 'kind' to someone, only later to discover that his action was 
isolated, and attributable to a knock on the head which he had just 
received. The award in each case would, in principle, have to be 
withdrawn.
(iii) Thinking and Doing
In this dichotomy we are similarly placed as with the last one.
What again should have been done here was to have gone back to the 
basic points of the meaning of doing and thinking whereupon there 
v/ould have been seen an interconnection. However, there has been a 
great deal of emphasis on the distinction between doing and thinking, 
and the actual doing has been looked upon as covering an area of
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observable movement. For example, the creative arts have envisaged Art, 
Music, Drama and Movement. Of course, on the face of it, these are all 
areas of doing, but what must be maintained is that they are not 1 doing1
which excludes thinking. It may well be that it is considered that
other areas of arts, like formulating a critique of Hamlet or writing a 
dissertation on some historical topic or concocting an argument to show 
that Descartes had no valid grounds for claiming to be starting from 
scratch in establishing his first propositions, are all non-creative.
They are academic, it is true, and it is probably in this area that a 
distinction is being made. The creative is being opposed to the 
academic. One is thought to be the area of thinking, the other the 
area of doing.
Such a dichotomy, viewed in the sense of there being two disparate 
units or elements is utterly mistaken. There is a related point which 
also indicates a misconception and this is where the 'creative1 is 
thought to be merely the adjectival form of 'create*. This, then, 
has suggested a making or a doing which superficially can be evidenced 
in moving, in making sounds and in painting. Yet, what is of first 
importance is that basic to these doings or these activities is some 
clear command over the manifestations of their art forms. They are 
not, it is true, bounded by what is known as the academic, but what needs 
to be emphasised here is that the most simple skills are evidence of the
exercise of thinking, in becoming organised in terms of selecting and
carrying out the right kind of movement to fit the situation.
Clearly, those people who advocate the following of particular 
courses in such creative arts, would be considering the doing or the 
activity, in the strong sense, which, I have shown, is intentional.
Thus, to consider the concept of creativity as covering the making of
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things which can be observed, and merely observed, is to conceive of 
the concept extremely narrowly, and for this reason is mistaken.
Levels of intelligence
By making explicit the ideas lying behind these dichotomies, my 
earlier argument concerning the concepts of thinking and intelligence 
becomes even clearer, and more directed to the discovery of the groups 
of concepts which have a definite relationship with the concept of 
creativity. One leading point made very early on, was that any human 
activity could only be sensibly interpreted as a thinking activity, 
and it is certainly interesting that in the original ideas of Binet, 
fIf intelligence1 meant thinking. Of course, the way that 'intelligence1 
has been used in more recent times has been closely aligned to the work 
done on I.Q,., but alongside this has been the ordinary concept of 
intelligence whereby people were thought to be bright or quick. Thus,
I have taken over both these ideas in the explication of the concept 
of intelligence.
What was discovered under this concept was that the seeing of 
connections between categories was essential in any concept of intelli­
gence, whether popular or I.Q,. - oriented. Next, what was noticed 
very clearly was that there was a tying of a value scheme, not only to 
the various connections which were seen between categories but also to 
the ends which people had in mind. As a result of these arguments, it 
was found that it was still possible to act intelligently without seeing 
any particular, original connections. This was especially true when we 
looked at the ideas of the 'academic'. What was also true was that in 
one important sense of the academic, my arguing pressed for the idea of
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bringing about new connections unseen by others. The only way of 
dealing with these two ideas was to suggest that there must be levels of 
intelligence, because even though an individual in no way ever suggested 
an original idea, this did not prevent our calling him intelligent.
Of course, there was a comparative idea, and in comparison with others 
who might well have suggested original ideas, such an individual was to 
be considered less intelligent, but nonetheless intelligent.
Now, what it is important to do is to see whether in fact there are 
levels of intelligence. This looks as if it has validity, but arguments 
are needed to show that the grounds for claiming that the seeing of 
connections unseen by others is more praiseworthy, more intelligent, 
are well founded.
The arguments which can be offered are these. Because the concept 
is comparative, then the more difficult of connections will render the 
one who sees them more intelligent. Thus, the claim is that the original 
connections are the most difficult because, presumably, it is their 
difficulty which prevents others from seeing them. As a counter­
claim, it may be said that they may not be necessarily more difficult, 
but then in reply, we might ask for what other reason have they not 
previously been seen. Once again, the reply could be that a lack of 
motivation or opportunity could be responsible. Many other people, it 
might be said, if they had had a little more motivation would have seen 
the points which Einstein saw, and possibly before Einstein saw them. 
Again, because of a lack of opportunity brought about through insufficient 
training, people have not been able to see these particular connections 
which other, acceptedly creative people have seen. However, it’may well 
be asked whether, whenever we are awarding praising ideas, we are ever
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able to take into account all the psychological points concerning 
motivation. For example, we do not know all the reasons why people do 
not see ordinary connections. Some of these people may simply be slow, 
or they may have had a hard life and possibly have lacked opportunities, 
but whenever we say that someone is moral or intelligent or creative, we 
do not know about all the contributory causes of what people do. Clearly, 
in condemning people it would be important to search out as many of these 
as possible to check how intentional an act seemed to be. Just as with 
condemning, so too would it be important with praising. Yet, once 
checked, the praising is not for what would have been behaviour, and the 
condemning is not for what would not have been behaviour. The praise 
and the condemnation are for what is thought to be actual behaviour. So, 
in so far as the seeing of connections previously unseen by others looks 
to be difficult, the one who first sees them is bright, and to be praised.
The second argument relates to speed. In establishing the criteria 
of intelligent performance it was necessary to accept that the seeing 
of connections between categories was essential. Because the concept is 
comparative, if one sees connections between categories a little later 
that another person, then the comparison may be detrimental to the former 
person. This implies what I claimed earlier, in the chapter on 
Intelligence (Chapter 4) that where this was an important matter then 
speed should count. The overall idea may not require this in so far as 
each level of intelligent performance is representative of an increased 
understanding, but on the occasions when such a seeing of connections 
calls for speed, then speed will have to be accepted as necessary in this 
comparative way. Certainly, in highly competitive activities, like 
boxing, speed would be necessary.
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Therefore, it may well he important on occasions to see original 
connections, and thus speed would he necessary, and the seeing of 
connections extremely important and this would denote a higher level of 
intelligent performance.
There is a final form of argument which actually puts into perspec­
tive the kind of originality which the concept of creativity demands.
The argument is on these lines. First of all, if we can say that 
intelligent performance is praised and is therefore evaluative, on what 
grounds precisely do we praise intelligent performance? One could 
say, for example, that all that is happening is that relationships 
between categories are spotted and these are spotted at different levels 
and sometimes this spotting requires comparative speed. What more, 
then, is there to the argument? What good precisely is this intelli­
gent performance? Is it a means to some other end or is it an end-in- 
itself?
Not/, one idea is that in order to grasp some kind of conceptual 
scheme, then a form of categorising is necessary. This is necessary to 
understanding, Y/hich means that nothing can be understood, nothing 
comprehended unless some form of intelligent performance is offered.
Does this mean, then, that intelligent performance is merely a means to 
understanding and if so, what is the status of understanding? Is that 
an end-in-itself?
Questions like these reduce us finally to working through a concept 
of reason. If v/e do not understand about things, there is no reason 
for us to do one thing rather than another. If, then, it is asked why 
we should concern ourselves with this, on which grounds should we be
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bothered, the very form of questioning commits us to the idea of reason- 
giving, for we cannot ask these questions unless we are so committed. 
Therefore, there is a definite connection between our form of investi­
gating, enquiring, asking questions, asking for reasons - and the whole 
concept of reason. So, if we are committed to reason-giving, then 
understanding becomes essential to the pursuit of reason. If we are 
attempting to hold that the concept of intelligence is evaluative it is 
because through the working of intelligent performance, we are able to 
see connections, which therefore enriches understanding which then points 
to the idea of reason; and thus the concepts of intelligence, under­
standing and reason are interwoven.
If now we try to see the specific value of originality within the 
concept of intelligence, there will be several points worth observing.
There look to be three leading ideas for the functioning of the 
concept of originality, and these ares first, where originality 
concerns doing something new in the world; secondly, where it concerns 
doing something new in the group; and thirdly where it means doing 
something new by the individual. Over and above these three leading
ideas there is also the notion of the bizarre where, in bringing about 
something new, there are no particular standards at all; and here, 
almost anything ever thought about, however poor, however inept, could 
again be called original.
To see which sense of originality is necessary to the concept of 
creativity, we must search out that way of being original which in 
some measure advances understanding, and this is imperative.
It may be maintained that the truly creative bring forward ideas 
which are completely new in the world, and do not simply use ideas already
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in existence. Now this is very difficult to sustain because there may 
be ideas which a,re used in one particular form or field, or domain of 
knowledge which has had some kind of existence in other forms or domains 
earlier, but in bringing about an understanding of an idea in a new form, 
this will be in its new form original in the world, but then the idea was 
already in existence. For most people, it would be a tremendous feat 
ever to discover which ideas were, in fact, completely new in the world.
Even in an example like the discovery or invention of the wheel, could this 
have been the result, at least partly, of the concerted effort of 
thousands of people over a long period? It is very likely that very
?r;
ordinary people saw the effects of circular objects rolling, but perhaps 
very few connected this with the wheel.
Again, with the invention of cocaine, a similar situation may have 
arisen. In one sense, the effects of tasting or sucking certain plants 
were known by ordinary people long before the invention. However, bringing 
this idea over to the area of dentistry would have been extremely helpful, 
and nobody had precisely seen this before, but the embryonic form of the 
idea was already in existence; and it may be shown factually that this 
is true of any invention. If this is true, then for what reason should 
we say that the truly creative must see some kind of connection which 
has never been in the world before?
As I have suggested before, an idea offered in one form may have 
previously been in existence. However, if activity is praised as 
original in the world, it need only be so original in the form in 
which it is presented. Here, clearly, understanding is enriched.
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Criteria of creativity
The idea of intelligent original performance can now he seen as 
the enriching of understanding, and this enriching is part of the 
whole idea of acting rationally, to which we must be committed even 
in bringing it into question.
Now, the concept of creativity necessarily includes that of 
originality, but while it has been admitted that originality in some 
areas of human endeavour has been accepted as possibly an end-in-itself, 
not all ways of being original have been included under a concept of 
creativity. What has been argued is that only when originality 
enriches understanding is it possible to think of it as creative.
Such originality will presuppose the seeing of connections between 
categories, and such original connections may be completely new in the 
world but this cannot be utterly necessary. On the other hand, such 
original connections may be new in the form in which the activity is 
manifested, whether the idea of it has had existence or not; and this, 
at least, is necessary.
We may find that what has been evaluated of a person’s activity 
as creative may help the economy, advance political sway, contribute to 
religious or social welfare, but none of these helps is necessary.
All that is necessary is that the activity of a person is evaluated 
as original in the sense that it must enrich understanding, and for 
this to be possible, intelligent performance of a high level is 
presupposed.
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Conclusion
Very often certain ideas have been opposed to each other. Examples 
are theory and practice and thinking and feeling. This kind of opposition 
inclines people to consider them as dichotomies where there appears to be 
an utter split between them; and yet, when they are examined, the ideas 
on each side of the dichotomy have been shorn to be related. One important 
implication of seeing the interconnections between the elements of these 
so-called dichotomies is to see the concept of creativity as wider than a 
’pure doing1 which gives an impression of non-academic, practical, and being 
evocative of feeling.
Another clear point which was established was that merely because a 
high level of linguistic ability was not evidenced, this did not preclude 
the idea of a high level of thinking being pursued. Again, if there was 
to be genuine practice, an implicit theory was presupposed.
In looking at levels of intelligence a clearer way of seeing the 
relationships between groups of concepts became evident. Being original 
and being intelligent, understanding and reason are all, in some measure, 
related when we come to look at the implications of a concept of creativity.
However, there is always a possibility that people can act intelligently 
without necessarily being creative. This is so because one can see connec­
tions between categories, and do so speedily, without being original. Yet, 
to act intelligently at the highest level is to be disposed to suggest 
original ideas.
This idea of suggesting original ideas is necessary to the concept of 
creativity but the whole point of seeing the concept as including an 
intelligent way of operating is to insist that it is not anything original 
which counts but only that form of originality which enriches understanding. 
It is this that calls for the highest level of intelligent performance.
Here, then, we have a concept of creativity in brief, explicit terms.
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